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The analysis of operational risk events in banks is complicated as the financial institutions
themselves, as well as the external environment in which financial institutions operate, are
complex adaptive systems. As a complex adaptive system, it is not possible to analyse
the outcomes of the system from a reductionist perspective as it is the interaction of the
agents in the system that drive the system outcome. Most analysis of operational risk in
banks has involved statistical analysis of the frequency and severity of historical events,
but this analysis does not identify the drivers of the events that is necessary to assist
management in managing the future events to an acceptable level. This study aims at
providing insights into operational risk management from a complex adaptive systems
view. An empirical study with AU, US and EU data will use cladistics analysis, networks
analysis and complexity theory for the validation of the methodology. The result of the
empirical study shows relatively stable important drivers of operational risk events. The
findings present the feasibility of applying the theories from other fields, i.e. cladistics
analysis and physics theory into analysing operational risk. Further, it reveals the man-
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Basel II defines operational (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006) risk as
the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems
or from external events and clearly indicates that operational risk is now considered as
including both internal errors and external influences.
Operational risk has been identified as a major risk faced by banks since the 1990s. Fi-
nancial institutions faced more than 100 operational risk events that caused over USD 100
million losses from 1993 to 2003 (Fontnouvelle et al. 2003). The total amount of opera-
tional risk losses grew rapidly to 107 billion euros (approximately USD 140.8 billion) by
2012 (Jongh et al. 2013), and just the top 5 operational risk losses each month in 2016
accumulated to USD 34 billion (ORX databasea). Operational risk now counts for 30%
of the risk challenges faced by banks Lin et al. (2013) and has grown from a residual
risk to an independent risk category in the Basel Accord. Operational risk had attracted
even more attention after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) when the interrelationship of
global financial institutions became clearer.
The analysis of operational risk events in financial institutions is complicated as the fi-
nancial institutions themselves, as well as the external environment in which financial
institutions operate, are complex adaptive systems (CAS). In a CAS, the features such as
dispersed interaction and continual adaptation mean that a reductionist analysis of indi-
vidual operational risk events will not yield information as to the likely future events as
they are dependent on both internal and external interactions. Since operational risk is
an output of a CAS, which is not a stable environment, it is essential for regulators and
financial institutions to understand operational risk from a system perspective. It is a ma-
jor tenet of this thesis that the characteristics of operational risk, as an output of a CAS,
can be better understood through investigating the emergence of operational risk in the
aSee https://managingrisktogether.orx.org/orx-news/top-5 for individual reports.
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system.
1.1 Objectives of the study
The global financial crisis(GFC) revealed that one of the root causes of failures of banks
was their inadequate and ineffective risk management (Bank of England Prudential Reg-
ulation Authority 2015). The objective of this thesis is to provide a method to understand
the characteristics of operational risk events as well as to understand the emergence of
operational risk events for more effective risk management. In particular, this study is not
concerned with quantifying expected losses.
This thesis is the first reported comprehensive study that combines operational risk anal-
ysis with the concept of CAS and evolutionary analysis techniques. Subsequently, three
topics need to be discussed to reach the research objective:
1. The identification of the bank environment as a CAS;
2. The determination of an appropriate method to analyse the output of the system;
3. Validation of the methodology suggested through analysis of operational risk events.
1.2 Research Method
The research will involve:
1. A review of the operational risk management research;
2. A review and interpretation of systems theory to establish that financial markets are
CAS;
3. Validation of the methodology through an in-depth study based on the data generated
from ORIC database.
This study is a qualitative and inductive study.
1.3 Organisation of the study
In achieving the research objective, this study is organised as follows:
1. Chapter 2 will review the nature of operational risk in banks;
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2. Chapter 3 will review the characteristics of CAS and the implications for analysis of
operational risk events;
3. Chapter 4 will review the relevance of the cladistics process to operational risk analy-
sis;
4. Chapter 5 will state the methodology used in the analysis of operational risk events,
and discuss the result for AU, US and EU banks for operational risk events from 2008 to
2014;
5. Chapter 6 will discuss the results of the power law test for operational risk and establish
a conceptual model to explain it;
6. Chapter 7 will focus on a comprehensive study to investigate the feasibility of extreme
operational risk pooling;
7. Chapter 8 will draw the conclusion and limitations of the current study and discuss the
future study.
Chapter 2
Operational Risk and Operational Risk
Management
2.1 Introduction
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank of International Settlement
has been working on Basel Accords for decades, and three versions of the Basel Accord
have been published, namely Basel I, Basel II and Basel III. In the research period, the
main effective Basel Accord is Basel II. Basel II provides a guideline for banks better
risk management and provides a framework for identifying and managing operational
risk. Hence this chapter will discuss operational risk and operational risk management in
conjunction with Basel II.
This chapter is structured into seven main sections. The remaining sections include:
1. Section 2.2 provides a general introduction to operational risk, then discusses the juris-
diction and definition of operational risk, categorisation and its distinctive features;
2. Section 2.3 discusses the definition of operational risk;
3. Section 2.4 provides a categorisation of operational risk;
4. Section 2.5 discusses the distinctive features of operational risk;
5. Section 2.6 reviews the operational risk management process;
6. Section 2.7 provides the conclusions and discussions from the literature;
Figure 2.1 provides a visual outline of this chapter.
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Figure 2.1: Structure of chapter 2.
2.2 Classification of Risks and Jurisdiction of Operational
Risk
Definitions and classifications provide both agreed meanings and potential jurisdictions
(Abbott 1988). Hence this chapter will start with the definition and jurisdiction of opera-
tional risk.
In general, risk is uncertainty in the expected returns of a bank or its earnings (Scott 2005,
Resti & Sironi 2007). Kaplan & Garrick (1981) describe risk as the sum of uncertainty
and damage. This distinction between risk and uncertainty emphasises the downside of
risk, which is the main focus of this study. Risk can be divided into two main sources,
financial risks and non-financial risks (Scott 2005). Financial risks are risks from the role
of financial institutions in the financial market, and financial institutions generate profit
from them, such as credit risk and market risk. Non-financial risks arise from causes other
than financial reasons, e.g. compliance failures and technology failures. Non-financial
risks are downside risks. As discussed by Kaplan & Garrick (1981), non-financial risks
bring only damages. Operational risk is such a non-financial risk with only downside.
Figure 2.2 shows the structure of risks in financial institutions.
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Figure 2.2: Jurisdictions of risks for Financial Institutions.
2.3 Definition of Operational Risk
Before implementing operational risk management, operational risk should be defined,
something easier said than done (Allen & Bali 2007). Likewise, Crouhy et al. (2000)
consider operational risk as a fuzzy concept due to the difficulties in distinguishing op-
erational risk and the normal uncertainties, such as market risk and credit risk, faced by
financial institutions in their daily operations. Definitions for operational risk range from
narrow to broad classifications.
Early practitioners and academics often consider operational risk as a residual category
which is difficult to quantify and manage in traditional ways. Commonwealth Bank of
Australia (1999) treat operational risk as a residual, being all risks other than credit and
market risk, which could cause volatility of revenues, expenses and the value of the Bank’s
business. Similarly, Crouhy et al. (2000) describe operational risk as a range of possible
failures in the operation of the firm that are not related directly to market or credit risk.
Malz (2011) recognise operational risk as breakdowns in policies and controls that ensure
the proper functioning of people, systems, and facilities, and he adds, it is everything
else that can go wrong. Early literature definitions of operational risk as a residual risk
made it difficult to provide an appropriate scope or establish an adequate measurement of
operational risk.
In last decade, increasing practitioners and academics tried to define operational risk pos-
itively. King (2001) suggests operational risk is a measure of the link between a firms
business activities and the variation in its business result. Similarly, Tripe (2000) de-
fines operational risk as the risk of operational loss. Although these definitions do not
describe the specific area involved, they reveal that operational risk is embedded in the
daily businesses of financial institutions. Pyle (1999) introduces detail into the definition
of operational risk, as being a result of costs incurred through mistakes made in carrying
out transactions such as settlement failures, failures to meet regulatory requirements, and
untimely collections. While this definition covers the internal sources of operational risk,
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it ignores the external sources of operational risk. Hain (2009) details the definition as
mistakes, incompetence, criminal acts, qualitative and quantitative unavailability of em-
ployees, failure of technical systems, and dangers resulting from external factors such as
external fraud, violence, physical threats or natural disasters as well as legal risk.
For regulatory purposes, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) defines
operational risk as the risk resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people
and systems or from external events. Strategic and reputational risk is not included in
this definition. Hadjiemmanuil (2003) argues the Basel definition is open-ended for its
failure in specifying the component factors of operational risk or its relation to other risks.
On the contrary, Thirlwell (2002) points out the Basel definition is a trade-off between
comprehensiveness and pragmatism, and this definition aims at providing a framework to
quantify operational risk. In this study, the definition of operational risk follows Basel
II, as it provides an appropriate boundary and extensive scope for research: operational
risk is the losses caused by inappropriate internal processes, staffs and systems or external
events.
2.4 Categorisation of Operational Risk
There are several ways to classify operational risk.Moosa (2007) explains three criteria
for the classification of operational risk: causes of operational events, resulting in loss
events and accounting forms of losses. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2006) has identified seven types of operational risk, which reflects some common causes
of operational risk:
1. Internal fraud: acts of a type intended to defraud, misappropriate property or circum-
vent regulations, the law or company policy, excluding diversity/ discrimination events,
which involves at least one internal party;
2. External fraud: acts of a type intended to defraud, misappropriate property or circum-
vent the law, by a third party;
3. Employment practices and Workplace safety: acts inconsistent with employment,
health or safety laws or agreements, from payment of personal injury claims, or from
diversity/ discrimination events;
4. Clients, products and business practices: unintentional or negligent failure to meet
a professional obligation to specific clients (including fiduciary and suitability require-
ments), or from the nature or design of a product;
5. Damage to physical assets: loss or damage to physical assets from natural disaster or
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other events;
6. Business disruption and system failures: disruption of business or system failures;
7. Execution, delivery and process management: failed transaction processing or process
management, from relations with trade counterparties and vendors.
Such a categorisation will be used as a comparative tool together with another character-
istics set derived from the dataset. Operational risk has three dimensions (Moosa 2007),
causes, events and the consequences. The derived characteristic set describes these three
dimensions, while Basel categorisation provides an event based classification for easier
management in determining capital to be held. This comparative study will present the
necessity of using the derived characteristic set for effective risk management.
2.5 Distinctive features of Operational Risk
Compared to market risk and credit risk, one of the most important factors is that banks
do not optionally take on operational risk as it is an inherent part of banking. Banks can
avoid a specific type of market or credit risk by closing related trading positions, while for
operational risk, it cannot be avoided unless all the transactions are closed down. Breden
(2008) comments that it is a common misconception that the operational risk manager
exists to prevent operational risk, but this is not the case. Operational risk is present in
everything we do and can only be avoided if the organisation closes its doors and ceases
trading. Just as any bank that wishes to make profits from lending must accept a degree of
credit loss, so an institution must accept that operational losses will always occur. Unlike
market risk and credit risk, operational risk is a downside risk only (Herring 2002), and
Buchmller et al. (2006) argue that the creation of profit is not a consequence of taking
on operational risk by financial institutions. Lewis & Lantsman (2005) consider opera-
tional risk as one-sided because there is a one-sided probability of loss or no loss. Koker
(2006) identifies two peculiarities of operational risk that are different from credit risk
and market risk in that operational risk is not closely related to any financial indicator and
the distribution of operational risk losses is more fat-tailed than credit risk. Operational
risk events are more likely to cause large unexpected losses (Allen & Bali 2007). The
peculiarities of operational risk compared to market risk and credit risk (Resti & Sironi
2007) are shown in Table 2.1.
A feature that distinguishes operational and credit/market risk is, as Lewis & Lantsman
(2005) argue, that operational risk tends to be uncorrelated with general market forces.
This is not the case for market risk and credit risk. Similarly, Rao & Dev (2006) argue,
operational risk depends more on the culture of the business units. Lewis & Lantsman
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Table 2.1: Peculiarities of operational risk
Market risk and Credit risk Operational risk
Consciously and willingly taken on Unaviodable
Speculative risks, implying losses or profits Pure risks, implying losses only
Easy to identify and understand Difficult to identify and understand
Comparatively easy to measure and quantify Difficult to measure and quantify
Large availability of hedging instruments Lack of effective hedging instruments
Comparatively easy to price and transfer Difficult to price and transfer
(2005) argue that credit risk and market risk are related to the state of the economy, for
the whole market will suffer the consequence of recession while the losses of operational
risk are less likely to be affected by market forces. However, Evans et al. (2008) find a
cyclical effect for operational risks that appeared to follow business cycles, and Folpmers
(2016) finds a high correlation between operational risk and credit risk in cross-sectional
data. Moosa (2007) explains the cyclical effect as in recession, financial markets suffer
more legal actions due to employee termination and counterparty bankruptcies. Allen &
Bali (2007) propose that operational risk correlates with systematic risk factors such as
macroeconomic fluctuations and use equity returns to present the procyclicality of oper-
ational risk. They conclude macroeconomic, systematic and environmental factors are
considerable indicators for risks of financial institutions.
Essentially then, operational risk is an unavoidable risk to banks as long as they operate
and bearing operational risk does not directly bring revenue to banks. On the other hand,
operational risk tends to be uncorrelated with market forces but does appear to have a
cyclical effect.
2.6 Operational Risk Management Process
Kingsley et al. (1998) suggests that operational risk management has seven objectives:
1. avoiding catastrophic losses;
2. generating insight of operational risk and
3. anticipating operational risk better;
4. providing objective performance measurement;
5. reducing operational risk by changing behaviour;
6. providing objective information so that services offered by the firm consider opera-
tional risk;
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7. ensuring that adequate due diligence is shown when carrying out mergers and acquisi-
tions.
There are four possible solutions for operational risk management (Hillson 2002, Oldfield
& Santomero 1997):
1. Accepting the risk. As a downside risk, operational risk is always managed under a
cost-benefit analysis. If the potential cost of taking a risk is lower than the cost of miti-
gating such risk, then the best solution would be accepting and continuously monitoring
such risk;
2. Avoiding the risk. For risks with high severity and probability, the best strategy is to
avoid such activity;
3. Transferring the risk. For risks with high severity but low probability, management will
transfer a part or all the risk to a third party by insurance, hedging and outsourcing;
4. Mitigating the risk. For risks with low severity but high probability, the strategy of
management is reducing the potential losses.
In the 1990s, banks did not consider independent operational risk processes or models but
employ standard risk avoidance techniques to mitigate them (Santomero 1997). However,
distinctive features of operational risk may lead to differences in steps for operational
risk management compared to market risk and credit risk management (Kaiser & Khne
2006, Janakiraman 2008). An important difference is that implementing operational risk
management in different lines of defence and organisational levels is much more difficult
than for market risk and credit risk management. Hence, the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (2003) suggests ten principles of sound operational risk management and
emphasises operational risk should be managed as a distinct risk category with period-
ically reviews of the banks operational risk management framework. The management
process is identification, assessment, monitoring/reporting and control/mitigation (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision 2003, Scandizzo 2005).
2.6.1 Identification and Assessment
Losses from operational risk events can be classified as expected loss, unexpected loss
and tail (extreme) loss (Alexander 2000) as shown in Figure 2.3. As the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (2011b) points out, Senior management should ensure the identi-
fication and assessment of the operational risk inherent in all material products, activities,
processes and systems to make sure the inherent risks and incentives are well understood.
In line with Basel II, Scandizzo (2005) provides a systematic method for operational risk
management, i.e. identification, assessment, monitoring/reporting and control/mitigation.







Figure 2.3: Loss distribution
He argues that operational risks are created by risk drivers, and a method that merges
quantitative and qualitative information can be helpful for preventive control measures
for operational risk management. However, research carried out by Pakhchanyan (2016),
indicates only 9% of current literature discussed risk indicators. A better understanding of
risk indicators should be done as Basel requires banks to implement risk indicators in in-
ternal measurement frameworks to capture operational risk drivers (Pakhchanyan 2016).
Appendix A provides a list of risk identification and assessment tools.
2.6.2 Mitigation
Risk mitigation is an action that changes the risk exposure by changing its impact and
probability, which in turn limits the consequences of risk (Singh & Finke 2010). Op-
erational risk can be mitigated by internal control processes, and banks should have a
strong control environment that utilises policies, processes and systems, appropriate in-
ternal controls and appropriate risk mitigation and/or transfer strategies (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision 2011b).
2.6.3 Reporting
Senior management should implement a process to monitor operational risk profiles reg-
ularly and material exposures to losses. Appropriate reporting mechanisms should be
in place at the board, senior management, and business line levels that support proactive
CHAPTER 2. OPERATIONAL RISK AND OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT12
management of operational risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011b).
2.7 Discussion
This chapter discusses operational risk, its features and operational risk management.
For this research project, the definition and categorisation from the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2006) are adopted as the data in the empirical study of this research
project is located in the effective time of Basel II.
There are two main areas of interest for operational risk management in financial institu-
tions, regulatory capital modelling and management of operational risk institutional wide.
Whilst majority of the literature focuses on improving the accuracy of capital modelling,
it is important to mention that operational risk is hard to model. As state by Moosa &
Silvapulle (2012),
“What these results show is the difficulty of modelling operational losses
in terms of financial indicators . The evidence for the effect of macroeco-
nomic factors is also weak, as the available evidence indicates. Operational
loss events are so random that they have no systematic relations to financial
indicators or macroeconomic factors. More important perhaps are the qual-
ity of internal controls, the operational riskiness of the business, the type of
business and management competence.”
Major concerns include the quality of data, use of internal and external data, handling
the dependence problem and aggregating expert opinions (Aue & Kalkbrener (2006), oko
(2013) and Shevchenko (2010)). In particular it should be noted that operational risk
loss distributions are heavy tail as a result of extreme losses, but these usually happen
only once and are without historical precedent so modelling operational risks is difficult.
(Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2006), oko (2013)). Further, as the situation becomes more
sophisticated, the models become less reliable (Danelsson 2008).
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011a) saw the problems and made sig-
nificant enhancements in Basel III to capital requirements. Basel III increases the capital
requirement by changing the capital definition, increasing the capital requirement and in-
troducing liquidity management. These requirements will impact profitability of banks
and lead to fundamental transformation of the business models (PwC Financial Services
Institute 2010). In a consultative document, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (2014a) pointed out that “Despite an increase in the number and severity of opera-
tional risk events during and after the financial crisis, capital requirements for operational
risk have remained stable or even decreased for the standardised approaches, calling into
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question their effectiveness and calibration”. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (2016) proposed a Standardised Measurement Approach for operational risk (SMA)
for comments, which introduces a new approach to quantify operational risk capital to
replace previous approaches, BIA, SA and AMA a). Whilst the Japanese Bankers Asso-
ciation (2016) concludes the implementation of SMA will not cause significant increase
in the capital requirement , the European Banking Federation (2016) points out that SMA
will result in higher capital for nearly all banks, including banks with good profit margins
and low loss records, with a mean capital increase of 61%. Mignola et al. (2016) point
out the SMA capital would be vary across banks compared with AMA capital and tests by
Peters et al. (2016) also suppored this view. Therefore, the European Banking Federation
(2016) recommends a recalibration of SMA as it is not capital neutral and is not aligned
with the aim of not increasing capital significantly.
Moreover, problems of risk sensitivity also haunt SMA. Although the Japanese Bankers
Association (2016) and theEuropean Banking Federation (2016) conclude that whilst re-
visions towards risk sensitivity is needed, and it is a great improvement compared with
the previous document (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014a), the simulation
test under a series of hypothetical but realistic conditions implemented by Mignola et al.
(2016) indicates the SMA is not a highly risk-sensitive measure. SMA does not respond
to the changes in risk profile of a bank, and the SMA capital appeared to be more vari-
able across banks (Mignola et al. 2016). Peters et al. (2016) argue that the difficulty of
incorporating key sources of operational risk data into the SMA framework also makes
SMA less risk sensitive. As well SMA fails to establish links between capital require-
ments and management (Mignola et al. 2016). Further, the regulatory capital under SMA
considers only information about the past and therefore is loss sensitive rather than risk
sensitive (German Banking Industry Committee 2016). As a result, risk management to
reduce operational risk is not directly taken into account. Similarly, the European Bank-
ing Federation (2016) noted the absence of management actions in SMA, which is capital
focused. It should be noted that the purpose of the Basel Accord is to encourage strong
risk measurement as well as management and the European Banking Federation (2016)
emphasises the importance of an active management framework.
As a very much capital focused approach, the proposed SMA may affect the sound opera-
tional risk management and make Pillar 2 ineffective as Pillar 1 is considered as a floor of
Pillar 2 estimates (Mignola et al. 2016). The proposed SMA assumes each loss will have
a direct impact on the banks capital requirement without considering mitigation actions,
which gives no incentives to control risk (Associazione Bancaria Italiana 2016). It is sug-
gested management will discard internal models under this framework, which challenges
aSee Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) for the details of Basic Indicator Ap-
proach,Standardised Approach and Advanced Measurement Approaches
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the maintenance of sound risk management (Associazione Bancaria Italiana 2016). The
European Banking Federation (2016) expresses its concern on the capital focused nature
of SMA and emphasises the Basel Accord should “encourage strong risk measurement
and management”, including Pillar 2 interaction. Financial institutions should be 11in-
vesting in risk management practices and have it recognised under Pillar 2” (European
Banking Federation 2016).
Whereas the quantitative models, both Basel II models and recently proposed SMA, seem
to have trouble, and Danelsson (2008) argues statistical models become less reliable when
the situation is more sophisticated, it is worthwhile considering alternative methodolo-
gies for understanding operational risk losses. Scandizzo (2005) introduce a systematic
method for operational risk management and argues that operational risks are created by
risk drivers. Some (Cummins et al. 2006) simply categorise the causes as internal and
external sources, and Kuritzkes (2002) argues the amount of capital will not be reliable
as the external events cannot be controlled effectively. Hence, a proper identification of
drivers for operational risk will help operational risk management in both improving the
accuracy of quantitative models and delivering better knowledge to management. The
later chapters of this thesis will introduce a method from biology to identify the key
drivers.
An overview of operational risk management principles and the process is presented in
this chapter. From the literature, it becomes apparent that operational risk management in
the banking system is not yet mature as there are weakness in the whole management pro-
cess. Considerable attention is needed. A major cause of such weaknesses is the nature of
banking industry as a CAS. In the next chapter, the concept of the CAS will be introduced
to provide insight into operational risk as well as operational risk management.
Chapter 3
Complexity in Financial Markets
3.1 Introduction
Sornette et al. (1996) investigated the S&P 500 crash in October 1987 and concluded that
no single source was identified as a key factor in this crash. Such a conclusion reflects a
complex system, i.e. the crash is a result of the cooperative phenomenon by the partici-
pants around the world, and such cooperative behaviours in the system cannot be reduced
to a simple decomposition to understand the drivers of the event. Complexity theory is
relatively new in social science. Waldrop (1992) defines complexity as the emerging sci-
ence at the edge of order and chaos. Therefore, it is necessary to have a holistic view of
the concept of complexity, and as a result, In complex adaptive systems it is not useful
to look for directly, and predictably linked, causes and effects; instead, what one has to
look for are emergent properties, attractors, and fitness landscapes (Walters & Williams
2003).
The main objectives of this chapter are
1. To establish that the financial industry, where operational risks emerge, is a CAS and
to discuss the properties of CAS.
2. To discuss the concepts of CAS related to this study.
This chapter is structured into six sections. The remaining content of this chapter is
structured as follows.
1. Section 3.2 reviews the literature to establish the principal features of CAS, and provide
a foundation for the discussion of the effect of the environment in which operational risk
events occur.
2. Section 3.3 examines several widely discussed properties of CAS.
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Figure 3.1: Loss distribution
3. Section 3.4 provides a general introduction to networks.
4. Section 3.5 concentrates on operational risk management environment as a CAS.
5. Section 3.6 summarises this chapter.
Figure 3.1 provides a visual structure of the chapter outline.
3.2 Complex Adaptive Systems
CAS occur in natural systems like ecosystems (Levin 1998) as well as artificial systems
such as the stock market (Mauboussin 2002, Sornette 2003a) and the economy (Arthur
et al. 1997). Complexity theory has been widely applied in both the natural science
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area and the social science area in recent years to better understand likely system out-
comes.Levin (1998) argues ecosystems are prototypical examples of CAS and points out
the essential aspect of such a system, i.e. nonlinearity, leading to historical dependency
and multiple possible outcomes.
It is easy to find books and papers that discuss economics, languages (Ellis & Larsen-
Freeman 2010), cities (Batty 2007, Bettencourt & West 2010), ecosystems or World Wide
Web (e.g. Barabsi et al. 2000, Park & Williger 2005), as CAS. However, it is harder
to define CAS formally. There is always the fear that rigorous definitions of CAS will
limit the application of the concept (Levin 1998). The Supreme Court Justice Stewart in
(United States Supreme Court 1963) writes
“I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I under-
stand to be embraced within that shorthand description, and perhaps I could
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it.”
Numerous literature discuss the definition and common characteristics of a CAS (e.g.
Holland 1995, Arthur et al. 1997, Cilliers 1998, Mitleton-Kelly 2003b, Mitchell 2009,
Holland 2014) but there is not a commonly accepted definition. Mitchell (2006) developed
a simple definition of a CAS as being a large network of relatively simple components
with no central control, in which emergent complex behaviour is exhibited. This simple
definition, although not rigorous, encompasses three important features of a CAS, i.e. a
large number of components, no central control and emergent behaviour. The behaviour
of the components may be able to be simply described when the number of components in
the CAS is small, however, when the components become numerous enough, conventional
means will become impractical (Cilliers 1998). Moreover, conventional methods will be
unable to help understand the system. Vemuri (1978) argues:
“The number of attributes necessary to describe or characterise a system
are too many. Not all these attributes are necessarily observable. Very often
these problems defy definition as to objective, philosophy, and scope. Stated
differently, the structure or configuration of the system is rarely self-evident.
In large systems involving, say, people, plants, computers, and communica-
tion links, there is scope for many possible configurations and selection of
one out of several possibilities has far-reaching repercussions.”
These components, or agents, are the entities that could intervene meaningfully in the
events that occur (Giddens 1984) and participate in the process of spontaneous change in
the system. One distinguishing feature between a complex system and a CAS is whether
the components/agents have the ability to interact meaningfully (Giddens 1984), and al-
low the system to adapt as a result of such interactions. They should be enmeshed in a
network of connections with one another. It is not necessary for all the agents to be con-
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nected, but as Cilliers (1998), Levin (1998), and Miller & Page (2007) argue, there are
connections among these agents in aggregate within the network, and localised interac-
tions proceed through these connections. Complexity emerges from the interaction and
interconnectivity of agents within and between a system and the environment it exists in
(Mitleton-Kelly 2003a). These connections could be relatively simple and stable, such as
co-authorship between researchers, or complex and changing, e.g. trading behaviour in
the stock market.
Interactions themselves in the CAS have several important characteristics. Firstly, these
interactions are nonlinear, i.e. the agents interact in non-additive ways (Holland 2002).
The nonlinearity brings two results, firstly there is no direct proportionality between the
input and output, and secondly the state of the system is not the sum of the action of
individual agents (Andriani 2003). Consequently, small input changes can result in large
effects on the stability of the system and vice versa, which is a precondition for com-
plexity. Secondly, the interactions are rich and usually have a fairly short range (Cilliers
1998). The richness of interactions allows the influence of events to spread along some
paths. Another feature that is important for the interactions is a recurrence. Marwan et al.
(2007) write:
“The second fact is fundamental to many systems and is probably one of
the reasons why life has developed memory. Experience allows remember-
ing similar situations, making predictions and, hence, helps to survive. But
remembering similar situations, e.g., the hot and humid air in summer which
might eventually lead to a thunderstorm, is only helpful if a system (such as
the atmospheric system) returns or recurs to former states. Such a recurrence
is a fundamental characteristic of many dynamical systems.”
The loops in the interactions allow a feedback process to occur, both positive and negative
(Mitleton-Kelly 2003b). CAS can reach a far-from-equilibrium condition and the system
becomes inordinately sensitive to external influences. Small inputs yield huge, startling
effects (Toffler 1984).
Another characteristic of the complex adaptive system is that there is no central control.
Arthur et al. (1997a) argue in a CAS such as the economy, there is no global control for in-
teractions, but the mechanisms of competition and coordination provide a control function
among agents. Mitleton-Kelly (2003a) writes in a bank case study that agent interactions
are neither managed nor controlled from the top, but communication provides the con-
nectivity. Johnson (2004) argue that decentralised systems, i.e. CAS, rely on feedback
for growth and self-organization. Feedback provides the system with a way of adapting
to the changing environment hence the system can adapt to an emerging environment and
survive.
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Emergence is a distinguishing characteristic of CAS. Checkland (1981) define emergent
behaviour as a whole entity, which derives from its component activities and their struc-
ture, but cannot be reduced to them. The process of interdependent agents acting and
creating a new order with self-organization following simple rules is emergence (Dooley
1997). The systems behaviour, which arises from the interactions of the agents, is impos-
sible to be measured and predicted by the behaviour of individual agents. Vemuri (1978)
remark that:
“The behavioural (political, social, psychological, aesthetic, etc.) element
at the decision-making stage contributes in no small measure to the overall
quality of performance of the system. Because of this, many largescale sys-
tems problems are characterised by a conflict of interest in the goals to be
pursued.”
Emergence is a macro level phenomenon as a result of the local level interaction, which
results in the system as a whole having larger reactions than would be predicted from
the sum of its agents individual reactions. Kauffman (1993) recognises two kinds of
emergent property in a CAS: spontaneous order (self-organization) by the interaction of
agents and emergence due to adaption and evolution over time. Such properties allow
complex adaptive systems to adapt and co-evolve with the environment in which it exists,
and creates sustainability without central control.
Co-evolution occurs where the evolution of one agent is (partly) dependent on the evo-
lution of other agents (Ehrlich & Raven 1964, Kauffman 1993). A distinction between
adaption and co-evolution is whether the system changes without influence from the en-
vironment in which it exists. This difference can be illustrated by Figure 3.2, where the
system and the environment it exists in present hard boundaries and only adaptation within
the system can evolve. For co-evolution to occur, the system needs to be linked to another
system within an ecosystem, as well as the environment in which it exists. Mitleton-
Kelly (2003b) argued the notion of co-evolution that can occur in CAS will change the
perspective and assumptions of traditional theories asunder such co-evolution conditions,
the behaviour (i.e. decisions, strategies, action) is not a simple response to the changing
environment, but it will influence the environment as well as other agents that connect
to it. This notion, therefore, implies that the actions and decisions will affect the whole
ecosystem.
Other features of CAS include chaos and complexity (e.g. Hayles 1990, 1991, Byrne
1998, Mitleton-Kelly 2003b), creation of new order (e.g. Kauffman 1993), far-from-
equilibrium (e.g. Cilliers 1998, Mitleton-Kelly 2003b),dissipative structures (e.g. Toffler
1984), aggregation (Holland 1995),nonlinearity (e.g. Holland 1995, Cilliers 1998), and
self-organized criticality (e.g. Bak et al. 1988, Northrop 2011). The term edge of chaos




Figure 3.2: Adaption (a) has a hard boundary while co-evolution (b) does not (Mitleton-
Kelly, 2003a)
denotes the transition space between order and disorder that can occur in a CAS, i.e. self-
organized criticality. The next section will introduce phase transition and self-organized
criticality. Kauffman (1993) argues natural selection and self-organisation make complex
systems exhibit order spontaneously, and the spontaneous emergence of order, the occur-
rence of self-organization. . The Noble Prize winner Ilya Prigogine introduces the concept
of dissipative structure to describe how an open system can stay far-from-equilibrium, as
nonlinearity becomes important because linear laws no longer apply. However, these fea-
tures and properties are not the core element that made complex adaptive system different
from other systems.
In summary, a CAS is a system with a large scale of agents, these agents have no central
control and interact with others, and results in the emergence of the system.
3.3 Phase transition, Self-organized Criticality and Power
Law Distributions
One objective of quantifying the effects of a CAS is to explain emergence, i.e. self-
organization. The concept of self-organized criticality is developed by Bak et al. (1988)
to explain phase transition. A phase transition is the transformation of a system from one
state to another (Nishimori & Ortiz 2011, Ivancevic & Ivancevic 2008). Sol et al. (1996)
give a more detailed description: It is well known, from the theory of phase transitions,
that a given system (possibly made of many subsystems) can undergo strong qualitative
changes in its macroscopic properties if a suitable control parameter is adequately tuned
and that close to these critical points some key characteristic constants (the so-called crit-
ical exponents) are the same for very different systems. CAS all display phase transition
phenomena (Sol 2011).
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In physics, phase transition can be driven by many factors, i.e. temperature, pressure and
electric field. For instance, phase transitions of water including melting, freezing, boiling
and condensation. When the transition occurs, there is a stage where the free energy is
non-analytic, i.e. a system undergoing phase transition is transforming to a new order,
and such transformation does not vary smoothly as a function of parameters (tempera-
ture, pressure, etc.). The behaviour of a thermodynamic system, therefore, behaves very
differently after a phase transition (however, these transformations are revertible). Phase
transition creates a change in the entropy of the system, and the change can be discontin-
uous (first-order phase transition) or continuous (second-order phase transition). During
the first-order transition, a system absorbs/releases heat, and other thermodynamic quan-
tities are discontinuous. The heat cannot transfer instantaneously between the system
and the environment in which it exists, and therefore when some part of the system has
completed the transition, other parts have not (mixed phase regimes). The second-order
transitions have continuous transition parameters, and the thermodynamic quantities are
continuous. Examples of second-order transitions include superfluid transition and Bose-
Einstein condensate (e.g. Anderson et al. 1995, Chen et al. 2005).
Figure 3.3 presents a system with 3 phases, i.e. solid phase, gaseous phase and liquid
phase. In such a system, there is a critical point with critical pressure and temperature,
where the fluid is sufficiently hot and compressed, the transition between liquid and gas
is a second-order transition, and the difference between liquid and gas cannot be distin-
guished near this point. For instance, at 1 atm and boiling point of 100 degrees Celsius,
the first-order transition occurs and water is transformed into steam and the difference is
observable. However, at 218 atm and 374 degrees Celsius, these two phases cannot be
distinguished, and the properties of water changes dramatically. For instance, it becomes
compressible and expandable, while liquid water is almost incompressible and has low
expansivity (Anisimov et al. 2004).
Johansen & Sornette (1999) suggests a model for the stock market, and argues that a
market crash can be seen as phase transition: the individuals at the microscopic level of
stock market have only 3 possible actions (states), i.e. selling, buying and waiting which
parallel the three states in the physical system (e.g. solid, liquid and gas for water). These
traders can interact with a limited number of other traders, and perceive the response of
the market as a whole in terms of increase or decrease in value. Sornette et al. (1996) iden-
tified a critical point in the 1987 S&P 500 market crash, which is similar to the findings
in earthquakes. Further research by Sornette (e.g. Sornette & Johansen 1997, Sornette
2003a,b) examined a variety of financial markets as well as financial crises and find that
financial markets and crises are analogous to a critical phase transition in physics sys-
tems, and provide a method to help investigating different origins of financial shocks, i.e.
self-organized and exogeneous shocks.










Figure 3.3: A typical fluid phase diagram with 3 phases, solid, gas and liquid.
Power law scaling is usually associated with criticality. Over the past decades, various
researchers have considered the power law scaling in complex systems. The work of Bak,
Tang and Wiesenfeld (Bak et al. 1987, 1988) introduces the concept Self-Organized Crit-
icality to describe the phenomena that a CAS with interacting components will organise
into a state analogous to a second-order phase transition spontaneously under certain con-
ditions. The sand pile model introduced by Bak et al. (1988) explained the presence of 1/f
noise in nature, which is a prototypical example of power law distribution. Power law dis-
tributions have also been observed in natural phenomena such as earthquakes magnitudes
(Pisarenko & Sornette 2003) and solar flares (Boffetta et al. 1999).
However, as point out by Stumpf & Porter (2012), most reported power laws lack statis-
tical support. Clauset et al. (2009) argues that traditional statistical methods may mises-
timate the parameters of heavy-tailed datasets, as a result wrongly estimate the scaling
behaviour. Further tests by Clauset et al. (2009) on datasets that indicate power-law scal-
ing indicate other distributions are present, e.g. exponential or log-normal scaling. This
thesis will apply a rigours method developed by Clauset et al. (2009) to investigate if there
is a power law scaling in the operational risk events.
3.4 Network
Another way to explore CAS is by adapting network theory. The interaction of the agents
in an operational risk management environment is frequent and nonlinear, and they cre-
ate a network. Networks in the financial system have been discussed for some time with
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Schweitzer et al. (2009) and Billio et al. (2013) describing the high connectivity in the fi-
nancial system. Caldarelli (2007) discusses the networks in the financial industry, includ-
ing the board of directors, stock markets and inter-bank market. Diebold & Yilmaz (2015)
explore financial and macro economic connectedness, including US asset markets, US fi-
nancial institutions, global stock markets, bond markets, foreign exchange markets as well
as global business cycles in detail. However, it is only recently the concept of networks
has been introduced to operational risk with Alexander (2000), Neil et al. (2005, 2009)
discussing the use of Bayesian networks in the quantification of operational risk.
3.4.1 Random network
Simple models, for instance, the ErdsRnyi model (Erds & Rnyi 1959), assume equal pos-
sibility of connectivity in a network for fixed nodes set with a fixed number of links.
Similarly, for the model introduced by Gilbert (1959), the links of the nodes occur with
the same possibility, and independent from each other. They assume that agents in com-
plex systems are linked randomly together, and such an hypothesis has been adopted by
other disciplines including sociology and biology. However, random network models are
not an appropriate reflection of the real world. Firstly, such models do not present strong
clustering of nodes, while the real world often shows higher clustering coefficients than
the value of the random network, e.g. world wide web (Albert et al. 1999, Barabsi et al.
2000). Secondly, as Mitchell (2006)) argues, random networks often have a Gaussian
distribution, while in the real world, it is often observed as power law distribution for
the degree distribution. Therefore, other models are introduced to model the real situa-
tion.
3.4.2 Small world network
A small world network can be illustrated as a graph in which most nodes are not neigh-
bours of others, whereas most nodes can reach other nodes by a small number of steps.Watts
& Strogatz (1998) mathematically defined the concept of small world network in 1998.
The Watts-Strogatz network can be generated as follows:
1. Begin with a ring nearest-neighbour coupled network consists of N nodes, each node
connected to K neighbours, and K/2 on each side;
2. Randomly rewire the connections with probability p, where p is a parameter between
order (p=0) and randomness (p=1).
Rewiring the connection means shifting one connection of a set node to a randomly se-
lected new node from the network, and the connection cannot be made to a currently
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.4: The process of increasing the randomness of random rewiring procedure
to generate a small world network. (a) A regular network with 20 nodes, every node
connects to 4 other neighbours. p=0. (b) As p increases, the graph becomes increasingly
disordered, and this is a small world network. (c) When p=1, all the connections are
rewired randomly.
connected node or the node itself. Figure 3.4 presents the generation of small world net-
work and the transition to the random network.
Watts & Strogatz (1998) use average path length and clustering coefficient to quantify
small world networks. The average path length measures the average number of inter-
mediaries, and the shorter the average path length, the closer the nodes (e.g. financial
institutions for the financial network, authors in co-authorship network) in the network.
The clustering coefficient measures the degree of the neighbours of a node and also the
neighbours of each other, i.e. the tendency of nodes to be connected. The clustering
coefficient varies from 0 to 1, where 0 means no clustering and 1 means full clustering.
Watts & Strogatz (1998) compared a small world network with a random network with
the same number of nodes to judge the path length and clustering coefficient, as Erds &
Rnyi (1960) proved, a random network often has relatively short path length and low clus-
tering when compared with other networks. Compared to a random network, a network
is a small network if its (CC ratio is many times greater than 1, meanwhile its APL ratio
of random network is approximately 1 (Watts & Strogatz 1998), or small world quotient,
i.e. CC ratio divided by APL ratio, is much greater than 1 (Amaral et al. 2000, Uzzi &
Spiro 2005). Where
CC ratio=
Clustering coe f f icient o f actual network
Clustering coe f f icient o f a random network with the same size and density
And
APL ratio =
Average path length o f actual network
Average path length o f a random network with the same size and density
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Studies indicate small networks exist in the financial industry. Boss et al. (2004) examine
the network structure of the Austrian interbank market using data from Oesterreichische
Nationalbank from 2000 to 2003, and conclude that the Austrian interbank network is
a small world network with low degree of separation. Similarly, Kanno (2015) assesses
the network structure in the Japanese interbank market and find it presents characteris-
tics of a small world network and a scale free network. In another, Baum et al. (2003)
show the Canadian investment bank syndicate network from 1952 to 1990 exhibits small
world properties. Further, the network of investment banks in Canada develops over time,
and while the APL ratio remains relatively stable, the CC ratio increased from approxi-
mately 1 to about 10, indicating the connections of investment banks increases with time.
Baum et al. (2003) suggest growth combined with turnover affects CC ratio significantly,
which provides future research on how growth or regression affects the robustness of the
network.
3.4.3 Scale free network
A common feature for ErdsRnyi networks and Watts-Strogatz networks is that the con-
nectivity distribution of the network is homogeneous, and they are exponential networks.
Barabsi & Albert (1999) provides another network model which grows via preferential at-
tachment and creates scale free networks, for instance,the World Wide Web (Albert et al.
1999, Barabsi et al. 2000). Such a network is simply defined as the network with a power
law distribution, as Barabsi & Albert (1999) point out, a common property of many large
networks is that the vertex connectivity follow a scale free power-law distribution. There
are two main issues for current exponential network models: firstly, real networks are
dynamically formed, and there is the creation of new nodes over time while current mod-
els formulate the rearrangement of connections (rewire and new connections), but cannot
add new nodes. Secondly, random network models and small world network models, for
instance, ErdsRnyi network and Watts-Strogatz network models assume uniform prob-
abilities for new connections, but that is unreal (Barabsi & Albert 1999, Barabsi et al.
1999). The Barabsi-Albert model, on the other hand, is suited to the real networks with
new nodes added to the system, e.g. World Wide Web.
The Barabsi-Albert model (Barabsi & Albert 1999, Barabsi et al. 2000) work with two
crucial mechanisms of self-organization of a network, i.e. growth and preferential attach-
ment. Networks grow through the join of new nodes connecting to the existing nodes
in the system, and these new nodes have a higher probability to connect to nodes with a
large number of connections in the system, and a Barabsi-Albert scale free network can
be generated as follows:
1. Start with a small number of nodes m0, at every time step, a new node with m ( m<m0)
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connections is added to the network, and the new node connect to existing node;
2. Each of the m connections of the new node then attached to an existing node i with ki





∑ j k j
.
At time step t, the network includes t +m0 nodes with mt connections. These two mech-
anisms lead the network to a scale free state, namely the shape of the degree distribution
does not change due to the increase of the network scale (Figure 3.5). The probability
P(k) for a node in such network have k connections decays as a power law:
P(k)∼ k−γ
Figure 3.5: A scale free network with 20 nodes, generated by the Barabsi-Albert scale
free network model.
Garlaschelli et al. (2005) presents a large market investment network, where both stocks
and shareholders are vertices connected by weighted links corresponding to sharehold-
ings. Their empirical study in three markets show power law tails.
3.4.4 Centrality
It is the seminal work of Bavelas (1950) and Leavitt (1951) and their colleagues on the
communication networks in small groups found centrality as the measurement of position,
presents the extent of individuals in a group as communication hubs, i.e. individuals with
more friends are more important in a communication network. There is certainly no
unanimity on exactly what centrality is or on its conceptual foundations, and there is very
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little agreement on the proper procedure for its measurement (Freeman 1978). To find
a proper centrality measure, this section will have a general discussion on the centrality
measures.
The simplest measure is degree centrality, which considers an important node should be
one with a large number of interactions (Nieminen 1974). Consider a node with degree
n-1; it would directly connect to all other nodes in the network hence it is at the centre of





If a network is directed, then the indegree and outdegree can be identified separately.
The idea behind closeness centrality is that the important node should be close and com-
municate quickly with other nodes in the network. Considering the situation in Figure 3.6:
node A and node B have the same degree centrality. However, the same degree centrality
cannot present the different importance of nodes under this situation. Closeness centrality
measures how close a node is to other nodes.
A
B
Figure 3.6: A description of the differences between degree centrality and closeness
centrality. Node A and B have the same degree centrality, and the connectivity of these
two nodes cannot reflected by it. Closeness centrality reflects such situation better.
Closeness is defined as the reciprocal of farness (Bavelas 1950), i.e. the average distance
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Betweenness centrality is a measurement of centrality based on shortest paths (Freeman,
1978). It assumes that an important node should be the one lies on the shortest paths







Where g jk(i) is the number of shortest paths between node j and k that passes i and g jk
is the number of shortest paths between j and k. Freeman (1978) argues that a node with
high Betweenness centrality is able to facilitate or limit interaction between the nodes it
connects.
Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the importance of a node in a network. The idea
behind eigenvector centrality is a node connected to important neighbours should be an
important node. Bonacich (1972a,b) proposed a simple eigenvector centrality. Denote A
as a matrix of relationships. The main diagonal elements of A are 0. The centrality of




Where λ is a constant so that the equation has a nonzero solution. Denote e as an eigen-
vector of matrix A, in matrix notation:
λe = Ae
The λ is the associated eigenvalue, and the largest eigenvalue is usually the preferred
one.
Considering the aim of this research, i.e. identify the crucial characteristics that lead to
the operational risk events, the eigenvector centrality is an important criterion. It should
be noticed that for operational risk, a risk event often occurs due to several characteristics
in the process and these characteristics together result in the event. Therefore the charac-
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teristic connects with other crucial characteristics should be considered as crucial.
3.5 Operational Risk Environment as Complex Adaptive
System
Although scholars have discussed the economy and the stock market as a CAS (e.g. Arthur
1995, Foster 2005), discussion on the financial industry as a CAS remains sparse with one
of the main papers beingAllan et al. (2012). This section will explore the properties of the
financial industry that indicate it is a CAS.
The organisational structure of financial institutions varies, however banks, as well as




4. Risk management department;
5. Administration department;
6. IT department;
7. Legal and compliance department;
8. Human resource department;
9. Operating units, e.g. retail banking, wholesale banking and fund management;
These agents interact with others:
1. The Treasury department, as the heart of financial institutions, controls and manages
cash flow as well as performing investment activities for institutions and the functioning
of the Treasury department requires it to interact with other departments.
2. The Loan department provides a service to other businesses and individuals. It is the
department that mainly interconnects with third parties.
3. The Accounting department provides an accounting service and financial support to
the institution and hence interacts with other departments.
4. The Risk management department provides a control function to the institution, includ-
ing risk identification, measurement and assessment and minimising the negative effects
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of risk events, including credit risk, market risk and operational risk. The risk manage-
ment process requires interaction across the whole institution.
5. The Administration departments carry out the daily activities of the institution. They
ensure the necessary work flow and information transfer between the departments. A
major duty of an administration department is ensuring the efficiency of the organisation.
This department relates to all other departments in the institution.
6. The IT department provides the online communication system with customers, builds
and maintains trading systems, interacts with the Treasury department and other systems
to help manage risk, maintain the day to day business transactions within the institution
and provide an information security function to other departments.
7. The Legal and compliance department is responsible for advising management on the
compliance laws, rules and standards and for preparing guidance to staff and monitoring
compliance with the policies and procedures and reporting to management (Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision 2005). This department supports the whole institution in
various areas, providing research on legal and regulatory issues as well as preparing re-
quired legal files and support to other departments. It helps with financial transactions for
clients interacting with loan department. Legal and compliance also provide support in
completing transactions and maintaining commitments to clients and regulators.
8. The Human resource department focuses on human resource management policies and
strategies to ensure the human performance in the institution. This department mainly in-
teracts with another department through staff development and training programs, which
design and implement plans for employees to enhance their knowledge and skills contin-
uously.
As mentioned in section 3.2, the interactions do not only occur inside a financial institu-
tion that lead to all operational risk events. For instance, external drivers as mentioned in
chapter 2 are a source of operational risk events. Hence, these agents inside banks interact
with other agents in the financial industry to create a system with interactive components
(Evans & Allan 2015), from which operational risk events emerge:
1. Banks interact with others with cashflow, i.e. borrowing/ lending money from/ to
other individuals and institutions, including asset management, security brokers, insur-
ance companies, retirement funds, individuals and businesses;
2. Asset management transferring by banking system, and borrowing money for invest-
ment;
3. Security brokers make security transactions for other individuals and institutions, in-
cluding banks; asset management, insurance companies, retirement funds, individuals and
businesses;
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4. Insurance companies provide services to other individuals and institutions, includ-
ing banks; asset management, security brokers, retirement funds, individuals and busi-
nesses;
5. Retirement funds interact with other institutions through lending, cashflow manage-
ment, asset management, security transactions and insurance. They also provide service
to individuals, which provides them cashflow and grant retirement benefits;
6. Individuals interact with these institutions by lending/borrowing activities and invest-
ment activities;
7. Business lending/borrowing from banks, and interacts with other institutions through
investments;
8. Regulators carry out regulations for the participants of the financial industry. One
important point for regulators is, they do not have central control for the financial indus-
try.
Schweitzer et al. (2009) illustrates a financial network for the major financial institutions
and show high connectivity as well as closed loops among the financial institutions. This
indicates that financial institutions are strongly interdependent and inter-connected, and
Schweitzer et al. (2009) argue such interdependence may result in instability of the net-
work.
The interconnection of financial institutions, can also be illustrated by the Network di-
agram for the expected losses of banks (red), insurances (black), and sovereigns (blue)
from 2004 to 2007 (Billio et al., 2013) as shown in Figure 3.7.
The financial industry also has no central control. Smith (1776) in his book The Wealth
of Nations first illustrates the force that drives market competition as
“ and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of
the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of
his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was not part of
it. By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the society
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it”
Similarly, in the financial industry, there is no global control for the trading activities of
participants and regulators concerned only with specific geographic areas, and even then,
they are concerned more with the stability of the financial system than with controlling
all activities.
It is relatively easy to observe the emergent property of a CAS in the financial industry as
it is impossible to predict the market change by observing one or two financial institutions,
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Figure 3.7: Relationships that are statistically significant at the 1% level among the
monthly changes of the expected losses of the different entities from 2004 to 2007. The
type of entities causing the relationship is indicated by colour: red for banks, black for
insurers, and blue for Sovereigns (Billio et al. 2013).
because the interactions of all the financial institutions create the emergent property. The
emergent property allows the behaviour of an agent to result in a huge impact to the
system. For instance, the collapse of Lehman Brothers lead to US market and global
market volatility, which started a new phase of the GFC. The activities in the financial
industry are influenced by other agents and the coevolving together with other agents
(Song & Thakor 2010, ul Haq 2005). Song & Thakor (2010) examines financial system
architecture evolution and find co-evolution is generated by securitisation and bank equity
capital. Operational risk, as an output of interactions in the financial system, is therefore
hard to understand and measure through linear analysis.
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that financial industry presents the essential
characteristics of a CAS i.e. numerous agents, interactions among agents, no central
control and emergence. Such characteristics result in difficulties with quantifying and
understand operational risk. For instance, a small input may lead to significant impact,
as observed with the GFC commencing in 2008 with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
and resulting in the collapse of inter banking lending system and then the crash of the
financial market. The series research of Danielsson (Danielsson 2002, Danelsson 2008,
Danielsson et al. 2016) implies that under the complex condition, traditional methods
such as Value-at-Risk are unreliable with these systemically important events. Therefore,
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it is necessary to understand operational risk from other perspectives.
3.6 Discussion
This chapter discussed in detail the properties of financial markets, and financial insti-
tutions as CAS. It should be noticed that there is no widely accepted properties set to
identify a CAS, and most of current judgement is made according to common scene as “I
know it when I see it” (Court Justice Stewart in Jacobellis v. Ohio (1963)). Therefore, it is
necessary to identify the most basic characteristics, i.e. most common and distinguishing
features, of CAS. The previous discussion presents four key elements, i.e. large scale of
agents, interaction, no central control and emergence. Absence of any of these elements
would indicate a system is unlikely to be a CAS. Other features may not be so critical
they may be a consequence of previous features, or they may not be applicable for all
CAS.
The environment where operational risk emerges includes both the financial institutions
and the financial industry, and it is important to bear in mind that there is no strict bound-
ary between CAS and the environment within which it exists. For instance, lawsuits and
regulatory change originate from third parties and regulators, but they become operational




As discussed in the previous chapter, the financial system displays all the characteristics
of a CAS. Cladistics analysis is a technique developed originally to study relationships in
biology, but it can be adapted to study relationships in any CAS (Mitleton-Kelly 2003b).
Hence, this thesis introduces cladistics analysis, to help us gain insight of operational risk
management.
Biologists developed two types of analysis to estimate ancestry in animals, cladistics
(phylogenetic) analysis and phenetic analysis. Cladistics analysis classifies the entities
by evolutionary relationships while phenetics is based on similarity of entities, i.e. mor-
phology. Griffiths (1974) explains the difference between cladistics and phenetics as two
fundamentally different types of classification techniques: phenetics attempts to classify
entities based on the overall similarity of entities (i.e. total or relative number of shared
characteristics), and cladistics analysis attempts to classify entities based on evolution-
ary relationships (i.e. shared derived characteristics, or branching pattern). Therefore,
phenetics does not necessarily reflect genetic similarities or evolutionary relatedness but
classifies organisms by the current state of characteristics while cladistics assumes, and
estimates ancestral relationships. Considering the purpose of this research, i.e. to provide
insights into operational risk events and their management, it is appropriate to use cladis-
tics analysis as that will identify linkages between the characteristics that have caused the
events.
The main objectives of this chapter are
1. To justify the application of cladistics analysis in operational risk event analysis;
2. To discuss the appropriate algorithm for this analysis, as there are alternative algorithms
34
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available to determine the linkage of the risk event characteristics.
There are five sections of this chapter, and the remaining sections are:
1. Section 4.2 justifies the application of cladistics analysis in operational risk analy-
sis;
2. Section 4.3 introduces the basics of cladistics analysis;
3. Section 4.5 examines the appropriate algorithm for this study; 3. Section4.4 introduces
the coding method of this study;
4. Section 4.6 summarises this chapter.
Figure 4.1 visually presents the structure of this chapter.
4.2 Justification of Using Cladistics Analysis in Analysing
Operational Risk
In his book “At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and
Complexity”, one founder of complexity science Stuart Kauffman (Kauffman 1995, p.
185) writes:
“We are seeking a new conceptual framework that does not yet exist.
Nowhere in science have we an adequate way to study the interleaving of
self-organization, selection, chance, and design. We have no adequate frame-
work for the place of law in a historical science and the place of history in a
lawful science. ”
Even though Kauffman (1995) identifies a lack of a framework for analysing complexity,
biologists have been analysing the complex evolutionary system for some time. As exam-
ples, Auyang (1998) discusses adaptive organisation of biological systems, and Kaneko
(2006) describes the systems in molecular biology as systems of strongly interacting ele-
ments. On a macro level, ecosystems and biosphere have been treated as complex adaptive
systems (Levin 1998). Auyang (1998) writes:
“The combined weight of puzzles strains the credibility of the doctrine
that macroevolution must be the resultant of microevolutionary modifica-
tions. If emergent changes occur during the formation of species, what can
their mechanisms be? Attempts to answer this question once led to the pos-
tulation of mysterious creative evolutionary forces that tainted the idea of
emergenceTo respect organismic integrity, we can no longer employ the in-
dependent individual approximation to factor the organism into uncorrelated











Figure 4.1: Structure of chapter 4.
genes or characters. The wholeness of organisms becomes a source of emer-
gent evolutionary changes.”
Further examples are Levin (1998), Callebaut & Rasskin-Gutman (2005) and Kaneko
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Table 4.1: The conceptual parallels between biological evolution and risk evolution,
reproduced from (Allan et al. 2012).
Concepts Biological Evolution Risk Evolution
Characteristics Phenotype Causes and descriptions of risk events
Inheritance Common ancestors Events from common origin
Evidence Fossils Historical data
Random variation Mutation Innovation, regulation
Selection Natural selection Management
Extinction Death of species Risk eradication
(2006) and some of them discuss system evolution under a phylogenetic framework (e.g.
Schlosser 2005).Studies have used cladistics analysis in social, business and economic .
For instance, McCarthy et al. (2000) apply it to an organisational study; Baldwin (2005)
and ElMaraghy (2008) models evolution in the manufacturing industry and Lake (2009)
study the bicycle design from 1800 to 2000. Allan et al. (2010) demonstrate the parallels
of evolution in financial risks and biology in that risks have unique characteristics like
DNA in biology, so that collective risk systems can evolve and co-evolve and the his-
tory of evolutionary path is an important aspect of risk. Allan et al. (2012) investigate
risk evolution using Darwinian criteria and found risk evolution satisfied all the criteria,
namely variation, competition, inheritance, accumulation of modifications and adaption.
The conceptual parallels between biological evolution and risk evolution are shown in
Table 4.1:
Risks, like species, evolve over time by modifications (Pagel et al. 2007). Innovations of
technologies and changes in regulations bring random variation to risks so they can evolve
(e.g. new technologies will bring new types of risks. For instance, internet banking may
involve cybercrime). Risk management processes reduce certain type of risks but some
others will still survive and evolve, like some species with certain characteristics are easier
to survive in nature. Information of an operational is kept in historical data after risk
mitigation, like fossils kept the information of species.
4.3 Basics of Cladistics Analysis
A classic way to illustrate the evolutionary relationships is by estimating phylogenetic
trees. In biology, a phylogenetic tree (cladogram) is a graph that presents the inferred evo-
lutionary relationships among different species. A phylogenetic tree can be transformed
into various shapes (e.g. diagonal-up, rectangular-right, rectangular-up, diagonal-down
and circle, see Baum & Smith (2013)), but these shapes are equivalent. The rectangular-
right tree as a visually easy to understand pattern will be applied to this thesis, and an











Level 1 Level 2
Figure 4.2: An example of a tree.
example is as illustrated in Figure 4.2.
A phylogenetic tree diagram consists of leaves, branches and nodes. The leaves, e.g. A,
B, C and D in Figure 4.2, represent different spices (organisms, genes) in an evolutionary
context, and in this thesis, they represent risk events. Nodes, e.g. a, b, c and d in Figure
4.2, correspond to lineage-splitting events, and in this thesis, they are the characteristics of
events. The branches, i.e. the connections between nodes, have a different meaning in dif-
ferent trees. In this thesis, these branches specify relationships other than an evolutionary
path, as there is no time line involved (and therefore, this is an unrooted tree).
A rotation of branches under a node will not change the relationships. For instance,
denoting the leaves under node a in Figure 4.2 as ((A, B), C) if it is rotated as ((B, A), C)
or (C, (A, B)), it is still the same tree.
Given the hierarchical structure of the phylogenetic trees for this thesis the left most char-
acteristics will be referred to as Level 1 characteristics, e.g. node a and b in Figure 4.2.
The second characteristic along the path is denoted as Level 2 characteristics, e.g. node c
and d in Figure 4.2, and so on.
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There are different approaches for estimating phylogenetic trees which can be classified
into two groups: distance-based methods and character-state based. Distance based meth-
ods usually construct a phylogenetic tree based on a distance matrix of pairwise genetic
distances (Felsenstein 1988). The main distance based methods including cluster anal-
ysis such as UPGMA (unweighted pair group method using arithmetic averages, Sokal
& Michener (1958)) and WPGMA (weighted-pair group method with arithmetic means,
Sokal & Michener (1958)), minimum evolution (Kidd & Sgaramella-Zonta 1971, Rzhet-
sky & Nei 1993) and neighbour-joining (Saitou & Nei 1987, Studier & Keppler 1988).
Character-state based approaches, or sequence-based methods, rely on the state of the
character, and all possible trees are evaluated to generate the one that optimises the evo-
lution based on the criteria of specific approach, e.g. minimum parsimony score for max-
imum parsimony approach. The main character-state based methods including maximum
likelihood methods (Felsenstein 1981) and parsimony methods (Camin & Sokal 1965,
Fitch 1971, Kluge & Farris 1969).
In this thesis, a maximum parsimony approach will be adopted as this thesis is apply-
ing cladistics analysis, and distance-based methods are phenetic methods. Moreover,
character-state based methods are often considered more powerful than distance based
methods (Rastogi et al. 2008), as they use raw data, which is considered as a string of
character states while transforming character-state data into distance matrix results in in-
formation loss. The selection between maximum likelihood and maximum parsimony
is challenging. Parametric approaches, both maximum likelihood and Bayesian meth-
ods, have attracted widening attention and attracts large number of scholars. Although
both methods are effective under most conditions (Hillis et al. 1994), some (e.g. Kuh-
ner & Felsenstein (1994), Gaut & Lewis (1995), Gadagkar & Kumar (2005)) argue that
maximum likelihood performs better than maximum parsimony under certain conditions.
However, it needs to be noted that the better results using maximum likelihood are gen-
erated from data that is identically distributed. Parametric approaches assume identically
distributed data while maximum parsimony do not (Sanderson & Kim 2000). However,
numerous literature argue real world (evolutionary and molecular biological) sequences
are heterogeneous and are not identically distributed (e.g. Miyamoto & Fitch (1995),
Lopez et al. (2002)). The performance of these two approaches is arguable for hetero-
geneous data. For instance, Gadagkar & Kumar (2005) insist maximum likelihood out-
performs maximum parsimony even when evolutionary rates are heterogeneous, while
Kolaczkowski & Thornton (2004) argue maximum likelihood is strongly biased and sta-
tistically inconsistent while maximum parsimony performs substantially better for mod-
erate heterogeneous data. Data for the financial system and operational risk are often
considered as heterogeneous (e.g. Hommes (2001), Danielsson (2002), Jobst (2007)).
Hence which approach is better remains uncertain, but as the data used in this thesis is
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Table 4.2: State of colour and shape




considered as heterogenous, maximum parsimony is preferred.
Whilst in this thesis maximum parsimony will be used it is still necessary to distinguish
the principle of parsimony and methods of parsimony that can then be used. Cladistic par-
simony is a set of methods for inferring cladograms on the basis of minimum number of
transformations (e.g. Camin & Sokal (1965), Fitch (1971)). There is an extensive discus-
sion of simplicity with phylogenetic parsimony (e.g. Farris (1983)), and it is believed that
minimising the number of ad hoc hypotheses will lead to greater explanatory power. It is
crucial for this thesis to make less ad hoc hypotheses as this may not meet the real-world
observations, and hence parsimony is finally selected.
4.4 Encoding
This research aims to find the common drivers of operational risk events rather than cat-
egorise operational risk events, and hence a proper coding strategy will result in a better
outcome. Pleijel (1995) delineate four different encoding methods. Assume an object
with features of colour and shape, as shown in Table 4.2:
There are 4 different coding methods:
1. Encoding characteristic states into multi-states, and assumes these characteristics are
linked, i.e. Absence (State 0); Black and Circle (State 1); Black and Square (State 2);
White and Circle (State 3); White and Square (State 4).
2. Encoding characteristic states into independent multi-states, i.e. Absence (0), Cir-
cle (1), Square (2) and Absence (0), Black (1), White (2) for shape and colour respec-
tively.
3. Encoding colour and shape states into independent binary state, and use additional state
to present Absence/ Presence, i.e. Absence (0)/ Presence (1), Black (0)/ White (1) and
Circle (0)/ Square (1).
4. Encoding all characteristic states into binary states and assume all the characteristic
states are independent, i.e. Absence (0)/ Presence (1), absence of Black (0)/ presence of
Black (1), absence of white (0)/ presence of White (1), absence of Circle (0)/ Presence of
Circle (1), absence of Square (0)/ presence of Square (1).
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Table 4.3: Comparison of four encoding methods
Absence of Feature Black-Circle Black-Square White-Circle White-Square
Encoding 1 0 1 2 3 4
Encoding 2 00 11 12 21 22
Encoding 3 0XX 100 101 110 111
Encoding 4 00000 11010 11001 10110 10101
Table 4.3 provides a comparison of these encoding:
For financial characteristics encoding, there are four main purposes:
1. The encoding should well reflect the attributes under investigation. It is important to
note that, unlike the application in biology, the encoding of financial events is not a purely
objective process. The selection of characteristics and the identification of different states
is vital to present information contained in the source data. Also, the encoding criteria
should match the purpose of the study. For example, a study on the impact of extreme sit-
uations will involve less characteristics with a relatively high threshold to identify state 1
(presence of such characteristic), whilst a study to identify major characteristics of events
will cover as many as characteristics as possible (from expert opinion and quantitative/
qualitative data).
2. The encoding should help reduce the total number of events. As the financial data
may come with millions of events, it is vital to reduce the number of events to a practical
level. One way to limit the number of unique events is apply binary encoding to source
data. For example, a characteristic set with 15 binary encoded characteristics contains
a maximum of 32,768 unique events, but when the states of characteristics increase to
3, the theoretical unique events increases to 14,348,907, which is almost impractical for
cladistics analysis. Hence, although algorithms for cladistics analysis support multiple
states, it is recommended that binary encoding is used. Another practical method is to
limit the characteristics under investigation.. Changing the threshold of Sate 1 will also
impact the number of unique events. If the threshold decreases from 10% to 5%, this will
half the theoretical maximum number of unique events.
3. Encoding should reflect the underlying assumption.i,e set the cause as state 1.
4. Continuous characteristics and quantitative variables should be transformed into dis-
crete data for cladistics analysis. There are several methods to transform continuous data
into discrete data, e.g. simple gap-coding (Johnson 1976) and generalized gap-coding
(Archie 1985). These methods create gaps to produce discrete codes for continuous data
(Kitching et al. 1998). A study of motor vehicle insurance claims (Evans & Li 2018) cre-
ates morphological characteristics from continuous data to help determine major drivers
of motor vehicle claims.
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Considering the above criteria, using encoding method 3 from biology is deemed appro-
priate. Using binary encoding for both presence and absence of cause type characteristics
presents categorical data, which reduces the states (compard to encoding method 1 and
2) and the number of characteristics (compared to encoding method 4). However, this
method, as discussed before, requires careful selection of characteristics to present the
attributes of events.
4.5 Maximum Parsimony
The fundamental idea in phylogenetics is the Hennig Auxiliary principle (see Hennig
(1965, 1966)). Hennigs Auxiliary Principle states that we should assume homology if
there is no contradictory evidence. Hennigs Auxiliary Principle is intended to maximize
the hypothesis of homology and minimize the hypothesis of homoplasy and avoid the
assumption of the unnecessary ad hoc hypothesis of parallelism (Hennig 1965, Henke
& Tattersall 2007), and works as an epistemological tool for the principle of parsimony
(Farris 1983, Henke & Tattersall 2007).
There are several algorithms for constructing a cladistics tree using the parsimony crite-
rion. Camin & Sokal (1965) introduced the first algorithm to apply parsimony in con-
structing a cladogram Later, Kluge & Farris (1969) presented a new algorithm for con-
structing a cladogram and generating the most parsimonious tree, and the algorithm is
named Wagner parsimony. Fitch parsimony (Fitch 1971) consider all the characters as
unordered, and Farris (1977) implement Dollos law for tree construction. These algo-
rithms have different assumptions, and the main differences are listed below:
1. Camin-Sokal parsimony assumes evolution is irreversible. That is when a derived
character state cannot return to its ancestral state.
2. Wagner parsimony assumes evolution is reversible, and the rates of change in either
direction are roughly the same. It also assumes ordered characters, e.g. change from state
3 to state 1 must pass through state 2. Hence it takes two steps.
3. Fitch parsimony assumes evolution is reversible with approximately the same change
rate in each direction, and it considers all characters as unordered. Therefore, change
from state 3 to state 1 only takes 1 step.
4. Dollo parsimony assumes the transition from the ancestral state is very rare, but there
is no restriction on transitions from derived state to ancestral state.
The selection of the algorithm applied to this thesis is therefore easy when considering
all these assumptions made. In this research, we consider the emergence of operational
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Table 4.4: Data matrix
Animals
Character states Minimum steps
A B C D E F G
Characters
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 1
2 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 3 2
3 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 2
4 3 2 0 0 3 1 0 4 3
5 1 1 2 1 0 1 3 4 3
6 1 0 0 0 0 -1 0 3 2
7 0 0 0 0 -1 0 1 3 2
Total 15
risk events, hence the appearance of characteristics of these events are the character state
change (i.e. when the characteristic is absent for a certain event, the state would be 0,
once it appeared, the state will change into 1). For operational risk events, once a driver
appears in a certain event, it will not disappear. For instance, the event caused by external
fraud will always involve external fraud (as it is caused by external fraud), while in biol-
ogy, a state change (e.g. A to G, C to T) might be reversed. Therefore, the Camin-Sokal
parsimony is applied for this research. In this research, every character selected for de-
scribing operational risk events has two states: 0 for the absence of this character and 1
for the presence of this character. Once this character shows up, it will not disappear, e.g.
events involve regulatory fines will always keep this fine.
Camin & Sokal (1965) used a set of hypothetical animals (Caminalcules, see Sokal (1983a,b,c,d))
to illustrate their methodology. They set 7 animals with seven characters, namely animal
A, B, C, D, E, F, G and character 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 in following tables. There are three major
steps (Camin & Sokal 1965):
1. Calculate minimum number of necessary evolutionary steps. If there are c Character
states, then the necessary steps is c-1 (Table 4.4).
2. Fitting every character to another character, and calculate the extra steps needed. Con-
sider Table 4.5 for character 5 as an example. Consider character 5 first. All animals have
character 5 expect E, hence A, B, D and F is a clad with only 1 character 5. C has 2 char-
acters 5. Hence a new branch is linked to the previous one with character 5 marked, and as
G has 3 characters 5 another new branch is linked to the one representing C with character
5 marked, as shown in Figure 4.3. After the basic shape is constructed, other characters
will be fitted to the cladogram following this process, and extra steps that needed to reach
the state change will be counted. The character not common for a clade will be marked
on the branches that represent the animals with that character. For instance, character
1 is only marked on the branch of A and F in Figure 4.3. One state change counts for
1 step. For example, character 1 appeared in 3 different places therefore the total steps
CHAPTER 4. CLADISTICS ANALYSIS 44




E A B D F C G steps steps
Characters
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 3 1 2
2 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 2 2 0
3 0 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 2 1
4 3 3 2 0 1 0 0 6 3 3
5 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3 X
6 0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 2 2 0
7 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 0
Total 21 15 6
Table 4.6: Compatibility matrix
Patterns Compatibilities Extra steps
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Characters
1 X 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 10
2 1 X 1 2 0 1 0 2 5
3 2 2 X 4 1 2 1 0 12
4 2 3 4 X 3 3 3 0 18
5 1 1 1 3 X 1 1 0 8
6 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 6 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 6 0
Compatibilities 2 2 2 2 3 1 2 14
Extra steps 6 8 8 11 6 8 6 53
are 3. Meanwhile character 4 appears in 2 different places with three steps each, and the
total steps is 6. If the extra steps, i.e. total steps minus minimum steps is small, then the
compatibility is high. Higher compatibility means more characters compatible with this
pattern hence less extra steps needed. Repeat this process and construct Compatibility
matrix as shown in Table 4.6.
3. The cladogram of the character that provides best pattern is the cladogram wanted, as
shown in Figure 4.3.
4.6 Summary
This chapter introduces the alternative methodology for the construction of cladograms
and concludes that the Camin-Sokal parsimony is appropriate for this research.
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Figure 4.3: Pattern cladogram of character 5.
Chapter 5
Cladistics Analysis for AU, US and EU
Markets
5.1 Introduction
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 reviewed relevant literature on operational risk management, complex
adaptive systems and cladistics analysis and discussed the operational risk management
environment from the perspective of it being a complex adaptive system. This chapter will
investigate the use of cladistics analysis to identify the characteristics of operational risk
events in Australia (AU), the US and Europe (EU)to validate the methodology. Figure 5.1
presents the structure of this chapter.
5.2 Description of data
The data for the AU, US and EU operational risk events is provided by ORIC interna-
tionala. This database provides reports on operational risk losses from the banking in-
dustry and insurance industry for various countries. This study uses ORIC data for AU,
US and EU banks from 2008 to the middle of 2014. After filtering duplicate events and
removing events with no reported losses, the AU data contains 94 risk events, the US data
contains 1362 risk events, and the EU data contains 770 risk events.
Due to limited data for some years, the time periods for analysis are set as 2008 to 2010
(2010 only for AU due to lack of data in 2008 and 2009), 2011 to 2012 and 2013 to 2014.
As well as these individual periods, analysis is carried out for cumulative periods. Table
5.1 and Figure 5.2 present the descriptive statistics for the AU, US and EU markets.
ahttps://www.oricinternational.com/
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Figure 5.1: Structure of chapter 2.
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for AU, US and EU events from 2008 to 2014
AU US EU
Number of Loss amount Number of Loss amount Number of Loss amount
Events (AU$, Million) Events (US$, Million) Events (US$, Million)
2008 8 $65,235 5 $822
2009 103 $7,884 58 $9,507
2010 39 $1,657 276 $125,576 163 $151,896
2011 27 $1,150 287 $128,396 140 $54,988
2012 14 $387 308 $654,193 166 $51,135
2013 11 $551 241 $293,426 149 $115,312
2014 3 $7 139 $367,438 89 $115,144
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Figure 5.2: Descriptive statistics for AU, US and EU events from 2008 to 2014.
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The losses for each market shown in Table 6 and Figure 5.2 indicate that from 2008 to
the middle of 2014, AU banks suffered AU$ 3,753 million losses from 94 operational risk
events, and US banks and EU banks incurred losses of US$ 1,642 billion and US$ 499
billion respectively. The loss amount in AU decreases every year while in US and EU
markets it fluctuates. Similar to the loss amount, the number of operational risk events
in AU decreases every year while US and EU markets suffer a dramatic growth and are
then relatively stable, which may indicate differing attitudes to operational loses in these
markets.
5.3 Derivation of characteristics for Cladistics Analysis
This section discusses different characteristics sets that are used for the construction of
cladograms. It is a basic assumption of the algorithm that is used to construct the clado-
grams that the characteristics of the operational risk events can be arranged in some logical
order, from an ancestral state to its related and subsequent state, as discussed in chapter 4.
Two characteristics sets are used in this study, the first reflects a set defined by Basel II,
and the second a set derived from analysis of the common characteristics in the descrip-
tions of the events recorded by ORIC.
5.3.1 Basel Based Characteristics
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) sets out operational risk character-
istics that are used by banks to determine the capital required against risks that might be
incurred in their business, which is event type based classification aims at ease the work
of managers (in capital calculation). Such characteristics set will be comparative tool to
show the necessity of using derived characteristics set. The Basel based characteristics
set are set out in Table 5.2.
5.3.2 Dataset Derived Characteristics without Descriptive Charac-
teristics
The Basel characteristic set reflects area of operation, whereas consideration of the de-
scriptions of the operational risk events in the ORIC database indicates that banks relate
their operational risk events to functionality. A dataset has then been derived from the
ORIC descriptions and their definitions are shown in Table 5.3. The generating process is
as follows:
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Table 5.2: Basel based characteristics.
Characteristics
1 Unauthorised activity
2 Theft and fraud (internal)









12 Disasters and other events
13 Systems
14 Monitoring and reporting
15 Account management
Table 5.3: Dataset Derived Characteristics.
Characteristics Definition
1 Bank cross selling Event involving a bank selling a product/service to a customer that was different to what the customer originally bought from the bank
2 Complex products Event involving products that had numerous components
3 Complex transaction Event involving a transaction that involved many parts
4 Computer hacking Event involving hacking into a system
5 Crime Event involving theft other than by deception
6 Derivatives Event involving a derivative transaction
7 Employment issues Event where employment contract conditions or government regulations relating to employment were breached
8 External fraud Event involving fraudulent activity by an external person(s)
9 Human error Event where a staff member made a mistake
10 Insurance Event involving an insurance product
11 Internal fraud Event involving fraudulent activity by a member of staff
12 International transaction Event involving a transaction occurring across a country border
13 Legal issue Event where a customer took an institution to court for remedy, but the event was not a regulatory breach
14 Manual process Event involving a manual process
15 Misleading Information Event where the product/service details were not made clear to a customer
16 Money laundering Event where funds were transferred for the purposes of creating a false impression that the transaction was legitimate
17 Offshore fund Event where a transaction involved a fund that was domiciled outside the country where the investor was located
18 Overcharging Overcharge of fees etc.
19 Poor controls Event where controls that should have been in place were not or were ineffective
20 Regulatory failure Event where a government regulation was breached
21 Software system Event involving a software issue
1. Oric has a set of descriptors for the reporting of operational risk events that they call
tags and these are shown in Appendix B.
2. A word count system (Hermetic) was used to search the descriptions of the operational
risk events for the Oric tags;
3. The resulting list of operational risk event descriptions were then examined and similar
tags combined and given common names to reduce the number of characteristics to a
manageable number for the software used.
This characteristic set is more likely to assist management in identifying drivers of oper-
ational risk events that can then inform their risk management process.
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Table 5.4: Descriptive Characteristics
Characteristics Definition
1 ATM Event involving an ATM
2 Big banks involved Event involving big banks
3 Credit card Event involving use/misuse of a credit card
4 Derivatives Event involving a derivative transaction
5 Multiple people Event imitated by many people
6 Single person Event initiated by an individual
5.3.3 Descriptive Characteristics
The previous two sections provide essential elements for the following study, but in order
to get better insight, some supplement characteristics will also be applied. The charac-
teristics listed in 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 present the factors that lead to the risk events without a
description of the event itself. It is possible that being unable to properly describe events
can lead to a loss of information in the encoding process and reduces the understanding
of the causes of events. A descriptive characteristics set were added and these are shown
in Table 5.4.
5.4 A presentation of tree outcome
As the original presentation of trees is unreadable due to the size of tree files, a summary
of the major branch structure of the tree outcome from the analysis is presented in Table
5.5. Level 1, Level 2, Level 3 shows the first 3 levels or branches of the trees, and the
columns next to themshow the total number of branches for a specific characteristics
combination in the next Level. If there is no next level, the number will be 0, e.g. the first
Level 1 characteristic combination “Complex transaction/Computer hacking/International
transaction/Credit card” has no Level 2 characteristic hence the number is 0. Due to the
limitation of pages (if all of them are included, this thesis will be over 1000 pages. These
trees will be made avaliable in electronic format with the thesis.), other tables will not be
presented in the context of this thesis.
Table 5.5: Transformation of tree of US market 2008-2010
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Poor controls 11 Big banks in-
volved/External
fraud
2 Multiple people 0
Internal fraud/Crime 0
Big banks involved 5 Legal issue 4
0




























2 Regulatory issues 0
External fraud 0
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Computer hacking 2 Multiple people 0
0































External fraud 5 Money laundering 3
Credit card 0
0





4 Legal issue 2 Crime 0
Multiple people 0
Offshore fund 0
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Complex transaction 0
Internal fraud 7 Multiple people/Poor
controls
3 External fraud 2
0
Multiple people 0
Money laundering 3 Multiple people 2
0
Poor controls 9 Single person 4 Big banks involved 3
0





External fraud 2 Legal issue 0
0











4 Internal fraud 0
Complex products 0















6 Poor controls 2 0
Complex transaction 0
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2 Poor controls 0
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3 Poor controls 0
0
Complex transaction 0















Derivatives 5 Multiple people 3
Single person 2
External fraud 14 Computer hack-
ing/Credit card
0


















Complex transaction 3 Multiple people 0
0
Single person 0





5.5 Results for AU with Descriptive Characteristic Set
This analysis includes both single period results and cumulative years results to under-
stand better how the relationships between the characteristics may be changing. The cu-
mulative tree shows possible new combinations of characteristics as new events are added,
which makes it easier to detect emerging risks from these new combinations.
Figures in Appendix C show the results of the analysis in the typical tree format for the
entire period. The analysis on year by year basis is shown in Figure C.1 to Figure C.3 in
Appendix C. Figure C.4 to Figure C.7 in Appendix C show the analysis across cumulative
years.
While it is tempting to interpret the trees resulting from the analysis as indicating path
dependency, there is a significant difference between the cladistics analysis and that re-
quired to demonstrate path dependency. The cladistics methodology simply identifies the
characteristics involved in operational risk events and orders the risk events into groups
that exhibit common characteristics such that there are the least number of branches from
Level 1 through to the unique characteristics for each event. It is also important to note
that Level 1 characteristics do not necessarily have to have occurred first as would be
required for evidence of path dependency. It is also important to appreciate that we are
analysing operational risk events across the Australian banking industry, and not for any
one particular bank, where it may be possible to demonstrate dependency of the charac-
teristics based on better information as to what has caused particular characteristics to
arise.
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 summarise the results from the trees in Appendix C. The analyse
of events including both independent periods and cumulative periods to ascertain the sta-
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bility of the Level 1 characteristics as independent periods may have bias from different
numbers of events and also from the timing of reporting of events. The Tables show the
periods in which each characteristic appears as a Level 1 characteristic and illustrates the
relative importance (over 5% of total events) of each characteristic that we have included
in the analysis.
Table 5.6: Significant Level 1 Characteristics for Events in AU Markets (Cumulative
periods, Derived characteristics).







Crime X X X X X
Derivatives
Employment issues












Poor controls X X X X X
Regulatory failure X
Single person X X X X X
Software system
The significant Level 1 characteristics of cumulative periods are Crime, External fraud,
Legal issue, Poor controls and Single person.
The significant Level 1 characteristics of independent periods are Crime, External fraud,
Legal issue, Poor controls and Single person.
The results indicate:
1. For individual years, poor controls are a major Level 1 characteristic, followed by
external fraud, legal issues and single persons.
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Multiple people involved X
Offshore fund
Overcharging
Poor controls X X X
Regulatory failure
2. For cumulative years, where the analysis is simply adding more events without con-
sideration as to when they were reported, poor controls, external fraud, legal issues and
single persons emerge again, as would be expected. At the Level 2, complex products,
internal fraud and regulatory failures appear as well as a new emerging characteristic,
multiple people. The emergence of multiple people as a Level 2 characteristic is the result
of combining more events and the algorithm used which has allowed this characteristic to
emerge when it would not have done so in individual years as the multiple year analysis
includes more events where multiple people involved occurs.
3. There are a lot of traditional characteristics, e.g. employment issues that are assumed
to drive operational risk events that have not appeared as being very important, and this
suggests they could be ignored, or at least given less attention from management.
4. Both multiple people and a single person characteristic can occur, i.e. risk events are
not uniquely characterised by requiring a single person to be involved, nor by requiring
groups of people to be involved, and risk prevention needs to recognise this possibility
and not concentrate on one of these characteristics alone;
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5. The combinations of characteristics have changed over time, and by way of illustration,
the poor controls Level 1 characteristic has combined in each year with new characteristics
to result in increasing risk events. In 2010 it combined with regulatory failure and human
error to result in three risk events, but by 2014 if you consider both the poor controls and
the combined poor controls/external fraud branches had combined with regulatory failure,
complex transaction, money laundering, crime, internal and external fraud, multiple and
single people involved, computer hacking, misleading information and an offshore fund
being involved to result in eight significant events. This illustrates the need to have put in
place improved controls to avoid even greater losses.
To illustrate the overall importance of the characteristics, Table 5.8 shows the percentage
of total operational risk event losses where the characteristic is present:
Table 5.8: Ranking of Risk Event Losses by Characteristics














Poor control is a major characteristic of Australian banks operational risk events, and the
analysis would indicate that attention to controls would have a significant effect on reduc-
ing operational risk event losses. Alternatively, failing to improve controls in the banks is
likely to result in increasing losses as new combinations of characteristics emerge.
Importantly, there is consistency across the individual years for the Level 1 and Level 2
characteristics, indicating stability of the characteristics, which is important information
for management as it indicates the maximum effect on operational risk events could be
achieved by concentrating on these characteristics.
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5.6 Results for US with Descriptive Characteristic Set
Figure D.1 to Figure D.3 in Appendix D show the cladistics trees for the US market with
derived characteristics in individual periods. Figure D.1, Figure D.4 to Figure D.7 in
Appendix D show the Level 1 characteristics for cumulative periods. Table 5.9 and Table
5.10 summarise the Level 1 characteristics in each tree.
Table 5.9: Significant Level 1 Characteristics for Events in US Markets (Cumulative
periods, Derived characteristics).
2008-2010 2008-2011 2008-2012 2008-2013 2008-2014
ATM
Bank cross selling
Big banks involved X X X X X
Complex products
Complex transaction X





External fraud X X X X
Insurance
Internal fraud X X X X
International transaction
Legal issue X X X X
Manual process
Misleading information X X
Money laundering
Multiple people X X
Offshore fund
Overcharging
Poor controls X X X
Regulatory issues X X X X
Single person X
Software issue
The significant Level 1 characteristics of cumulative periods are Regulatory issues, Legal
issues, Internal fraud, External fraud and Big banks involved.
The significant Level 1 characteristics of independent periods are Regulatory issues, Mul-
tiple people, Poor controls, Legal issue, Internal fraud, Crime, External fraud, Misleading
information, Computer hacking and Big banks involved.
The results indicate:
1. For individual years, the major characteristics leading to risk events are Poor controls,
Legal issue, Internal fraud, Crime, External fraud, Misleading information and Computer
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Big banks involved X X X
Complex products
Complex transaction





External fraud X X
Insurance
Internal fraud X X
International transaction
Legal issue X X
Manual process
Misleading information X X
Money laundering
Multiple people X X X
Offshore fund
Overcharging
Poor controls X X X
Regulatory issues X X
Single person X
Software issue
hacking. For cumulative years, Regulatory issues, Legal issues, Internal fraud, External
fraud are the main Level 1 characteristics. The significant difference between cumulative
years and individual periods reveals the instability of environment in individual periods.
For instance, Regulatory issue does not appear in the first period in individual years, but
continuously emerges as a Level 1 characteristic in cumulative years. This is consis-
tent with real world, where numerous fines occur after years of investigation after the
GFC.
2. Big banks involved always appears as a Level 1 characteristic both in independent peri-
ods and cumulative years, and indicates that big banks incur similar operational risk events
to other banks, whilst the contrary is often claimed in operational risk management. In the
US analysis, 44.3% reported losses involved big banks. While Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (2006) uses gross income as an indicator to calculate regulatory capital in
the Basic Indicator Approach which implies a positive relationship between bank size and
operational risk exposure, some empirical studies (Sharifi et al. 2016, Tandon & Mehra
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2017) show the size of banks inversely related to the capital held for operational risk, and
big banks have well developed framework for operational risk management compared to
other banks. The result of current study reveals big banks do not overwhelm other banks
in operational risk management.
Table 5.11 shows the percentage of total operational risk event losses where a characteris-
tic is present. What is interesting is that regulatory issues appear in more than 50% of the
total losses after the first period of investigation, which may reflect the hysteretic nature
of regulators in the US.
Table 5.11: Ranking of Risk Event Losses by Characteristics, only characteristics above
1% are listed.










Bank cross selling 1.7%
Overcharging 1.1%
5.7 Results for EU with Descriptive Characteristic Set
Table 5.12 and Table 5.13 below summarises the results from Figure E.1 to Figure E.7 for
the EU operational risk events in Appendix E.
The significant Level 1 characteristics of cumulative periods are Big banks involved,
Crime, Internal fraud, Misleading information, Poor controls and Regulatory issues.
The significant Level 1 characteristics of independent periods are Big banks involved,
Crime, Internal fraud, External fraud, Legal issues, Poor controls and Regulatory is-
sues.
The results indicate:
1. The EU market has relatively stable Level 1 characteristics both in independent pe-
riods and cumulative years. For cumulative years, the significant Level 1 characteristics
are Crime, Internal fraud, Misleading information, Poor controls and Regulatory issues.
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Table 5.12: Significant Level 1 Characteristics for Events in EU Markets (Cumulative
periods, Derived characteristics)
2008-2010 2008-2011 2008-2012 2008-2013 2008-2014
ATM
Bank cross selling





Crime X X X
Derivatives
Employment issues
External fraud X X X
Human error
Insurance
Internal fraud X X X X
International transaction
Legal issues X X
Manual process X X
Misleading information X X X
Money laundering X
Multiple people X X
Offshore fund
Overcharging
Poor controls X X X
Regulatory issues X X X X X
Single person
Software issues
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Crime X X X
Derivatives
Employment issues
External fraud X X
Human error
Insurance
Internal fraud X X
International transaction







Poor controls X X
Regulatory issues X X X
Single person
Software issues
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Table 5.14: Ranking of Risk Event Losses by Characteristics, only characteristics above
1% are listed.














Table 5.15: Important Level 1 characteristics for AU, US and EU market
AU US EU
Crime Big banks involved Big banks involved
External fraud External fraud Crime
Legal issue Internal fraud Internal fraud
Poor controls Legal issues Legal issues
Single person Poor controls Poor controls
Regulatory issues
For independent periods, the significant Level 1 characteristics are Crime, Internal fraud,
External fraud, Legal issues, Poor controls and Regulatory issues.
2. Similar to US market, Big banks emerge as a significant Level 1 characteristic in the EU
market. Crime is significant in the EU market, but Crime events cause minor losses.
Table 5.14 shows the percentage of total operational risk event losses where the charac-
teristic is present. Similarly, to the US market, the regulatory issue is involved in most of
the losses.
5.8 Comparison of AU, EU and US results with Descrip-
tive Characteristic Set
The most important Level 1 characteristics for the AU, US and EU markets are sum-
marised in Table 5.15.
From Table 5.15 we can observe that:
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1. The AU market shows some different characteristics with US and EU markets. Single
person is a Level 1 characteristic in the AU market while it does not emerge in US and
EU markets. While Regulatory issues is important in both US and EU market, it is not
a significant Level 1 characteristic in AU market. This may reflect a different regulatory
environment.
2. Although the Level 1 characteristics for the EU and US markets are the same, the two
markets show some different patterns for the Level 1 characteristics over time. Regula-
tory issues is not a Level 1 characteristic in the US from 2008-2010, whilst in the EU,
Regulatory issues is always a significant Level 1 characteristic. This may reflect lower
standards of supervision of the US market before the GFC.
3. The common drivers for EU and US markets are poor controls, regulatory issues and
internal fraud, which may well indicate that:
a) Banks, in both their daily management and business activities, are weak in process
control, and
b) Banks may not be paying sufficient attention to regulations.
5.9 Analysis with Basel Characteristics Set
5.9.1 Results for AU
Figure F.1 to Figure ?? in Appendix F show the cladistics trees for the AU market with
Basel characteristics from 2010 to 2014, both cumulative and independent periods. Table
5.16 and Table 5.17 summarise the Level 1 characteristics in each tree.
The significant Level 1 characteristics for the independent periods for the AU banks are
Improper practices, Suitability, disclosure and fiduciary, Theft and fraud (external) and
Theft and fraud (internal).
The significant Level 1 characteristics that emerge consistently over the cumulative peri-
ods in the AU market are Advisory activities, Improper practices, Suitability, disclosure
and fiduciary, Theft and fraud (external) and Theft and fraud (internal).
5.9.2 Results for US
Figure G.1 to Figure G.7 in Appendix G show the cladistics trees for the US market with
Basel characteristics from 2008 to 2014. Table 5.18 and Table 5.19 summarises the Level
1 characteristics in each tree.
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Suitability, disclosure and fiduciary X X X
Systems
Systems security X
Theft and fraud (external) X X X
Theft and fraud (internal) X X
Unauthorised activity
Table 5.17: Significant Level 1 Characteristics for Events in AU Market (Cumulative
Periods).
2010 2010-2011 2010-2012 2010-2013 2010-2014
Account management













Suitability, disclosure and fiduciary X X X X X
Systems X X X
Systems security X X
Theft and fraud (external) X X X X X
Theft and fraud (internal) X X X X X
Unauthorised activity
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Big banks involved X X X
Credit card
Derivatives









Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary X
Systems X
Systems security X X X
Theft and fraud (External) X X X
Theft and fraud (Internal) X X X
Unauthorised activity
Vendors & suppliers
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Table 5.19: Significant Level 1 Characteristics for Events in US Market (Cumulative
Periods).
2008-2010 2008-2011 2008-2012 2008-2013 2008-2014
Account management
Advisory activities X X
ATM X
Big banks involved X X X X
Credit card
Derivatives




Improper practices X X X X X
Monitoring and reporting
Multiple people X X X
Products flaws
Single person X X X
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary X X X
Systems X X
Systems security X X X X X
Theft and fraud (External) X X X X X
Theft and fraud (Internal) X X X X X
Unauthorised activity
Vendors & suppliers
The significant Level 1 characteristics for the independent periods for the US banks are
Theft and fraud (Internal); Theft and fraud (External); Systems security; Improper prac-
tice and Big banks involved.
The significant Level 1 characteristics that emerge consistently over the cumulative peri-
ods in the US banking industry are Theft and fraud (Internal), Theft and fraud (External),
Systems security, Improper practice, Multiple people, Single person and Big banks in-
volved.
5.9.3 Results for EU
Table 5.20 and Table 5.21 below summarises the results from the trees of EU operational
risk events in Figure H.1 to Figure H.7 in Appendix H.
The significant Level 1 characteristics for the EU banks over independent periods are
Theft and fraud (Internal); Theft and fraud (External); Systems security; Improper prac-
tice and Big banks involved.
The significant Level 1 characteristics for the EU banks over cumulative periods are Theft
and fraud (Internal); Theft and fraud (External); Systems security; Improper practice and
Big banks involved.
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Theft and fraud (Internal) X X X
Theft and fraud (External) X X X
Systems security X X X
Employee relations
Discrimination
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary








Multiple people X X
Single person X X
Credit card
Big banks involved X X X
ATM
Derivatives
Table 5.21: Significant Level 1 Characteristics for Events in EU Market (Cumulative
Periods).




Big banks involved X X X X X
Credit card
Derivatives




Improper practices X X X X X
Monitoring and reporting
Multiple people X X X
Products flaws
Single person X X
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary X
Systems X
Systems security X X X X X
Theft and fraud (External) X X X X X
Theft and fraud (Internal) X X X X X
Unauthorised activity
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5.9.4 Comparison of AU, US, and EU results
From the above tables, we can observe that:
1. The significant Level 1 characteristics are consistent in AU, both in individual periods
and cumulatively.
2. Consistent Level 1 characteristics leading to operational risk losses have been Theft
and fraud (Internal), Theft and fraud (External), Systems security and Improper practice.
Both the US and EU markets show similar significant Level 1 characteristics. Also, the
Level 1 characteristics are stable throughout the observed period.
3. The emergence of the Big banks involved characteristic as a significant characteristic
is indicative that big banks often are involved in more operational risk events than small
banks which may well be a result of their size and number of transactions. As a descriptive
characteristic, Big banks involved emerges in all the trees for both the EU and US as a
Level 1 characteristic. Data provider SNL Financial indicate that the largest 5 banks in US
have about 45% of the industry total assets, which is $15 trillion at the end of 2014, and
the other 6504 institutions then share 55% of the assets (Vanderpool, 2015). Considering
the market share of big banks and the results for the big banks in the cladistics analysis,
we can infer that big banks, although the number is small, play a significant role in the
creation of operational risk events due to the volume of their business activities.
4. The consistency of the key characteristics across time and across the two markets shows
that in the US and EU banking industry, the major sources of operational losses are the
same.
However, the analysis based on characteristics derived from Basel categorisation of event
types has the following weakness as a basis for analysing operational risk losses as
it:
1. Ignores the losses from poor controls, which usually underlies the risk events as an
indirect cause;
2. Ignores legal issues, which is both a driver that will directly lead to losses and a result
of other events that cause secondary damage;
3. Is not detailed enough to provide the information needed for the daily business analy-
sis.
4. Ignores regulatory change, which affects the banks significantly.
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5.10 Implications for Operational Risk Management
There are several implications from the above study:
1. The major drivers of operational risk are relatively stable across time in all three re-
gions. This stability allows management to have confidence to concentrate on reducing
the incidence and impact of these characteristics to the extent that it is cost efficient to do
so.
2. Although the Level 1 characteristics are stable in each region, there are slight differ-
ences among them. The most significant difference is the absence of Regulatory issues
in the AU market whilst in the EU and US it emerges as an important Level 1 driver. A
major cause of this is bankruptcy during the GFC and its consequences and lawsuits. EU
and US banks suffer bigger impact of the GFC. The return on equity of major banks in
Australia falls from 15% in 2007 to 10% in 2009 and recovers rapidly after then(Senate
Economics References Committee, 2012), while return on equity of US banks fall from
12% to -1% in Q4 2009b. Similarly, EU banks suffers a shortfall from about 16% in 2007
to 2% in 2011c.Another reason lays in daily risk management as numerous Regulatory
issues related events in EU and US involve failure in management process, e.g. inappro-
priate report. Therefore, the management style in different regions varies, but they may
not bring the best result in practice.
3. The characteristics in the AU, US and EU are relatively stable over time, but they
have different emerging characteristics combinations. By comparing the significant Level
1 characteristics between cumulative periods and separate periods, it is easy to see that
AU banks have the same Level 1 characteristics, whilst for the US and EU banks, there
is a slight difference between the separate period and cumulative results. This may be
caused by two reasons. The first reason is the delay in regulatory fines and penalty is-
sues. Huge operational losses often relate to regulatory issues and lawsuits. While the
damage of market risk and credit risk occurs immediately during the GFC, the impact of
operational risk is delayed to around 2012 as the investigation of regulators and lawsuit
of stakeholders is time-consuming. As discussed above, AU banks suffered less impact
from the GFC than EU and US banks, which implies they perform better in operational
risk management during the GFC, hence the response from regulators and stakeholders
is not as serious as what happened to EU and US banks. The second cause is legislative
issues. Various international regulators are constructing complex laws after the GFC in
pursuit of financial stability, e.g. Basel III. Whilst major changes in regulation occurs, AU
bData generated from Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, quarterly reported.
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/PWS/DownloadBulkData.aspx
cData available from the World Bank, annually reported. https://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/global-financial-development
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banks and regulators consider it in a more moderate way which provides a more stable
regulatory environment.
What is worth mentioning also is that comparing the common key Level 1 characteristics
of US and EU with the derived characteristics set to the key Level 1 characteristics with
the Basel characteristics set, Regulatory issues and Legal issues emerge from the analysis
using the derived characteristics but these characteristics relate to external factors which
are not included in the Basel characteristics, and this limits the usefulness of the analysis
using Basel characteristics.
This chapter manages to achieve its objective through empirical study of operational risk
events in different regions. This study presents cladistics analysis as a feasible approach
for operational risk assessment. Cladistics analysis provides management insight in all
investigated regions by presenting key drivers of operational risk events, and emerging
driver combinations which not easy to be presented by other methods.
Chapter 6
Existence of Power Law and Tipping
Points
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 presented the results of a cladistics analysis of bank operational risk events in
AU, US and the EU and determined the important characteristics of operational risk events
and their stability. A basic feature of a CAS is the existence of power law behaviour and
tipping points where the CAS becomes unstable and transitions from a stable environment
through to a further stable environment. In this chapter, the existence of a power law
relationship and tipping points are tested for the financial market using operational risk
events. Objectives of this chapter are to systematically analyse power law behaviour in
the financial industry and operational risk events and to explain the mechanism underlying
such behaviour. Figure 6.1 presents a visual structure of this chapter.
6.2 Phase Transition and Critical Point Analysis
The observation that the output of natural and social systems follows a heavy tailed power
law distribution has been discussed for some time. Bak et al. (1988) commented that
power law relationships have been observed in quasar lights, sunspots, currents through
resistors, and the flow of rivers. The observation of power law relationships in social
systems have also been noted in stock exchange price indices (Bak et al. 1988), the struc-
ture of the WWW and city sizes (Stumpf & Porter 2012), economic systems (Gabaix
2016) and in the commodity market (Fernholz 2017). Whilst not specifically discussing
power law distributions, earlier papers have observed that financial systems show very
heavy tails in their distributions of output. This was found in operational risk events in
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Figure 6.1: Structure of chapter 6.
Evans et al. (2008) and Ganegoda & Evans (2013) where both papers concluded that
banks had very heavy tailed operational loss distributions. However, Clauset et al. (2009)
noted that the qualitative observation that had often been used historically to determine
if a power law distribution existed is not an adequate basis for concluding the output of
a system does follow a power law distribution. Stumpf & Porter (2012) also pointed out
that just observation by itself lacks statistical support. Therefore, even if the observed
heavy tailed distribution of operational risks presents power law behaviour, a statistical
rigourous method should be applied to test the exsistence of power law. I will apply a
method by Clauset et al. (2009) in reminder of this chapter to justify the exsistence of
power law behaviour.
CAS move through phase transition to a critical point where they reorganise into a new
state (Bak 1996). The phase transition is a sudden change near the critical point, and
hence if there is a critical point, there should be a phase transition. For instance, there is a
phase transition in financial market during the GFC (Liu et al. 2015, Jurczyk et al. 2017).
However, there is no such transition in the study period for operational risk. As shown in
section 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7, it is clear that from 2008 to 2014, there is no significant change
in the Level 1 characteristics, which reflects a relatively stable environment. Therefore,
the phase transition in AU, US and EU market does not exist, and there is no critical point
through that period. In next section, a model derived from physics is provided.
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6.3 Test for Operational Risk
Stumpf & Porter (2012) comments that many observed power law distributions lack sta-
tistical support and accordingly the test for a power law distribution in this section will
follow three steps. Firstly, estimating the power law parameters, i.e. the exponent and
the lower boundary x min, then evaluating the performance of power law distribution, i.e.
if power law is statistically feasible with the current data. And thirdly a comparison will
be made with other distributions to find out if power law is the best fit.
6.3.1 Estimation of parameters and Lower boundaries
As mentioned in Chapter 3, I estimated the threshold xmin and its corresponding scaling
parameter for AU, US and EU operational losses were estimated as shown in Table 6.1.
The lower bound on power-law behaviour for AU, US and EU losses is 100000, 100000
and 99989.11 respectively. The data over this threshold is the data being tested to see if the
power law is a good fit. Using the maximum likelihood estimation, α is estimated.





6.3.2 Performance of power law distribution
The statistical test shown in Table 6.2 shows that for all three regions, the loss data follows
a power law distribution, as the p-value is over 0.05 in AU, US and EU.
Table 6.2: Performance of power law distribution for losses in AU, US and EU.




6.3.3 Comparison with other distributions
Following Clauset et al. (2009) methodology, a comparison of a power law distribution
and a log-normal distribution for the operational risk losses is presented in Table 6.3. For
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all three regions, the log-normal distribution is a better fit to the operational risk event
losses.
Table 6.3: Comparison of power law distribution to log-normal distribution.





In general, we can state there is a power law behaviour for operational risk events, whilst it
is not the best fit distribution. However, there are several issues need to be identified in this
test. Firstly, does it matter if operational risk losses do not present power law behaviour?
The above test has presented that operational risk events present power law behaviour,
but there are other distributions that fit data better (e.g. log-normal in this study). As
Stumpf & Porter (2012) pointed out, most reported power laws lack statistical support. In
this case, there is statistical support while the statistics also support other distributions. In
previous work (Li et al. 2018), we argue that the precise fitting to a power law distribution
is not the critical issue, as long as the distributions are heavy tailed distributions. What
is crucial is the mechanism behind this, as some (Avnir et al. 1998, Keller 2005) doubted
the usage of the power law in CASs.
Hence the second issue that needs to be identified is the mechanism behind such a dis-
tribution in operational risk events. The origin of power laws in the banking sector and
operational risk events are different. For power laws in the financial market, e.g. banking
sectors and insurance companies, the mechanism behind them is self-organised critical-
ity. Researchers have identified criticality in financial markets, with Liu et al. (2015) and
Gatfaoui et al. (2017) identifying patterns of near-critical behaviour before a financial cri-
sis where the stock market moves toward a certain direction, and suddenly changes to a
different direction. Such sudden change is caused by the interaction of participants in the
market.
On the other hand, for operational risk events, the power law behaviour originated from
highly optimised tolerance. For a highly optimised tolerance (HOT) state, the key fea-
tures can be identified from the operational risk management as CAS as the system is
showing high efficiency and robust to designed-for uncertainties but sensitive to design
flaws and sensitive to unanticipated perturbations (Carlson & Doyle 1999). Banks are
designed to be high efficiency systems and are able to have high performance when the
environment changes moderately. Such modular configurations could handle anticipated
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changes and common perturbations, but even a small unanticipated event may destroy
HOT. Considering the case of financial institutions as the environment where operational
risks emerge, financial institutions are well prepared for certain types of events, but unan-
ticipated perturbations may result in a huge effort. For instance, a German clerk holding
down 2 key which results in a 222,222,222.22-euro misplaced transaction took place (and
this transaction passed supervisory examination). As a result of HOT, operational risk
events present power law behaviour.
Operational risk events present power law behaviour, but there is no critical point in the
examined period. This is mainly determined by the relatively low severity and connec-
tivity of operational risk events. The policies of government and regulators in the GFC
stabilised banks, as their efforts, e.g. quantitative easing 2, will encourage investment
in higher yielding asset (e.g. stocks and commodities) and result in higher income and
profits, hence reduce the function of loss/gross income.
A major reason that a critical point may not be reached is that operational risk events
usually have relatively low severity, and the operational risk events network is not highly
connected as most operational risk events are internal to the banks. For instance, a total
number of 873 institutions are involved in the reported operational risk events in EU
market, but about 40% involved institutions that do not connect to other banks through
any events, and only 11 reported institutions connected to more than 10 other institutions
through operational risk events. The vertex connectivity of the EU operational event
network is 0 which implies the connectivity of EU operational risk network is not strong.
Figure 6.2 shows the connectivity of banks through operational risk events in EU markets.
By observation, the connectivity is not high. Similarly, the severity of operational risk
events is relatively low compare to the extreme values of credit and market risk (e.g. in Li
et al. (2015), the VaR of operational risk is significantly lower than of credit and market
risk at each confidence level). As a result, operational risk events usually do not reach a
critical point.
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Figure 6.2: Operational risk events network for EU markets from 2008 to 2014. A vertex
represents a bank, and the links represent the linkage of banks in a risk event.
Chapter 7
An Application of the Cladistics Results
to an Extreme Operational Risk Pooling
Concept
7.1 Introduction
Li et al. (2017) analysed extreme operational risk events in US and EU banks from 2008
to 2014 based on data provided by ORIC International, where an extreme event was one
where the recorded loss was greater than $US100 million. The number and amount of the
extreme operational risk losses determined by Li et al. (2017) are summarised in Table
??:
Table 7.1: Extreme Operational Risk Losses
Losses Number of Events Losses ($ US Million)
US EU US EU
>$ 1b 40 25 654,147 183,812
$500m to $1b 64 11 14,491 7,515
$100m to $500m 23 24 13,407 5,590
Total 127 60 682,045 196,917
Over the period 2008 2014, US banks incurred almost $700 billion losses from extreme
operational risk events, and EU banks incurred almost $200 billion losses. In terms of rel-
ative impact, losses over $1 billion clearly have the greatest impact on profits and extreme
operational risk losses in banks appear highly skewed which is consistent with the results
in Ganegoda & Evans (2013). Just to put these losses into perspective, the total assets of
US and EU banks at the end of 2014 were $US16 trilliona and $US 23 trillionb respec-
ahttps://ycharts.com/indicators/us banks total assets
bEuropean Central Bank, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150828.en.html and X-
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tively, spread across 5573 US banks and 3972 EU banking groups. Whilst he number of
banks incurring the extreme operational risk events is then relatively small and the impact
on the banks asset bases is moderate, there is a much greater impact on the share price and
hence the reputation of the offending banks. Sturm (2013) considers the impact on Ger-
man banks share price of announcements of operational losses and concluded that there
was evidence of negative cumulative abnormal returns following both the announcement
of the operational loss and the announcement of the settlement. Similarly, Fiordelisi et al.
(2014) concludes from a study of US and EU banks operational risk losses between 1994
and 2008 that there was substantial reputational damage following the announcement of
the losses. Given the likely disproportionate impact on each banks reputation when an
extreme operational risk event occurs, it may well be in the interests of banks to develop a
pooling or insurance arrangement for these larger losses to reduce the impact, especially
on share price of the individual bank. Such a pooling arrangement may well be of interest
to regulators as significant reputational damage to a bank may well affect the stability
of the banking system. I will only consider the feasibility of an inter-bank pooling ar-
rangement, but I recognise that insurers may well be able to offer insurance even if an
inter-bank pooling arrangement were not feasible.
7.2 Sustainable Pooling Issues
The main actuarial criteria for a sustainable pooling arrangement for extreme operational
risk events is that the expected frequency and severity of claims must be reasonably pre-
dictable within acceptable bounds. To achieve this the pool needs a sufficiently large
number of participants with identifiable and bounded potential losses and where the dif-
ferent risks are priced appropriately. In addition, the feasibility of the pooled arrangement
would be greatly enhanced if there could be shown there was a low expected correlation
of events across the banks as this would allow a pricing structure that would be advanta-
geous to participating banks as their contribution to the pool would be less than the losses
potentially incurred by themselves and effectively allow a spreading of costs across banks
and across time. Given the low frequency of observed extreme operational risk events,
and the actuarial importance of the correlation of extreme operational risk events to the
feasibility of the pool concept, I will use two approaches to analyse the historical occur-
rence of extreme operational risk events:
1. First, the Pearson coefficient will be calculated for losses v. year of occurrence and
bank name v. year of occurrence to determine statistically the independence of the ex-
treme operational risk events. As the number of events being considered is relatively
RATES http://www.x-rates.com/average/?from=USD&to=EUR&amount=1&year=2014
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small, which reduces the reliability of statistical measures, this study will also investigate
the number of banks with single year events and multiple year events as a proxy for the
frequency of events and observe for those with single events, the distribution of the events
across the years as a proxy for correlation;
2. Secondly, given the relatively small number of extreme operational risk events that
can be quantitatively assessed with any reliability for determining future occurrences, I
will use a qualitative assessment and consider the underlying characteristics of the histor-
ical extreme operational risk events to determine the drivers of the events as a means of
understanding the commonality of the drivers and hence the likely correlation of future
events.
7.3 Empirical Analysis
Table 7.2 shows the Pearson Coefficient for US and EU extreme operational risk losses
against the year of loss, and also the year of loss against the bank name which was deter-
mined by giving each bank a unique numerical code.
Table 7.2: Pearson Coefficient
Year v. Loss Year v. Bank
US 0.011 -0.254
EU -0.144 -0.044
To test the reliability of the Pearson coefficients, the data was categorised into 3 periods,
2008-2010, 2011-2012 and 2013-2014. Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 show the distribution of
the number of banks incurring multiple period losses, and the average loss.
Table 7.3: US Banks, Distribution of Multiple Events
Number of Total Losses
Percentage of Banks
Average Loss Per Bank
Periods of Losses ($US bill) ($US bill)
1 $513 77% $ 12
2 $20 13% $ 3
3 $97 10% $ 16
Table 7.4: EU Banks, Distribution of Multiple Events
Number of Total Losses
Percentage of Banks
Average Loss Per Bank
Periods of Losses ($US bill) ($US bill)
1 $42 75% $2
2 $103 25% $13
3 $0 0% $0
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Table 7.5: US Banks, Distribution of Single Events




Table 7.6: EU Banks, Distribution of Single Events




Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 show the distribution of single events across the periods:
The Pearson coefficient indicates there is no significant correlation between losses and
years, nor between years and banks, indicating that for the period analysed, losses are
reasonably independent within the constraints of the measure used and the relatively small
data used. The results in Tables 7.2 to 7.6 empirically support the implication of the
Pearson coefficient and indicate that during the period 2008-2014, around 75% of banks
in the US and the EU with extreme operational risk losses had a loss in only 1 period, i.e.
most of the banks are not serial offenders. In the US, most of the losses by value have
occurred in banks with losses in only one period, but this pattern is not observed in the
EU where those banks with events in two periods have the most losses by valuec. The
US banks with events in all three periods have larger average losses than the other US
banks and in the EU banks, those with events in two periods have higher average losses
than those banks with only one event. Overall, this analysis suggests that the distribution
of losses is heavy tailed with a few banks having both a higher frequency of events and
a higher severity of losses. The results in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 indicate that by number of
banks, there has been a reasonably even distribution of events across the different periods,
but the distribution by value of the losses is highly concentrated. This concentration is the
result of a very large loss by one bank, and if removed, the distribution by value of the
losses is also reasonably evenly distributed.
7.4 Qualitative Analysis
Financial markets, and financial institutions exhibit the features of a complex adaptive
system which do not lend themselves to statistical modelling (Danelsson 2008). Further,
Mittnik & Yener (2009) counselled against placing too much reliability on both Pearson
cThe data have been cleaned so that losses from an event are only recorded once, thus eliminating as far
as possible double counting of some events.
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Table 7.7: Systemic Characteristics 2008 2014
US EU
Internal fraud Legal issue
Legal issue Misleading information
Misleading information Poor controls
Poor controls Regulatory issue
Regulatory issue Software issue
coefficients and copulas when analysing operational risk co-variability. To give greater
breadth and depth to the analysis of the feasibility of a pooled arrangement for sharing ex-
treme operational risk losses across banks, particularly given the relatively small amount
of data and the skewness of the extreme operational risk losses, we have determined the
drivers of the extreme operational risk events, using a process known as cladistics analysis
to test for systemic drivers that would suggest high correlation of extreme operational risk
events.
This study use cladistics analysis to determine the degree of commonality of the drivers
of the US and EU extreme operational risk events over the period 2008 2014. A high
degree of commonality and sustainability of the main systemic drivers of the extreme
operational risk events across banks and across geographic zones would be indicative that
in the longer term, banks may well have similar events with a high correlation of losses
as the events are driven by common characteristics. The cladistic trees for US and EU
extreme operational risk losses over the period 2008 2014 are shown in Appendix I. The
most systemic characteristics, i.e. those on the left side of the trees are summarised in
Table 7.7:
The results in Table 7.7 indicate that there is significant commonality in the systemic
characteristics of the extreme operational risk events across the US and the EU banks.
This would indicate that over time, it is highly likely that there will be similar extreme
risk events in both geographic zones. Furthermore, the number of main characteristics
is reasonably small, indicating a significant commonality in the major drivers of extreme
risk events. This result is consistent with the findings of Chernobai et al. (2011) who found
what I have called poor controls was also a significant driver of operational risk events,
but this study questions the assumption Chernobai et al. (2011) made of independence of
operational risk events, and also questions the reliability of quantitative analysis, such as
the Pearson coefficient when analysing extreme events in a complex adaptive system. The
cladistics analysis has a similar objective to that of Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2016) who
analysed covariates of causes of operational risk events, but this analysis uses a different
approach and importantly, does not make any assumption as to independence of the risk
events and has shown there is significant dependence in terms of the characteristics of
extreme operational risk events.
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Table 7.8: Dominant Network Characteristics for Operational Risk Events 2008 2014
EU US
Regulatory issues Legal issue
Misleading information Misleading information




Complex transaction Internal fraud
Money laundering Complex transaction
Internal fraud International transaction
International transaction Money laundering
7.5 Network Analysis
Cladistics analysis identifies the systemic characteristics of risk events, but a closer ob-
servation of the trees in Appendix I will show that the main systemic characteristic for
a particular group of events also occurs in other groups of events at lower levels of sys-
temic importance. It is difficult to easily identify the overall extent of the influence of
some characteristics from the cladistics analysis where the characteristics occur in several
groups of events. Network analysis is concerned with the totality of the influence of char-
acteristics on the risk events and compliments the cladistics analysis. Network analysis
of the financial system is gaining attention with recent papers including Haldane & May
(2011) who looked at the systemic risk in the banking system resulting from intercon-
nectedness, Battiston et al. (2016) who argued economic policy needs interdisciplinary
network analysis and behavioural modelling and Joseph & Chen (2014) who looked at
interconnectedness indicators as predictors of potential financial crises. The following
analysis will use network analysis to indicate the overall degree of importance in the net-
work of the characteristics of extreme operational risk losses. Based on Bavelas (1950)
and Leavitt (1951) and the features of the network, this study use eigenvector centrality as
the measure of importance of the characteristics. Figure J.1 and Figure J.2 in Appendix
J sets out the network diagrams for the US and EU extreme operational risk events and
their characteristics with the major connectivity . The red dots are the extreme operational
risk events and the blue squares are the dominant characteristics that are linked to the risk
events. The more graphically central the characteristic, the more events are connected to
it. The dominant characteristics from Appendix J are summarised in Table 7.8 in descend-
ing order of degrees of connectivity which measures the number of risk events connected
to each characteristic:
The results in Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 indicate that there is not much difference between
the dominant characteristics determined by the cladistics analysis and the network anal-
CHAPTER 7. AN ANALYSIS OF EXTREME OPERATIONAL RISK POOLING 85
ysis, but the network analysis has found that there are more common characteristics be-
tween the US and EU banks than appears from the cladistics analysis. The combined
result is indicative of there being significant commonality of the main characteristics of
extreme operational risk events across the US and the EU, but the network analysis indi-
cates there is a reasonable range of causes of the extreme operational risk events.
7.6 Feasibility of an Extreme Operational Risk Pool
As stated, in order for a pooled arrangement for sharing extreme operational risk losses
across banks to be actuarially sustainable, it is necessary that there are a large number
of participants, the expected losses are reasonably determinable, and to be economically
attractive, correlations of these extreme operational risk events between the participants
should be low. This analysis shows: 1. The EU and US banking systems do have a large
number of potential participants. 2. The number of banks with extreme operational risk
events is relatively small, and the losses are highly skewed, indicating that statistically
based pricing may be difficult. 3. The banks with extreme operational risk events do
not appear to be serial offenders, i.e. the losses appear to be reasonably spread over the
banks that have these losses. 4. There are a small number of the main characteristics or
drivers of the extreme operational risk events, but these main drivers occur also as lower
level characteristics in other risk events, and the overall number of significant drivers is
reasonably large. These features of extreme operational risk events would suggest that
it might be difficult to convince a large number of banks who have not incurred these
extreme losses to join a pooled arrangement, and for the pool to be feasible, regulatory
compulsion may be required in the interests of the economy to achieve stability of the
banking system. On the positive side, the lack of serial offenders, and the reasonably large
number of significant characteristics would suggest that sufficient diversification within
the pool may be achievable, but this is derived from the reasonably large number of drivers
of the extreme events and not from international diversification, so country specific pooled
arrangement could be feasible, at least in the US and EU. Pricing of the risks involved
would require capping the losses claimable due to the highly skewed distribution of losses
and the potential for unexpected losses.
7.7 Potential Pooled Arrangements
The analysis suggests that for at least the US and EU banks, pooled arrangements could
be established domestically, but smaller economies may need to establish pools across
several economies simply to have adequate numbers of participants. But even in the US
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and EU, compulsory participation and capping of losses that could be claimed would
be required to make the pool economically attractive. Given the results of Ganegoda &
Evans (2013), a charging structure based on each banks assets would appear reasonable
and simple to operate. Sustainability of the pool would require a cap on claims payable
in order for the range of claims to be determinable.
7.8 Conclusion
The use of a cladistics analysis on the extreme operational risk losses has provided in-
sight into the possible covariance of losses that would not be possible from the alternative
methodology based on linear regression. A pooled arrangement to insure EU and US
banks would appear feasible and would be justified in terms of the benefits to sharehold-
ers from avoiding severe share price declines when extreme operational risk events are
announced and settled, and the advantage to the community of reducing the risk of insta-
bility in the banking system.
Some issues that not discussed under the proposed framework might also impact the pool-
ing arrangement due to the lack of data, e.g. moral hazard and trust issues (Manning &
SusanMarquis (1996), Attanasio (2012)). Hence further issues should be considered be-
fore the pooling arrangement is implemented.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Insights into Operational Risk Characteristics and
Management
The purpose of this study is to understand the characteristics of operational risk in a
systematic way. In this thesis, operational risk management and operational risk was de-
scribed from a systematic aspect with cladistics analysis to present the key factors. Banks
and events from AU, US and EU market are investigated for this research. This thesis
studies those banks and events by cladistics analysis to present the key characteristics
of operational risk emergence based on the appreciation that banks operate in a CAS.
The result revealed in the post GFC period, whilst key characteristics of operational risk
events are slightly different across the AU, US and EU markets, the key characteristics
are relatively stable across time. There are power law behaviours in operational risk,
but no phase transition or critical point emerges during the investigated period. Further
study shows that a risk pool might be helpful for reducing the instability in the banking
system.
The thesis specifically illustrates:
1. The cladistics analysis finds that the major drivers of operational risk are relatively
stable across time in all three regions. This stability implies the application of such
methodology to operational risk assessment is applicable and allows management to have
confidence to concentrate on reducing the incidence and impact of these characteristics if
that is costs efficient. The Level 1 characteristics are slightly different across 3 regions,
which may suggest a different management style and management culture. The 3 regions
also have different emerging characteristics combinations, which may be caused by dif-
ferences in regulatory issues, law suits and legislative issues. In addition, it is feasible the
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evolutionary process in the financial systems allows more new combinations of charac-
teristics to occur within the financial institutions, and more quickly than would occur in
natural systems which are slower to evolve, and a few of these new combinations in the
financial systems then created catastrophic losses (Li et al. 2018).
2. The power law is not the best distributional fit for operational risk losses. Li et al.
(2018) The outcome from cladistics analysis reveals stableness in operational risks, which
implies no tipping point in operational risk during the GFC (Li et al. 2018) due to low
connectivity and relatively low severity of extreme operational risk events (e.g. in Li et al.
(2015)).
3. The application of cladistics analysis and network analysis combined with actuarial
analysis to the risk pooling issues of operational risk suggests that operational risk pooling
may need to be established domestically, with smaller economies may need to associate
with others to grant adequate numbers of participants.
This thesiss findings present the feasibility of applying the theories from other fields, i.e.
cladistics analysis and physics theory into analysing operational risk. Further, it reveals
the management environment and management style in different markets is relatively sta-
ble after the GFC. In the main financial markets, management issue and regulatory issue
are crucial to the occurrence of operational risk. This implies banks should both im-
prove their management to reduce regulatory breach in daily operation, and be aware of
its strategy to reduce law violation. A holistic and clear picture from this thesis about
introducing cladistics analysis and systems theory into operational risk management can
benefit future researchers in the study of cross-disciplinary studies of operational risk
management.
8.2 Limitations
Although the research methods in this thesis has been applied in numerous fields, it is
crucial to appreciate the underlying assumptions. Before these methods are applied to any
field, a rigorous examination of the feasibility should be applied to both the theoretical
and practical issues. Another important point is the alignment of research aim and the
research methods. For instance, cladistics could provide both categorisation and common
ancestor information, and this should be carefully selected to meet the research objective.
Coding and explanation of the outcome is highly skilled, which will limit the application
of cladistics analysis outside of an academic environment.
This study was also limited to the availability of data. The data is generated for all the
banks other than a specific bank. Therefore, the findings are more generalised to the
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banking system than any specific bank Further, it is limited to the post GFC period so that
the findings can be generalised only to this period.
8.3 Future research
This study provides an insight into operational risk based on the concept that banks oper-
ate as CAS. A single bank can be investigated if data is available using cladistics analysis.
Further, it will be interesting to develop the concept model of operational risk phase tran-
sition into a theoretical model. Finally, a development of comprehensive analysis with
cladistics analysis, networks analysis and other techniques for operational risk manage-
ment will be interesting.
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Appendix A
Identification and Assessment Tools
Banks were asked to implement following risk identification and assessment tools (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision 2011b, 2014b):
1. audit findings as an input to various operational risk management tools;
2. internal loss data collection and analysis provides meaningful information for assessing
the banks exposure to operational risk. However, about 1/3 of the banks have not fully
implemented this tool (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014b);
3. external data collection and analysis. External data indicators including gross opera-
tional loss amounts, dates, recoveries, and relevant causal information for operational risk
events from other financial institutions. Under certain situation, banks do not use external
loss data in their operational risk management because it is not consistent with their AMA
requirement (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014b);
4. risk and control self-assessments. This often refer to Risk Self-Assessment (RSA)
which banks assess potential threats and vulnerabilities, and Risk Control Self Assess-
ments (RCSA) which banks evaluates inherent risk;
5. business process mapping which identify the key steps in the overall business process.
However, this tool is not implemented by many banks due to high cost and doubted ef-
ficiency (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2014b).Kng et al. (2005) discuss the
application of business process monitoring and measurement in Credit Suisse, and state
the importance of clarifying the business needs before implementation and evaluating
tools.
6. risk and performance indicators. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014b)
point out this is the least used tool of all operational risk management tools. Scan-
dizzo (2005) discussed a methodology for mapping operational risk and described the
approach to identify relevant key risk indicators (KRI), as well as the information KRI
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conveyed.
7. scenario analysis, which is actively used by many banks for obtaining expert opinion
of business line and identifying potential operational risk events as well as estimating the
impact. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2014b) point out that some banks
use it on an ad hoc basis while others banks and academics use it only for risk measure-
ment, e.g. Dutta & Babbel (2014) discuss the scenario analysis in the measurement of
operational risk capital;
8. comparative analysis is used to compare the result from different assessment tools to
provide comprehensive view of operational risk profile for banks. It is not widely used
in banks due to the limited definition in the guideline as well as the difficulties in fully
implementing these tools before comparative analysis can be applied (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision 2014b). However, researchers use it to understand operational
risk. Anghelache & Olteanu (2009) adopt comparative analysis for the capital assessment
approaches and concludes current approaches for assessing operational risk has issues due
to identification of losses, consistency problem and subjectivity estimates. Meanwhile,
some methods are applied on irrelevant data, poor quality or too expensive (Anghelache &
Olteanu 2009). Jimenez-Rodrguez et al. (2009) further conduct comparative analysis with
data from a Spanish Saving Bank and conclude the divergences in estimating regulatory
capital for operational risk. They find non-advanced approaches, i.e. BIA and SA, provide
extremely conservative result compared with advanced measurement approach.
9. other identification and assessment activities.
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Table B.1: Oric tags and frequences.
Rank Freq Word or phrase Rank Freq Word or phrase Rank Freq Word or phrase
1 2600 robbery 35 38 dye pack 69 7 best execution
2 1445 lawsuit 36 37 kyc 70 7 churning
3 1249 theft 37 35 system failure 71 7 sustainability
4 701 skimming 38 32 counterfeit money 72 7 tracking device
5 648 money laundering 39 31 rogue trading 73 6 natural disaster
6 294 identity theft 40 28 obstruction 74 6 toxic debt
7 272 insider trading 41 26 accounting fraud 75 6 usury
8 219 embezzlement 42 25 mismanagement 76 5 bribery and corruption
9 188 collateral 43 21 energy trading 77 5 loan sharking
10 181 reward 44 21 extortion 78 4 debt recovery
11 166 phishing 45 21 patent infringement 79 4 insurance fraud
12 157 mortgage fraud 46 20 market data 80 4 libel
13 148 culture 47 20 whistleblowing 81 4 money supply
14 143 forgery 48 19 bullying 82 4 regulatory change
15 141 card fraud 49 18 arson 83 3 card forgery
16 140 hacking 50 18 cash in transit 84 3 factoring
17 113 discrimination 51 18 defamation 85 3 health and safety
18 112 assault 52 18 islamic banking 86 2 advance fee fraud
19 101 bombing 53 18 sexual harassment 87 2 application fraud
20 94 market manipulation 54 16 industrial action 88 2 inadequate supervision
21 88 misrepresentation 55 13 bomb threat 89 2 internal theft
22 82 collusion 56 13 cheque-kiting 90 2 mail theft
23 70 ponzi scheme 57 13 regulatory investigation 91 2 privacy breach
24 67 corporate governance 58 13 run on the bank 92 2 settlement failure
25 62 bank failure 59 11 investment fraud 93 2 vishing
26 60 cybercrime 60 11 procurement 94 1 advertising and marketing
27 53 organised crime 61 11 ram raid 95 1 billing fraud
28 52 accident 62 10 front-running 96 1 client money segregation
29 50 denial of service 63 10 mifid 97 1 corporate takeover
30 49 botnet 64 9 misselling 98 1 employee error
31 45 flash crash 65 9 smishing 99 1 fiduciary breach
32 44 breach of contract 66 8 industrial espionage 100 1 market intervention
33 44 information security 67 8 loan default 101 1 personal safety
34 42 outsourcing 68 7 bank takeover 102 1 ransomware
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Poor controls, Internal fraud
Multiple people involved
Investment fraud;$2m; ANZ
Tax fruad;$4m; Macquarie Bank
















Credit card fraud;$0.02m; individual
Single person
Multiple people involved, ATM
ATM fraud; $50m; various banks









Single person, Credit card
ATM; $0.1m; individuals
Multiple people involved, International transaction













Charges issues for derviatives;$15m; Goldman Sachs
Misleading Information, Derivatives
Failure to disclose; $450;NAB





Cheque processing; $0.05m; Westpac
Regulatory;$0.02; Deutsche Bank
Regulatory failure
Figure C.1: AU Tree 2010.
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External fraud, International transaction
ATM fraud; $0.04m; various banks
ATM
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Credit card fruad; $0.04m; various banks
Credit card
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ATM Fraud; $0.2; CBA
ATM
Credit card
Credit card fraud; $7m;
Complex transaction
Crime
Credit card fraud; $0.1m; Coles
ATM fraud; $0.08m; CBA
Complex transaction
Human error
Credit card fraud; $0.3m; Bank of Queensland








Figure C.2: AU Tree 2011-2012.
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Insider Trading; $7m; ABS & NAB
Internal fraud, External fraud, Multiple people involved
M theft; $0.1M; Bendigo & Adelaide Bank
Crime, ATM
Fee error; $50m; Bank of Queensland
Poor controls, Complex transaction, Manual process
Fees; $7m; ANZ
Legal issue, Overcharging
Poor controls, External fraud







Misleading advertising; $0.004m; Mortgage Choice
Regulatory failure
Fraud; $176m; Trio





Money laundering; $41m; Westpac
Regulatory failure, Complex transaction, Money laundering
Stolen Bitcoins; $1.2m; Tradefortress
Multiple people involved, Computer hacking
Figure C.3: AU Tree 2013-2014.
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Employee issue; $6m; JP Morgan
Employment issues
Credit card fraud; $0.2m; various banks








IT fraud;$3m; Bank of Queensland
External fraud











Bank cross selling, Insurance
Failure to disclose; $450;NAB
Regulatory failure, International transaction






Credit card fraud; $1m; various banks
Poor controls
ATM fraud; $50m; various banks
International transaction
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Credit card fraud; $7m;
Credit card
Fraud; $0.5m; Citibank & NAB
Human error
Poor controls
Cheque processing; $0.05m; Westpac
Human error
Project failure;$520m; CBA












Investment advice;$285m; ANZ & Prime Broking
Internal fraud
Investment fraud;$2m; ANZ
Tax fruad;$4m; Macquarie Bank











Regulatory; $0.04m; ABN Amro
Single person
Figure C.4: AU Tree 2010-2011.
APPENDIX C. TREES FOR AU MARKET WITH DATASET DERIVED CHARACTERISTICS116
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Single person, Regulatory failure
Fraud; $0.2m; individual
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Human error
Cheque processing; $0.05m; Westpac
Regulatory failure
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Regulatory;$0.02; Deutsche Bank
Regulatory; $0.04m; ABN Amro
Single person
External fraud
Fraud; $0.5m; Citibank & NAB
Complex transaction
Credit card fraud; $0.3m; Bank of Queensland
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ATM fraud; $0.04m; various banks
ATM
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Credit card fraud; $7m;
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Bank cross selling, Insurance
Failure to disclose; $450;NAB
Regulatory failure, International transaction
Charges issues for derviatives;$15m; Goldman Sachs
Misleading Information, Derivatives
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International transaction, Complex transaction
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Figure C.5: AU Tree 2010-2012.
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Bank cross selling
Money laundering; $41m; Westpac
Crime, International transaction, Money laundering
Human error
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Regulatory;$0.02; Deutsche Bank


















Stolen Bitcoins; $1.2m; Tradefortress
Poor controls, Computer hacking











Credit card fraud;$0.02m; individual
Single person
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Credit card fraud; $7m;
Complex transaction
Crime Credit card fraud; $0.1m; Coles
ATM fraud; $0.08m; CBA
Complex transaction
Multiple people involved, ATM Credit card fraud; $1m; various banks
Poor controls
ATM fraud; $50m; various banks
Multiple people involved, International transaction
Investment fraud;$150m; individuals
ATM fraud; $0.04m; various banks
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Fraud; $95m; Opes Prime
ATM Fraud; $0.2; CBA
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Bank cross selling, Insurance
Failure to disclose; $450;NAB
Regulatory failure, International transaction
Charges issues for derviatives;$15m; Goldman Sachs
Misleading Information, Derivatives
Single person
Employee issue; $6m; JP Morgan
Employment issues
Internal fraud Fraud; $0.6; individual
Fraud;$2m; AWA
International transaction, Complex transaction
Regulatory failure Fraud; $0.2m; individual
Overcharging
Insider trading;$0.09m; Lion Securities
Poor controls, Human error
Cheque processing; $0.05m; Westpac
External fraud Fraud; $0.5m; Citibank & NAB
Complex transaction
Credit card fraud; $0.3m; Bank of Queensland
Poor controls
Investment advice;$285m; ANZ & Prime Broking
Multiple people involved, Bank cross selling
Single person ATM Fraud; $0.2m
Crime
Credit card fraud; $0.2m; various banks
Legal issue
Poor controls
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Tax fruad;$4m; Macquarie Bank
International transaction, Complex transaction
Investment fraud;$2m; ANZ
Complex products Project failure;$520m; CBA
Software system
Regulatory failure; $0.05m, Credit Suisse
Human error
Figure C.6: AU Tree 2010-2013.
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Internal fraud Fraud; $70m; CBA
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International transaction
Investment fraud;$150m; individuals
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ATM
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Single person
ATM Fraud; $0.2; CBA
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Credit card fraud; $7m;
Complex transaction
Crime ATM fraud; $0.08m; CBA
Complex transaction
Credit card fraud; $0.1m; Coles
Human error Credit card fraud; $0.3m; Bank of Queensland
Fraud; $0.5m; Citibank & NAB
Complex transaction
Single person
Employee issue; $6m; JP Morgan
Employment issues
Credit card fraud; $0.2m; various banks
Poor controls, Legal issue





International transaction, Complex transaction
Fraud; $0.6; individual
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Regulatory failure Investment fraud; $2m
Money laundering; $41m; Westpac
International transaction, Complex transaction, Money laundering
Multiple people involved Fraud; $100m; Westpac
Stolen Bitcoins; $1.2m; Tradefortress
International transaction, Computer hacking
Multiple people involved, International transaction EFTPOS fraud;$50m; indivduals
ATM
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ATM; $0.1m; individuals
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International transaction, Complex transaction




Regulatory failure Regulatory;$2m; ANZ
Misleading advertising; $0.004m; Mortgage Choice
Misleading Information
Bank cross selling Misleading advice; $136m; CBA, Storm
Regulatory failure, Complex transaction
Investment advice;$285m; ANZ & Prime Broking
Multiple people involved
Human error
Cheque processing; $0.05m; Westpac
Regulatory failure
Regulatory failure; $0.08m, Barclays
International transaction, Legal issue
Regulatory;$0.02; Deutsche Bank








Bank cross selling, Insurance
Failure to disclose; $450;NAB
Regulatory failure, International transaction
Charges issues for derviatives;$15m; Goldman Sachs
Misleading Information, Derivatives
Figure C.7: AU Tree 2010-2014.
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Unnamed; $53m; fraud
Internal fraud, Money laundering
Legal issue Multiple companies; $10m; Law action
Complex transaction
State Strees Bank; $200m; Overcharging
Overcharging
Computer hacking
SecureWorks Inc.; $9m; Hacking
Crime
Multiple companies; $9.5m; Online scam
Complex transaction, International transaction, Credit card
JPMorgan; $0.64m; Hacking
Single person
DA Davidson; $0.38m; Breach in security
Genesis Securities; $0.6m; Hacking
Regulatory issues
Big banks involved
TD Bank; $0.38m; Computer hacking
Poor controls
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.1m; ID theft
Single person, Complex transaction
BoA; $0.3m; Hacking
Internal fraud, ATM, International transaction
BoA; $0.05m; Hakcing
Legal issue
Heartland Payment Systems; $41.4m; Data breach
Software issue
Poor controls
Capital One; $0.17m; Fraud
Crime, Big banks involved
TXJ; $75.18m; Computer hacking
Credit card
Ocean Bank; $0.59m; Cyber heist
Multiple people
Investor Relations International; $1.7m; Insider trading
Legal issue
Crime
M&T Bankl; $0.48m; Computer hacking
Computer hacking
H&R Block; $0.29m; ID theft
HSBC; $0.22m; ID theft
Credit card, Big banks involved
UBS; $100m; legal action
Internal fraud
Internal fraud
Merrill Lynch; $400m; Trading loss
Poor controls CalPERS; $95m; Lawsuit
Legal issue
Gryphon Holdings; $17.5m; Investment fraud
Money laundering Webster Bank; $6.2m; Fraud
Multiple banks; $2.6m; fraud
Complex transaction
External fraud
Onyx Capital Advisors; $20m; Fraud
First National Mortgage Solutions, LLC; $0.44m; Mortgage raud
Complex transaction
Fidelity ATM; $4.2m; fraud
ATM
Money laundering 3 Hebrew Boys'; Capital Consortium Group; $82m; Money laundering
Wachovia; $3.5m; Loan fraud
Crime
Computer hacking
Multiple banks; $3.86m; Cyber attack
Monarch Bank; $0.2m; Fraud
Credit card
Big banks involved Several banks; $0.68m; Identity theft
International transaction
Charles Schwab & Co.; $0.25m; Hcking
Poor controls
Ernst & Young; $8.5m; Fraud
Regulatory issues
Wells Fargo; $0.23m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Internal fraud Countrywide; $0.13m; Fraud
Mid-America Bank and Trust Co.; $10.1m; Bank fraud
Money laundering
Regulatory issues
Blue Index; $90m; Insider trading
International transaction
FINRA; $11.6m; Regulatory issues
Pequot Capital Management; $28m; Insider trading
Poor controls
Chelsey Capital; $3.5m; Insider trading
Internal fraud
Derivatives
City of San Diego; $0.08m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Trillium Brokerage Services; $2.26m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
Deutsche Bank;$1.2m; Insider default-swap case
Poor controls, Big banks involved
Misleading information
Legal issue
Discover Financial Services;$775m; Legal action
Big banks involved
Derivatives
Southridge Capital Management LLC; $26m; Regulatory failure
Regulatory issues, Overcharging
Multiple institutions; $457m; High credit rating
Big banks involved Credit Suisse; $296m; Misleading information
Insurance
JPMorgan; $98m; Legal action
Poor controls
Poor controls
Countrywide; $624m; Legal issues
Principal Financial Group; $10m; Fraud
Bank cross selling
Oppenheimer Funds; $20m; Bond fund mismanagement
Complex products
Big banks involved
BoA; $108m; Regulatory issue
Regulatory issues
BoA; $137.3m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
Goldman Sachs; $100m; Lawsuit
Wells Fargo; $1.4b; Mismarked investments
Derivatives
Bank cross selling Brookstreet Securities Corp; $300m; Misleading information
Regulatory issues, Complex products
BoA; $16.7b; Legal action
Derivatives, Big banks involved
Internal fraud
SEC; $8.4m; Legal action
Luis Hiram Rivas; $18m; fraud
Money laundering
Poor controls
Multiple companies; $1.6m; Hedge fund scam
Complex transaction
Sterling Foster & Co.; $66m; Fraud
American Express; $31m; Legal action
Legal issue
Multiple people
Multiple banks; $1.7m;Supervisory failure
Complex products
Internal fraud
Unnamed; $0.9m; Loan scam
Poor controls KL Group; $78m; Hedge fund fraud
Multiple companies; $0.06m; Identity theft
Regulatory issues
Regulatory issues Prestige Financial Center Inc; $1.3m; Fraud
Complex transaction
SafeNet; $2.98m; Option scandal
Big banks involved
TD Bank; $1m; Bank fraud
External fraud





First Bank; $18.5m; Fraud
Legal issue
Credit card Merrick bank; $16m; Computer hacking
Crime, Software issue
Several banks; $27.5m; Credit card scam
Computer hacking
Complex transaction Pierce Commercial Bank; $495m; Mortgage fraud
Poor controls, Complex products
Several companies; $2.3m; Mortgage fraud
Crime Paypal; $0.44m; fraud
Ameriquest Mortgage Company; $0.15m; Internal fraud
Poor controls, Internal fraud, Big banks involved
Big banks involved
Charles Schwab & Co.; $1.8m; Employment issues
Employment issues
Software issue
TD Bank; $1.87m; IT issues
Internal fraud
External fraud, ATM Citigroup; $2m; Crime
Multiple people
Citigroup; $5.75m; Cyber hacking
International transaction
Regulatory issues
Citigroup; $0.6m; Tax problem
Offshore fund
Complex transaction Deutsche Bank; $550m; Tax traud
Poor controls, Internal fraud, Complex products
Multiple companies; $4b; Regulatory issues
Legal issue
UBS; $780m; Regulatory failure
Crime
JPMorgan; $722m; Unlawful pament scheme
Multiple people
Misleading information Goldman Sachs; $25.73m; Regulatory breach




Goldleaf Financial Solutions; $0.17m; Embzzling
Complex transaction, Complex products
First Priority Pay; $0.5m; Embezzlment
Big banks involved
Wells Fargo; $45m; fraud
Legal issue
Crime Countrywide; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Software issue
JPMorgan; $1.1m; Stealing clients
Regulatory issues, Derivatives Several companies; $6m; Fraud
Internal fraud
Bank of Montreal; $0.15m; Incorrect marking option
Poor controls
External fraud
Sherbourne Financial; $10.2m; Online stock scam
Crime
KP Consulting; $0.56m; Wire fraud
Copiah Bank; $0.25m; Bank fraud
Poor controls, Computer hacking
Eclipse Property Solutions; $0.03m; Stealing credit card
Credit card
Several banks; $1.6m; Fraud
Complex transaction
Money laundering
Merrill Lynch; $0.78m; Fraud
Internal fraud, Employment issues
Wells Fargo; $6m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Rushford State Bank; $0.5m; Fraud
Crime
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; ATM heist
ATM, International transaction
Single person Barclays Bank; $298m; US sactions
Big banks involved
Pure Class, Inc.; $53m; Wire fraud
Poor controls
Internal fraud
Compass bank; $0.03m; Internal fraud
Software issue, Credit card
Money laundering
Homemaxx Title & Escrow LLC; $1.75m; Fraud
Single person
Fleet Bank; $1.1m; Fraud
Misleading information Coast Bank; $1.2m; Money laundering
Chicago Development and Planning; $8.4m; Fraud
Regulatory issues
Legal issue Certegy Check Services, Inc.; $0.98m; Data breach
Citadel Investment Group; $1.1m; fraud
Software issue
Software issue
Goldman Sachs; $3m; Data theft
Crime
Commerce Bank; $2m; System error
External fraud
Legal issue BGC; $1.7m; Legal action
Citizens Financial Bank; $0.03m; Poor controls
External fraud
Big banks involved
UBS; $10m; Human error
Derivatives, Complex products Citigroup; $30b; Derivatives
Complex transaction
JPMorgan; $1.1b; Subprime CDO
Misleading information
Legal issue
Morgan Stanley; $102m; Improper subprime lending
Wells Fargo; $100m; Improper bid
Complex transaction
Bank cross selling Multiple banks; $700m; Legal action
Multiple people
U.S. Bank; $30m; Risky investments
Complex products
Regulatory issues
Wachovia; $160m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Tennessee Commerce Bank; $1m; Employment issue
Legal issue
Misleading information
Next Financial Group Inc.; $0.5m; Regulatory issues
Complex transaction
ICAP; $25m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
MF Global; $10m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved Citigroup; $0.65m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
Citigroup; $1.25m; Report error
Manual process
Single person
RANLife Home Loans; $0.1m; Human error
Internal fraud
Southeast National Bank; $0.48m; Embezzlement
ATM
Misleading information Multiple companies; $1.8m; Internal fraud
EquityFX, Inc.; $8.19m; Investment scam
Bank cross selling
Big banks involved
UBS; $2.75m; Insider trading
Internal fraud Morgan Stanley; $2.5m; Embezzling
SunTrust; $0.04m; Fraud
Manual process
Figure D.1: US Tree 2008-2010.
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Citigroup; $0.02m; Fraud
Poor controls, External fraud, Big banks involved
Regulatory issues, Big banks involved
Multiple companies; $11m; Insider tradnig
Multiple people
Overcharging
Morgan Stanley; $3.3m; Improper fee arrangement
Poor controls
Bank of New York Mellon; $931.6m; Fruad
BoA; $10m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Complex products
Several banks; $4.5b; Lawsuit
Legal issue
State Street Corporation; $4.99m; Failed CDO
Several banks; $9.17m; Regulatory failure
Poor controls
Derivatives
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.3m; Market manipulation
JPMorgan; $228m; Bid rigging
Misleading information
Poor controls, Big banks involved
Goldman Sachs; $2.15b; Poor controls
Internal fraud




Stewardship Fund LP; $35m; Mortgage restructuring scheme
Misleading information, Complex products
Derivatives
Morgan Keegan & Co.; $64m; Fraud
External fraud
First Republic Securities Company; $0.87m; Lawsuit
Legal issue
Internal fraud
InfrAegis, Inc.; $20m; Fraud
Misleading information
Commonwealth Advisors Inc.; $32m; Hiding losses
Poor controls
Internal fraud
ClassicCloseouts.com; $5m; Wire fraud
Overcharging
Money laundering
Pisgah Community Bank; $0.6m; Internal fraud
Multiple people
Capitol Investments; $82m; Investment fraud
Universal Brokerage Services; $194m; Money laundering
Derivatives
Big banks involved
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.14m; Currency trade fraud
ATM
BoA; $0.42m; Internal ATM fraud
Computer hacking
Single person
U.S. Bank; $0.03m; Swindling customer
Crime
Several banks; $0.4m; Hacking
Poor controls
BoA; $0.4m; ATM theft
Derivatives
Credit Suisse; $1.1b; Fraud
Misleading information
JPMorgan; $0.03m; Bid rigging
Software issue
Nasdaq OMX; $40m; Software issues
All banks; $15m; Regulatory issues
Regulatory issues
Crime
Cornerstone Bank; $6000; Robbery
Single person
Chelsea State Bank; $0.38m; Fraud
Poor controls, External fraud
Regulatory issues
Several firms; $0.91m; Overcharging
Overcharging




Hold Brothers On-Line Investment Services; $4m; Stock manipulation
Offshore fund
SEC; $17.7m; Penny stock
Multiple people
Pentagon Capital Management Plc; $76.8m; Mutual fund trading
Big banks involved
Credit Suisse; $1.75m; Regulatory breach
Derivatives
UBS; $8m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Misleading information
NYSE; $5m; Insider trading
Multiple people
Brookstone Securities; $2.6m; Misleading information
Complex products
Fannie Mae; $440b; Misleading investor
Derivatives
Compass Group Management; $1.4m; Insider trading
Misleading information, Complex products
Raymond James Financial Inc.; $300m; Regulatory issues
Deutsche Bank; $1.1b; Derivatives
Big banks involved
Derivatives, Big banks involved
Several banks; $39.9m; Bank fraud
External fraud
Goldman Sachs; $0.06m; Insider trading
Multiple people, Complex products
Regulatory issues, Multiple people
SureInvestment LLC; $4.9m; Regulatory issues
Poor controls
Several companies; $30.6m; Securities fraud
Internal fraud
Rocky Mountain Bank & Trust; $0.11m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
Rodman & Renshaw Capital Group; $0.34m; Regulatory issue
JP Turner & Company; $0.46m; Regulatory failure
Poor controls
Regulatory issues, International transaction
JPMorgan; $83.3m; Breaking US saction
Big banks involved
Money laundering
M&T Bank; $3.6m; Money laundering
Standard Chartered Bank; $300m; Money laundering
Big banks involved
Offshore fund
Credit Suisse; $3b; Tax evasion
Credit card, Big banks involved






Twin Capital Management; $25m; Computer hacking
Crime
Unnamed; $850m; Cyber gang
International transaction
Carder Profit; $205m; Hacking
Credit card
Legal issue
Comerica Bank; $1.9m; Cyber attack
Poor controls
Professional Business Bank; $0.47m; Hacking
Crime, Big banks involved
U.S. Bank; $0.11m; Crime
Single person




Garda Cash Logistics; $2.3m; Crime
West-Aircomm Federal Credit Union; $0.4m; ATM theft
ATM
Multiple people
Dwelling House Savings and Loan; $2.5m; Fraud
Money laundering
Several companies; $13m; ID theft
International transaction
ATM
Unnamed; $2.3m; ATM skimming
External fraud
Eastern Bank; $0.02m; ATM skimming
Big banks involved
External fraud
Several banks; $10m; Fraud
Internal fraud
Multiple banks; $1.5m; Phishing
Computer hacking
JPMorgan; $384m; Legal issues
ATM
Fidelity National Information Services; $13m; Online theft
Computer hacking
Citigroup; $2100; ATM skimming
Big banks involved
UBS; $10.59m; Employment issue
Employment issues
Manual process
Capital One; $210m; Deceptive marketing
Poor controls





Several companies; $7.2b; Overcharging
Overcharging, Credit card
Big banks involved
HSBC; $5.5m; Legal issue
Software issue
Citigroup; $1.4m; Legal issues
Bank of New York Mellon; $2b; Lawsuit
Overcharging
Several banks; $303m; Tax issue
International transaction
Derivatives
Several banks; $2.9b; Legal action
Misleading information
HSBC; $526m; Fraud
Citigroup; $54.3m; Legal issue
Regulatory issues
Complex products




Goldman Sachs; $600m; Poor controls
Poor controls




BoA; $0.93m; Emoployment issues
Poor controls










BoA; $2.8b; Legal issues
Misleading information, Complex transaction
Derivatives
Legal issue




Deutsche Bank; $1b; Legal action
Internal fraud
New Mexico Finance Authority; $40m; Fraud
Fire Finance; $200m; Fraud
Multiple people
NAPFA; $46m; Fraud
Legal issue, Bank cross selling
Internal fraud
Community State Bank; $2m; Fraud
Single person
Multiple companies; $1.7m; Bank fraud
Poor controls









UBS; $0.5m; Tax issues
Big banks involved
Misleading information




Taylor Bean & Whitaker; $1.9b; fraud
Credit card




M&T Bank; $0.22m; Mail fraud
Internal fraud
SAC Capital Advisors; $4m; Fraud
Legal issue
Allied Home Mortgage Corp.; $834m; Lending fraud
Insurance




Goldman Sachs; $37m; Legal action
Derivatives
BoA; $2.6m; Mortgage fraud
Money laundering
Big banks involved
Wells Fargo; $2.1m; Fraud
ATM
Chase Bank; $0.01m; Fraud
Poor controls
Chase Bank; $0.06m; ATM fraud
Wells Fargo; $0.02m; Fraud
Crime
Regulatory issues, Internal fraud
ICP Asset Management; $23.5m; Fraud
Derivatives
Individual; $170m; International transaction
Multiple people, Internal fraud
Community Bank & Trust; $6m; Fraud
Poor controls
Several companies; $63.8m; Stock fraud
External fraud, Complex transaction
Several banks; $3m; Hacking
Computer hacking, Big banks involved
CDR Financial Products; $3m; Fraud
Poor controls
MF Global; $1b; Poor controls
Legal issue
Chase Bank; $1m; Legal issue
Big banks involved
Lehman Brothers; $450m; Legal action
Bank cross selling
Highridge Futures Fund; $50m; Poor controls
Misleading information
FirstCity Bank; $7m; Internal fraud
Internal fraud
Taylor, Bean & Whitaker; Ocala Funding LLC; $7.6b; Lawsuit
Internal fraud
New Mexico Finance Authority; $40m; Faked audit
Manual process
First California Bank;$0.68m; Fraud
Software issue
Nasdaq OMX; $13m; Software issues
CME Group; $0.5m; Code theft
Internal fraud
Several companies; $300m; Data breach
Credit card
Legal issue
Rosenthal Collins Group LLC; $1m; Software issues
AXA Rosenberg; $242m; IT error
Manual process
Regulatory issues
Ocean Bank; $10.9m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Pacific National; $7m; Regulatory failure
Offshore fund
Zions Bank; 8m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
Multiple comanies; $2.85m; Hacking
Computer hacking
Derivatives
Infinium Capital Management; $0.85m; Computer error
Complex transaction, Software issue
Guggenheim Securities; $0.87m; Poor controls
Yorkville Advisors LLC; $280m; Fraud
Misleading information
Misleading information
FXCM; $10m; Regulatory failure





Deutsche Bank; $12b; Hi up loss
Big banks involved
Jefferies & Company, Inc.; $1.93m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
Internal fraud
Ozark Heritage Bank; $0.02m; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved
Citigroup; $0.5m; Regulatory failure
Regions Bank; $200m; Mortgage securities fraud
Derivatives
UBS; $160.2m; Bond scheme
Complex transaction
Big banks involved
HSBC; $1b; Money laundering
Money laundering
Goldman Sachs; $22m; Systems failure
Software issue
Derivatives, Big banks involved
UBS; $0.3m; Fund priceing violation
Complex products
Wells Fargo; 11.2m; Regulatory issues
Complex transaction
Wells Fargo; $2m; Regulatory failure
JPMorgan; $3.62m; Sale of risky investment
Misleading information
Figure D.2: US Tree 2011-2012.
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Poor controls
Huntington National Bank; $3.6b; Incorrect forclosure
Global Payments; $93.9m; Data breach
Software issue
Manual process




Maiden Capital; $9m; Fraud
Regulatory issues
State Retirement Systems of Illinois; $2.2b; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
Victorville; $65m; Misleaing investors
Atlas ATM Corp.; $0.05m; Fee notice failure
ATM
Big banks involved
UBS; $50m; Mortgage fine
Derivatives
Morgan Stanley; $1.12m; Unfair pricing
BoA; $800m; Credit card products
Credit card
Morgan Stanley; $275m; Misleading investors
Complex products
Legal issue
First Horizon National Corporation; $110m; Mortgage claims
Derivatives
Blackstone Group; $85m; Disclosure lawsuit
Arrowhead Capital Management; $100m; fraud
External fraud
Merrill Lynch; $11m; Misleading information
Complex transaction
Complex products
UBS; $0.4m; Misleading information
Poor controls, Big banks involved
Goldman Sachs; $375m; Lawsuit
Big banks involved
Citigroup; $730m; Lawsuit
JPMorgan; $11b; MBS mis selling
Derivatives
Multiple people
CBOE; $6m; Regulatory failure
Single person, Software issue
Computer hacking




Several companies; 1.03m; Cyber gang
Money laundering
Several banks; $45m; Cybertheft
ATM
Internal fraud









GE Capital; $169m; Discrimination
Credit card
Bank of North Carolina; $3m;Legal issues
Poor controls
Wilmington Trust Bank; $148m; fraud
Poor controls, Misleading information, Money laundering
Barclays Capital; $8.8b; Lawsuit
Regulatory issues
ABN Amro; $1m; Regulatory issue
Big banks involved
Morgan Stanley; $1.2m; Fraud
Internal fraud
JPMorgan; $63.9m; Regulatory failure
Employment issues, Big banks involved
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $1.5m; Legal issues
BoA; $39m; Gender bias
Multiple people
Big banks involved




HSBC; $1.92b; Money laundering
Money laundering
BoA; $1.74b; Legal issues
Complex transaction




Wells Fargo; $3.2m; Legal issues
Derivatives
Morgan Keegan & Co.; $6.5m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $280m; Mortgage bond
Ally Financial; $2.1b; Lawsuit
International transaction
Poor controls
JPMorgan; $100m; Distort price
Credit Suisse; $400m; Lwasuit
External fraud
External fraud
United Security Bank; $0.35m; Legal issue
Computer hacking
TCF Bank; $500; Fraud
Poor controls
Chase Bank; $100m; Mortgage fraud
Big banks involved
External fraud
Farmers Bank and Trust; 0.5m; Fraud
E-Trade Bank; $0.06m; Fraud
Single person
Multiple people
Amcore Bank; $1m; Fraud
Unnamed; $0.25m; ATM fraud
ATM





TD Bank; $0.09m; Fraud
Citizens Bank; $0.65m; Fraud
Money laundering
Credit card




Individuals; $1m; Securities fraud
Derivatives
First Community Bank of Hammond; $0.57m; Bank fraud
International transaction
SunFirst Bank; $200m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Regulatory issues
BNP; $8.9b; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved
Wegelin & Co. Privatbankiers; $1.2b; Tax evasion
Big banks involved
Deutsche Bank; $1m; Overcharging
Overcharging
Internal fraud




Credit Suisse; $540m; Price manipulation
Derivatives
BoA; $5.7m; Short sale fraud
Poor controls
ATM
TD Bank; $0.04m; ATM error
Software issue
JPMorgan; $0.13m; ATM theft
Internal fraud
Misleading information
BoA; $7.5m; Mislead investors
Poor controls
Bank of New York Mellon; $1b; Administrative error
Regulatory issues
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ; $250m; Illegal transfer
International transaction
Morgan Stanley; $5m; Sales of IPO
External fraud
Several banks; $0.56m; Fraud
BoA; $0.02m; Hacking
Computer hacking




BoA; 4b; Less regulatory capital
Derivatives
Goldman Sachs; $0.96m; Complex transactions
Legal issue
JPMorgan; $54.2m; Breach of contract
Visa; $13.3m; Data breach
Software issue
Poor controls, Internal fraud
Guaranty Bank; $0.5m; Stealing clients
Single person
Rochdale Securities LLC; $5.3m; Unauthorized purchase
Derivatives
MF Globa; $141m; Rogue trades
Goldman Sachs; $118m; Unauthorized trade
Big banks involved
Misleading information
Bank of the Commonwealth; $393.49m; Fraud
Manual process
Olympus Corporation; $1.7b; Fraud
Regulatory issues
Institutional Shareholders Services; $0.33m; Information leaks
Single person
Lender Processing Services; $35m; Regulatory issues
Internal fraud
New Castle Funds; $0.15m; Internal fraud
Single person
BoA; $6m; Steal from clients
Big banks involved
Mainstreet Bank; $0.38m; Fraud
Gaffken & Barriger Fund; $12.6m; Fraud
Misleading information
Derivatives
Jefferies LLC; $25m; Mortgage bond trading
Legal issue
FBI; $140m; Penny stock fraud
Multiple people, International transaction
Refco; $2.4b; Fraud
Legal issue, Internal fraud
Allied Home Mortgage Corp.; $150m; Fraud
Multiple people, Insurance
Absolute Capital Management Holdings Ltd.; $200m; Stock manipulation
Regulatory issues
Oppenheimer & Co.; $1m; Overcharging
Overcharging
Hastings State Bank; $0.22m; Regulatory failure
Insurance
First Federal Bank; $3000; Regulatory failure
Mutual of Omaha; $0.05m; Reglatory failure
Poor controls
Money laundering
Citigroup; $1.3m; Wire fraud
Internal fraud
Associated Bank; $0.5m; Compliance issues
Poor controls
Banorte-Ixe Securities International; $0.48m; Inadquate controls
K1 Group; $311m; Hedge fund fraud
Internal fraud
Poor controls
Square; $0.5m; Regulatory issue
Employment issues
Oppenheimer & Co.; $1.4m; Penny stock deals
Derivatives
TCF National Bank; $10m; Money laundering
Complex transaction
First Independence Bank; $0.25m; Regulatory failure
Goldman Sachs; $0.8m; Process error
Big banks involved
Internal fraud
John Thomas Financial; $1.1m; Fraud
Employment issues
RMBS; $2m; Securities fraud
Software issue
LPL Financial; $9m; Regulatory failure
Poor controls
Merrill Lynch; $1.05m; Regulatory fialure
Misleading information, Complex products
Big banks involved
Citigroup; $0.06m; Website vulnerability
Computer hacking
ING Groep NV; $1.2m; Email violations
Complex transaction
HAP Trading LLC; $1.5m; Algorithm issue
Software issue
Worldwide Capital; $7.25m; Short selling
Multiple companies; $14.4m; Short sale crackdown
Derivatives
Deutsche Bank; $100m; Tax fraud
Big banks involved
Multiple people
ConvergEx Group; $150.8m; Fraud
Offshore fund
Several companies; $34m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
BoA; $1.27b; Regulatory failure
Complex products
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $13b; Regulatory breach
Derivatives
Citigroup; $30m; Data breach
Morgan Stanley; $8.01m; Employment issues
Multiple people, Employment issues
Computer hacking
FIS; $13m; Data breach
Single person
Several companies; $1m; Hacking
Crime
TCF Bank; $0.09m; Crime
ATM
First Niagara Bank; $2200; ATM theft
Unnamed; $221m; ATM heist
International transaction
Multiple people
Several banks; $0.14m; ATM theft
Unnamed; $45m; ATM cyberheist
International transaction
ATS Uptime, Inc; $1.3m; Crime
Internal fraud
External fraud
E trade; $0.2m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Chase Bank; $0.03m; Fake ID
TD Bank; $0.02m; Crime
Single person
Multiple people
Several banks; $0.02m; Fraud
External fraud
Popular Community Bank; $0.29m; Crime
Single person
Chase Bank; $0.17m; ATM theft
ATM, Big banks involved
Several banks; $0.05m; Robbery
Figure D.3: US Tree 2013-2014.
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Regulatory issues
Several firms; $0.91m; Overcharging
Overcharging
All banks; $15m; Regulatory issues
Software issue
KPMG; $25b; Inconsistent regulation
Internal fraud
Individual; $170m; International transaction
Several companies; $6m; Fraud
Single person, Derivatives
Chelsey Capital; $3.5m; Insider trading
Multiple people
Computer hacking Genesis Securities; $0.6m; Hacking
Stock; $0.25m; Hacking
Crime, Complex transaction
Offshore fund Citigroup; $0.6m; Tax problem
Big banks involved
IRS; $7.67b; Regulatory issues
International transaction
Multiple people
Blue Index; $90m; Insider trading
International transaction
FINRA; $11.6m; Regulatory issues
Derivatives City of San Diego; $0.08m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Trillium Brokerage Services; $2.26m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
Big banks involved
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.3m; Market manipulation
Derivatives
Complex transaction Multiple companies; $4b; Regulatory issues
Credit Suisse; $1.75m; Regulatory breach
Derivatives
International transaction Credit Suisse; $3b; Tax evasion
Credit card, Offshore fund
JPMorgan; $83.3m; Breaking US saction
Poor controls
Morgan Stanley; $3.3m; Improper fee arrangement
Overcharging
Derivatives
Wells Fargo; $2m; Regulatory failure
Complex products
Deutsche Bank;$1.2m; Insider default-swap case
Multiple people
Regions Bank; $200m; Mortgage securities fraud
Internal fraud
Misleading information, Complex products
Stewardship Fund LP; $35m; Mortgage restructuring scheme
Complex transaction
Regulatory issues Raymond James Financial Inc.; $300m; Regulatory issues
Derivatives
Brookstreet Securities Corp; $300m; Misleading information
Bank cross selling
Legal issue
Investor Relations International; $1.7m; Insider trading
Multiple people
Multiple companies; $10m; Law action
Complex transaction
Derivatives
Deutsche Bank; $1b; Legal action
Misleading information
Multiple institutions; $457m; High credit rating




JPMorgan; $98m; Legal action
Poor controls
Credit Suisse; $296m; Misleading information
Insurance
Big banks involved
Several banks; $303m; Tax issue
International transaction
HSBC; $5.5m; Legal issue
Software issue
Regulatory issues
Several banks; $4.5b; Lawsuit
Complex products
UBS; $780m; Regulatory failure
Crime
JPMorgan; $722m; Unlawful pament scheme
Multiple people
Misleading information
Morgan Stanley; $43.12m; Misleading investors
Complex products
Goldman Sachs; $25.73m; Regulatory breach
Derivatives Citigroup; $54.3m; Legal issue
Wells Fargo; $1.4b; Mismarked investments
Poor controls
External fraud Allied Home Mortgage Corp.; $834m; Lending fraud
Insurance
First Bank; $18.5m; Fraud
Overcharging State Strees Bank; $200m; Overcharging
Bank of New York Mellon; $2b; Lawsuit
Big banks involved
Computer hacking
Professional Business Bank; $0.47m; Hacking
Heartland Payment Systems; $41.4m; Data breach
Software issue
Poor controls
Capital One; $0.17m; Fraud
Crime, Big banks involved
TXJ; $75.18m; Computer hacking
Credit card
Ocean Bank; $0.59m; Cyber heist
Computer hacking
Multiple companies; $9.5m; Online scam
Complex transaction, International transaction, Credit card
JPMorgan; $0.64m; Hacking
Single person
DA Davidson; $0.38m; Breach in security
Big banks involved BoA; $0.42m; Internal ATM fraud
Internal fraud, ATM
TD Bank; $0.38m; Computer hacking
Internal fraud
Money laundering
Universal Brokerage Services; $194m; Money laundering
Derivatives
Unnamed; $53m; fraud
Luis Hiram Rivas; $18m; fraud
Misleading information
Multiple people Webster Bank; $6.2m; Fraud
Multiple banks; $2.6m; fraud
Complex transaction
Misleading information
SEC; $8.4m; Legal action
Derivatives Credit Suisse; $1.1b; Fraud
Big banks involved
InfrAegis, Inc.; $20m; Fraud
Complex transaction
Single person
Goldleaf Financial Solutions; $0.17m; Embzzling
Complex transaction, Complex products




Southeast National Bank; $0.48m; Embezzlement
ATM
Big banks involved
UBS; $0.5m; Tax issues
Regulatory issues




Wells Fargo; $45m; fraud
Legal issue
U.S. Bank; $0.03m; Swindling customer
ATM
Crime
Countrywide; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Software issue
JPMorgan; $1.1m; Stealing clients
ATM BoA; $0.4m; ATM theft
Several banks; $0.4m; Hacking
Poor controls
Poor controls




Gryphon Holdings; $17.5m; Investment fraud
KL Group; $78m; Hedge fund fraud
Misleading information
External fraud Countrywide; $0.13m; Fraud
Mid-America Bank and Trust Co.; $10.1m; Bank fraud
Money laundering
Money laundering Fleet Bank; $1.1m; Fraud
Homemaxx Title & Escrow LLC; $1.75m; Fraud
Single person
Misleading information
Multiple companies; $1.6m; Hedge fund scam
Complex transaction
Sterling Foster & Co.; $66m; Fraud
American Express; $31m; Legal action
Legal issue
Money laundering Chicago Development and Planning; $8.4m; Fraud
Regulatory issues
Coast Bank; $1.2m; Money laundering
Single person Multiple companies; $1.8m; Internal fraud
EquityFX, Inc.; $8.19m; Investment scam
Bank cross selling
Internal fraud
TD Bank; $1.87m; IT issues
Software issue, Big banks involved
Community State Bank; $2m; Fraud
ClassicCloseouts.com; $5m; Wire fraud
Overcharging
Big banks involved
Charles Schwab & Co.; $1.8m; Employment issues
Employment issues
External fraud
Several banks; $39.9m; Bank fraud
Derivatives
ATM
Wells Fargo; $0.02m; Fraud
Crime





Wells Fargo; $0.23m; Fraud
Poor controls
TD Bank; $1m; Bank fraud
Misleading information
Several banks; $10m; Fraud
Internal fraud, Crime
Computer hacking Charles Schwab & Co.; $0.25m; Hcking




Pacific National; $7m; Regulatory failure
Offshore fund
Wachovia; $160m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Misleading information
MF Global; $10m; Regulatory failure
Pipeline Trading Systems; $1m; IT issues
Complex products
Big banks involved
Goldman Sachs; $100m; Lawsuit
Legal issue
Citigroup; $1.25m; Report error
Manual process
BoA; $0.72m; Fraud
Derivatives Citigroup; $0.65m; Regulatory failure
JPMorgan; $3.62m; Sale of risky investment
Complex products
Multiple people
Jefferies & Company, Inc.; $1.93m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
ICAP; $25m; Regulatory failure
Multiple companies; $0.06m; Identity theft
Internal fraud
Multiple people Pequot Capital Management; $28m; Insider trading
Ernst & Young; $8.5m; Fraud
External fraud
Complex transaction
Zions Bank; 8m; Regulatory failure
Next Financial Group Inc.; $0.5m; Regulatory issues
Misleading information





Big banks involved Deutsche Bank; $550m; Tax traud
Complex products
UBS; $160.2m; Bond scheme
Single person
RANLife Home Loans; $0.1m; Human error
Bank of Montreal; $0.15m; Incorrect marking option
Regulatory issues, Derivatives
UBS; $2.75m; Insider trading
Big banks involved
Copiah Bank; $0.25m; Bank fraud
External fraud, Computer hacking
Complex transaction, Complex products
Pierce Commercial Bank; $495m; Mortgage fraud
External fraud




Goldman Sachs; $3m; Data theft
Crime
Credit card Several companies; $300m; Data breach
Compass bank; $0.03m; Internal fraud
Internal fraud
External fraud
Chelsea State Bank; $0.38m; Fraud
Crime
Citizens Financial Bank; $0.03m; Poor controls
Legal issue
Commerce Bank; $2m; System error
Big banks involved
UBS; $10m; Human error
Internal fraud
Citigroup; $0.5m; Regulatory failure
Regulatory issues
RBS; $0.62m; Embezzlement
Ameriquest Mortgage Company; $0.15m; Internal fraud
Crime, External fraud
ATM BoA; $0.3m; Hacking
Computer hacking, International transaction
Wells Fargo; $4000; Internal ATM theft
Legal issue
BoA; $0.93m; Emoployment issues
Employment issues
Multiple banks; $700m; Legal action
Multiple people, Bank cross selling
Wells Fargo; $100m; Improper bid
Complex transaction
Morgan Stanley; $102m; Improper subprime lending




Computer hacking BoA; $0.05m; Hakcing
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.1m; ID theft
Single person, Complex transaction
Legal issue
Lehman Brothers; $450m; Legal action
Bank cross selling
Tennessee Commerce Bank; $1m; Employment issue
Regulatory issues
Taylor, Bean & Whitaker; Ocala Funding LLC; $7.6b; Lawsuit
Internal fraud Citadel Investment Group; $1.1m; fraud
Software issue
Certegy Check Services, Inc.; $0.98m; Data breach
Misleading information
Oppenheimer Funds; $20m; Bond fund mismanagement
Complex products
Principal Financial Group; $10m; Fraud
Bank cross selling
Countrywide; $624m; Legal issues
Big banks involved
BoA; $108m; Regulatory issue
Complex transaction BoA; $2.8b; Legal issues
Complex products
BoA; $137.3m; Regulatory failure
Regulatory issues
Software issue AXA Rosenberg; $242m; IT error
Manual process
BGC; $1.7m; Legal action
Crime
Computer hacking
SecureWorks Inc.; $9m; Hacking
Multiple people Fidelity National Information Services; $13m; Online theft
ATM, Big banks involved
M&T Bankl; $0.48m; Computer hacking
Single person
Pure Class, Inc.; $53m; Wire fraud
Big banks involved Barclays Bank; $298m; US sactions
U.S. Bank; $0.11m; Crime
Computer hacking
International transaction
Several companies; $13m; ID theft
Multiple people
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; ATM heist
ATM
Multiple companies; $11m; Unauthorized wire transaction
Computer hacking, Big banks involved
Misleading information, Big banks involved
Regulatory issues
BoA; $10m; Regulatory failure
Overcharging
Goldman Sachs; $0.65m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
UBS; $8m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
Derivatives Deutsche Bank; $1.1b; Derivatives
Complex products
JPMorgan; $228m; Bid rigging
Legal issue
MortgageIT; $1b; Fraud lawsuit
Complex products




BoA; $16.7b; Legal action
Bank cross selling
Complex products Goldman Sachs; $1b; Legal action
Legal issue, Overcharging
JPMorgan; $1.1b; Subprime CDO
Poor controls
External fraud
Taylor Bean & Whitaker; $1.9b; fraud
Crime
Sherbourne Financial; $10.2m; Online stock scam
Single person
Paypal; $0.44m; fraud
Credit card Merrick bank; $16m; Computer hacking
Software issue
Multiple banks; $0.77m; ID theft
Complex transaction
Several companies; $2.3m; Mortgage fraud
Multiple people First National Mortgage Solutions, LLC; $0.44m; Mortgage raud
Several companies; $63.8m; Stock fraud
Internal fraud
Single person
KP Consulting; $0.56m; Wire fraud
Eclipse Property Solutions; $0.03m; Stealing credit card
Credit card
Several banks; $1.6m; Fraud
Complex transaction
Money laundering
Merrill Lynch; $0.78m; Fraud
Internal fraud, Employment issues
Wells Fargo; $6m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Rushford State Bank; $0.5m; Fraud




Onyx Capital Advisors; $20m; Fraud
Computer hacking Monarch Bank; $0.2m; Fraud
Credit card
Multiple banks; $3.86m; Cyber attack
ATM Unnamed; $2.3m; ATM skimming
Crime
Fidelity ATM; $4.2m; fraud
Money laundering 3 Hebrew Boys'; Capital Consortium Group; $82m; Money laundering




Dwelling House Savings and Loan; $2.5m; Fraud
Money laundering
H&R Block; $0.29m; ID theft
HSBC; $0.22m; ID theft
Credit card, Big banks involved
Complex products Multiple banks; $1.7m;Supervisory failure
Misleading information
Goldman Sachs; $0.06m; Insider trading
Derivatives, Big banks involved
Internal fraud Merrill Lynch; $400m; Trading loss
UBS; $100m; legal action
Crime
Internal fraud, Misleading information
Unnamed; $0.9m; Loan scam
Regulatory issues SafeNet; $2.98m; Option scandal
Prestige Financial Center Inc; $1.3m; Fraud
Complex transaction
Figure D.4: US Tree 2008-2011.
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Legal issue
Big banks involved




Citigroup; $1.4m; Legal issues
Several banks; $2.9b; Legal action
Derivatives
Several banks; $303m; Tax issue
International transaction




BoA; $0.93m; Emoployment issues
Employment issues
Multiple banks; $700m; Legal action
Multiple people, Bank cross selling
Wells Fargo; $100m; Improper bid
Complex transaction
Morgan Stanley; $102m; Improper subprime lending
Complex products Citigroup; $383m; Lawsuit
Derivatives
U.S. Bank; $30m; Risky investments
Bank cross selling
Misleading information
Goldman Sachs; $25.73m; Regulatory breach
Regulatory issues
Discover Financial Services;$775m; Legal action
BoA; $150m; Fraud
Multiple people
Morgan Stanley; $5m; Employment issues
Employment issues
Derivatives HSBC; $526m; Fraud
Credit Suisse; $296m; Misleading information
Insurance
Complex products
MortgageIT; $1b; Fraud lawsuit
Derivatives UBS; $500m; Lawsuit
Goldman Sachs; $1b; Legal action
Overcharging
Poor controls
JPMorgan; $98m; Legal action
Derivatives
BoA; $108m; Regulatory issue
BoA; $2.8b; Legal issues
Complex transaction, Complex products
Derivatives





Internal fraud, Bank cross selling
Deutsche Bank; $1b; Legal action
External fraud
Allied Home Mortgage Corp.; $834m; Lending fraud
Insurance




Goldman Sachs; $37m; Legal action
Derivatives
BoA; $2.6m; Mortgage fraud
Money laundering
Overcharging
State Strees Bank; $200m; Overcharging
Several companies; $7.2b; Overcharging
Credit card




Pierce Commercial Bank; $495m; Mortgage fraud
Poor controls, External fraud
Goldleaf Financial Solutions; $0.17m; Embzzling
Internal fraud, Single person
Stewardship Fund LP; $35m; Mortgage restructuring scheme
Misleading information
Regulatory issues
Hold Brothers On-Line Investment Services; $4m; Stock manipulation
Offshore fund
Pentagon Capital Management Plc; $76.8m; Mutual fund trading
Poor controls Zions Bank; 8m; Regulatory failure
Infinium Capital Management; $0.85m; Computer error
Derivatives, Software issue
Big banks involved
Multiple companies; $4b; Regulatory issues
Credit Suisse; $1.75m; Regulatory breach
Derivatives
UBS; $8m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
External fraud
Several banks; $1.6m; Fraud
Single person
Several companies; $2.3m; Mortgage fraud
Morgan Keegan & Co.; $64m; Fraud
Derivatives
Multiple people Several companies; $63.8m; Stock fraud
Internal fraud
First National Mortgage Solutions, LLC; $0.44m; Mortgage raud
Legal issue First Republic Securities Company; $0.87m; Lawsuit
Derivatives
Multiple companies; $10m; Law action
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $298m; US sactions
Crime, Single person
Charles Schwab & Co.; $1.8m; Employment issues
Employment issues
Derivatives
BoA; $16.7b; Legal action
Misleading information, Bank cross selling
Complex products
Goldman Sachs; $0.06m; Insider trading
Multiple people




Regulatory issues UBS; $0.3m; Fund priceing violation
Poor controls
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.3m; Market manipulation
Poor controls
UBS; $2.75m; Insider trading
Single person
UBS; $10m; Human error
External fraud
Chase Bank; $0.01m; Fraud
ATM
Wells Fargo; $0.23m; Fraud
Multiple people
Citigroup; $0.02m; Fraud
Manual process Capital One; $210m; Deceptive marketing
Poor controls
JPMorgan; $549m; Misleading information
Misleading information
Internal fraud
Community State Bank; $2m; Fraud
ClassicCloseouts.com; $5m; Wire fraud
Overcharging
Multiple people
Merrill Lynch; $400m; Trading loss
Fire Finance; $200m; Fraud
Derivatives
Poor controls
Gryphon Holdings; $17.5m; Investment fraud
CalPERS; $95m; Lawsuit
Legal issue
External fraud Mid-America Bank and Trust Co.; $10.1m; Bank fraud
Money laundering
Countrywide; $0.13m; Fraud
Money laundering Webster Bank; $6.2m; Fraud




TD Bank; $1.87m; IT issues
Software issue
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.14m; Currency trade fraud
ATM
Wells Fargo; $4000; Internal ATM theft
Poor controls
Single person
U.S. Bank; $0.03m; Swindling customer
Crime Several banks; $0.4m; Hacking
Poor controls
BoA; $0.4m; ATM theft
Computer hacking BoA; $0.42m; Internal ATM fraud
BoA; $0.3m; Hacking
Poor controls, International transaction
Single person
Wells Fargo; $45m; fraud
Legal issue
Crime JPMorgan; $1.1m; Stealing clients
Countrywide; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Software issue
Poor controls






Morgan Stanley; $2.5m; Embezzling
UBS; $0.5m; Tax issues
Regulatory issues
Single person
First Priority Pay; $0.5m; Embezzlment
External fraud Merrill Lynch; $0.78m; Fraud
Money laundering, Employment issues
M&T Bank; $0.22m; Mail fraud
Derivatives
New Mexico Finance Authority; $40m; Fraud
Big banks involved JPMorgan; $0.03m; Bid rigging
Credit Suisse; $1.1b; Fraud
Misleading information
Complex transaction Commonwealth Advisors Inc.; $32m; Hiding losses
Poor controls
InfrAegis, Inc.; $20m; Fraud
Misleading information
Misleading information
SEC; $8.4m; Legal action
Individual; $2.7m; Fraud
Bank cross selling
Luis Hiram Rivas; $18m; fraud
Money laundering
Poor controls
Multiple companies; $1.6m; Hedge fund scam
Complex transaction
Sterling Foster & Co.; $66m; Fraud
American Express; $31m; Legal action
Legal issue
Money laundering Coast Bank; $1.2m; Money laundering
Chicago Development and Planning; $8.4m; Fraud
Regulatory issues








AXA Rosenberg; $242m; IT error
Manual process
Citadel Investment Group; $1.1m; fraud
Internal fraud
Citizens Financial Bank; $0.03m; Poor controls
External fraud
BGC; $1.7m; Legal action
Regulatory issues All banks; $15m; Regulatory issues
Goldman Sachs; $22m; Systems failure
Poor controls, Big banks involved
Crime
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; ATM heist
ATM, International transaction
Computer hacking
SecureWorks Inc.; $9m; Hacking
Stock; $0.25m; Hacking
Regulatory issues, Complex transaction
Big banks involved U.S. Bank; $0.11m; Crime
Single person
Multiple companies; $11m; Unauthorized wire transaction
International transaction
Single person Pure Class, Inc.; $53m; Wire fraud
Cornerstone Bank; $6000; Robbery
Software issue
Internal fraud West-Aircomm Federal Credit Union; $0.4m; ATM theft
ATM
Garda Cash Logistics; $2.3m; Crime
External fraud




Wells Fargo; $2.1m; Fraud
Several banks; $39.9m; Bank fraud
Derivatives
ATM
Wells Fargo; $0.02m; Fraud
Crime
Chase Bank; $0.06m; ATM fraud





Sherbourne Financial; $10.2m; Online stock scam
Crime
KP Consulting; $0.56m; Wire fraud
Eclipse Property Solutions; $0.03m; Stealing credit card
Credit card
Money laundering Rushford State Bank; $0.5m; Fraud
Wells Fargo; $6m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Credit card
Several banks; $27.5m; Credit card scam
Computer hacking
Unnamed; $0.06m; Fraud
Crime Multiple banks; $0.77m; ID theft
Merrick bank; $16m; Computer hacking
Software issue
Poor controls
RANLife Home Loans; $0.1m; Human error
Single person
MF Global; $1b; Poor controls
Legal issue
Lehman Brothers; $450m; Legal action
Bank cross selling
Tennessee Commerce Bank; $1m; Employment issue
Regulatory issues
Taylor, Bean & Whitaker; Ocala Funding LLC; $7.6b; Lawsuit
Misleading information
Oppenheimer Funds; $20m; Bond fund mismanagement
Complex products
Principal Financial Group; $10m; Fraud
Bank cross selling
Countrywide; $624m; Legal issues
Regulatory issues
Pacific National; $7m; Regulatory failure
Offshore fund
Derivatives Bank of Montreal; $0.15m; Incorrect marking option
Single person
Guggenheim Securities; $0.87m; Poor controls
Money laundering HSBC; $1b; Money laundering
Big banks involved
Wachovia; $160m; Money laundering
Internal fraud
Certegy Check Services, Inc.; $0.98m; Data breach
Legal issue
New Mexico Finance Authority; $40m; Faked audit
Manual process
First California Bank;$0.68m; Fraud
Software issue Compass bank; $0.03m; Internal fraud
Credit card
CME Group; $0.5m; Code theft
Regulatory issues
Individual; $0.35m; Fraud
Single person, Complex transaction
Ozark Heritage Bank; $0.02m; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved
Citigroup; $0.5m; Regulatory failure
Regions Bank; $200m; Mortgage securities fraud
Derivatives
Complex transaction UBS; $160.2m; Bond scheme
Deutsche Bank; $550m; Tax traud
Complex products
Money laundering Homemaxx Title & Escrow LLC; $1.75m; Fraud
Single person




Southeast National Bank; $0.48m; Embezzlement
ATM
Misleading information Multiple companies; $1.8m; Internal fraud
EquityFX, Inc.; $8.19m; Investment scam
Bank cross selling
Computer hacking
Multiple companies; $9.5m; Online scam
Complex transaction, International transaction, Credit card
DA Davidson; $0.38m; Breach in security
Single person Copiah Bank; $0.25m; Bank fraud
Poor controls, External fraud
JPMorgan; $0.64m; Hacking
Legal issue
Professional Business Bank; $0.47m; Hacking
Heartland Payment Systems; $41.4m; Data breach
Software issue
Poor controls Ocean Bank; $0.59m; Cyber heist
TXJ; $75.18m; Computer hacking
Credit card
Big banks involved
TD Bank; $0.38m; Computer hacking
Poor controls
Capital One; $0.17m; Fraud
Legal issue, Crime
BoA; $0.05m; Hakcing
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.1m; ID theft
Single person, Complex transaction
Poor controls, Software issue
Several companies; $300m; Data breach
Credit card
Goldman Sachs; $3m; Data theft
Crime
Nasdaq OMX; $13m; Software issues
External fraud Commerce Bank; $2m; System error
Chelsea State Bank; $0.38m; Fraud
Crime
Regulatory issues
KPMG; $25b; Inconsistent regulation
Internal fraud Individual; $170m; International transaction
Chelsey Capital; $3.5m; Insider trading
Multiple people
Misleading information
NYSE; $5m; Insider trading
Poor controls
ICAP; $25m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
MF Global; $10m; Regulatory failure
Pipeline Trading Systems; $1m; IT issues
Complex products
Complex transaction Jefferies & Company, Inc.; $1.93m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
Next Financial Group Inc.; $0.5m; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved
Citigroup; $1.25m; Report error
Manual process
Deutsche Bank; $12b; Hi up loss
Multiple people
BoA; $0.72m; Fraud
Legal issue Goldman Sachs; $100m; Lawsuit
BoA; $137.3m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
Derivatives
JPMorgan; $228m; Bid rigging
Big banks involved
City of San Diego; $0.08m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
Poor controls
Yorkville Advisors LLC; $280m; Fraud
Big banks involved Wells Fargo; $1.4b; Mismarked investments
Legal issue
Citigroup; $0.65m; Regulatory failure
Legal issue Southridge Capital Management LLC; $26m; Regulatory failure
Overcharging
Citigroup; $54.3m; Legal issue
Big banks involved
Complex products
Brookstreet Securities Corp; $300m; Misleading information
Bank cross selling
Derivatives
Raymond James Financial Inc.; $300m; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved Deutsche Bank; $1.1b; Derivatives
JPMorgan; $3.62m; Sale of risky investment
Poor controls
Multiple people
Blue Index; $90m; Insider trading
International transaction
FINRA; $11.6m; Regulatory issues
Misleading information
Fannie Mae; $440b; Misleading investor
Internal fraud
Prestige Financial Center Inc; $1.3m; Fraud
Complex transaction
Multiple companies; $0.06m; Identity theft
Poor controls
SafeNet; $2.98m; Option scandal
Poor controls Pequot Capital Management; $28m; Insider trading
Ernst & Young; $8.5m; Fraud
External fraud
Complex transaction SEC; $17.7m; Penny stock
Trillium Brokerage Services; $2.26m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
International transaction M&T Bank; $3.6m; Money laundering
Money laundering
IRS; $7.67b; Regulatory issues
Offshore fund
Overcharging
Several firms; $0.91m; Overcharging
Big banks involved
BoA; $10m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Bank of New York Mellon; $931.6m; Fruad
Morgan Stanley; $3.3m; Improper fee arrangement
Poor controls
Big banks involved
Multiple people Multiple companies; $11m; Insider tradnig
Goldman Sachs; $0.65m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Offshore fund Credit Suisse; $3b; Tax evasion
International transaction, Credit card
Citigroup; $0.6m; Tax problem
Complex products
State Street Corporation; $4.99m; Failed CDO
Legal issue Several banks; $4.5b; Lawsuit
Morgan Stanley; $43.12m; Misleading investors
Misleading information
Poor controls
Several banks; $9.17m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives Wells Fargo; 11.2m; Regulatory issues
Complex transaction
Wells Fargo; $2m; Regulatory failure
International transaction Standard Chartered Bank; $300m; Money laundering
Money laundering
JPMorgan; $83.3m; Breaking US saction
Legal issue UBS; $780m; Regulatory failure
Crime
JPMorgan; $722m; Unlawful pament scheme
Multiple people
Derivatives
Compass Group Management; $1.4m; Insider trading
Internal fraud Several companies; $6m; Fraud
Single person
ICP Asset Management; $23.5m; Fraud
Multiple people
Rodman & Renshaw Capital Group; $0.34m; Regulatory issue
Poor controls Deutsche Bank;$1.2m; Insider default-swap case
Big banks involved
JP Turner & Company; $0.46m; Regulatory failure
Computer hacking Multiple comanies; $2.85m; Hacking
Poor controls
Genesis Securities; $0.6m; Hacking
Multiple people
Investor Relations International; $1.7m; Insider trading
Legal issue
Computer hacking
Unnamed; $850m; Cyber gang
International transaction
Carder Profit; $205m; Hacking
Credit card
Several banks; $3m; Hacking
Internal fraud, Big banks involved
External fraud
Multiple banks; $3.86m; Cyber attack
Monarch Bank; $0.2m; Fraud
Credit card
Big banks involved Charles Schwab & Co.; $0.25m; Hcking
Several banks; $0.68m; Identity theft
International transaction
Crime
Dwelling House Savings and Loan; $2.5m; Fraud
Money laundering
M&T Bankl; $0.48m; Computer hacking
Computer hacking
H&R Block; $0.29m; ID theft
UBS; $100m; legal action
Internal fraud
Eastern Bank; $0.02m; ATM skimming
ATM
Several companies; $13m; ID theft
International transaction
Big banks involved
HSBC; $0.22m; ID theft
Credit card
External fraud
Several banks; $10m; Fraud
Internal fraud
Multiple banks; $1.5m; Phishing
Computer hacking
JPMorgan; $384m; Legal issues
ATM Citigroup; $2100; ATM skimming
Fidelity National Information Services; $13m; Online theft
Computer hacking
External fraud
Onyx Capital Advisors; $20m; Fraud
Money laundering Wachovia; $3.5m; Loan fraud
Crime
3 Hebrew Boys'; Capital Consortium Group; $82m; Money laundering
ATM Unnamed; $2.3m; ATM skimming
Crime
Fidelity ATM; $4.2m; fraud
Misleading information
TD Bank; $1m; Bank fraud
External fraud, Big banks involved
Complex products Multiple banks; $1.7m;Supervisory failure
Brookstone Securities; $2.6m; Misleading information
Regulatory issues
Internal fraud, Misleading information Unnamed; $0.9m; Loan scam
KL Group; $78m; Hedge fund fraud
Poor controls
Figure D.5: US Tree 2008-2012.
APPENDIX D. TREES FOR US MARKET WITH DATASET DERIVED CHARACTERISTICS125
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6
Legal issue, Employment issues, Big banks involved
BoA; $0.93m; Emoployment issues
Poor controls




ClassicCloseouts.com; $5m; Wire fraud
Overcharging
Community State Bank; $2m; Fraud
Multiple people
Chelsey Capital; $3.5m; Insider trading
Regulatory issues
Merrill Lynch; $400m; Trading loss
Money laundering
Multiple banks; $2.6m; fraud
Complex transaction
Webster Bank; $6.2m; Fraud
External fraud Citizens Bank; $0.65m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Mid-America Bank and Trust Co.; $10.1m; Bank fraud
Poor controls
Poor controls
Wells Fargo Advisors; $0.65m; Check writing scam
Big banks involved




Unnamed; $0.9m; Loan scam
Poor controls KL Group; $78m; Hedge fund fraud




Derivatives, Bank cross selling
Absolute Capital Management Holdings Ltd.; $200m; Stock manipulation
Allied Home Mortgage Corp.; $150m; Fraud
Multiple people, Insurance
Poor controls
Citadel Investment Group; $1.1m; fraud
Software issue
Certegy Check Services, Inc.; $0.98m; Data breach
American Express; $31m; Legal action
Misleading information
Derivatives
Universal Brokerage Services; $194m; Money laundering
Money laundering
New Mexico Finance Authority; $40m; Fraud
Poor controls MF Globa; $141m; Rogue trades
Goldman Sachs; $118m; Unauthorized trade
Big banks involved
Complex transaction
Credit Suisse; $540m; Price manipulation
Big banks involved
Commonwealth Advisors Inc.; $32m; Hiding losses
Poor controls
InfrAegis, Inc.; $20m; Fraud
Misleading information
Regulatory issues ICP Asset Management; $23.5m; Fraud
Several companies; $6m; Fraud
Single person
Multiple people
FBI; $140m; Penny stock fraud
International transaction
Individuals; $1m; Securities fraud
External fraud
Fire Finance; $200m; Fraud




First California Bank;$0.68m; Fraud
Software issue Compass bank; $0.03m; Internal fraud
Credit card
CME Group; $0.5m; Code theft
Misleading information
Sterling Foster & Co.; $66m; Fraud
Multiple companies; $1.6m; Hedge fund scam
Complex transaction
Money laundering Coast Bank; $1.2m; Money laundering
Chicago Development and Planning; $8.4m; Fraud
Regulatory issues
Money laundering K1 Group; $311m; Hedge fund fraud
Regulatory issues
Fleet Bank; $1.1m; Fraud
Manual process New Mexico Finance Authority; $40m; Faked audit





Southeast National Bank; $0.48m; Embezzlement
ATM
Homemaxx Title & Escrow LLC; $1.75m; Fraud
Money laundering




UBS; $0.5m; Tax issues
Regulatory issues




Goldleaf Financial Solutions; $0.17m; Embzzling
Complex transaction, Complex products
First Priority Pay; $0.5m; Embezzlment
Misleading information
Gaffken & Barriger Fund; $12.6m; Fraud
Poor controls Multiple companies; $1.8m; Internal fraud
EquityFX, Inc.; $8.19m; Investment scam
Bank cross selling
Poor controls, Legal issue, Misleading information
Countrywide; $624m; Legal issues
Principal Financial Group; $10m; Fraud
Bank cross selling
Wilmington Trust Bank; $148m; fraud
Money laundering
Oppenheimer Funds; $20m; Bond fund mismanagement
Complex products
Misleading information
Maiden Capital; $9m; Fraud
Legal issue
Blackstone Group; $85m; Disclosure lawsuit
Goldman Sachs; $375m; Lawsuit
Complex products
Big banks involved




Discover Financial Services;$775m; Legal action
MortgageIT; $1b; Fraud lawsuit
Complex products
Derivatives Southridge Capital Management LLC; $26m; Regulatory failure
Regulatory issues, Overcharging
Multiple institutions; $457m; High credit rating
Complex products
Stewardship Fund LP; $35m; Mortgage restructuring scheme
Complex transaction
Multiple banks; $1.7m;Supervisory failure
Multiple people
Regulatory issues
Raymond James Financial Inc.; $300m; Regulatory issues
Derivatives
Brookstreet Securities Corp; $300m; Misleading information
Bank cross selling
Poor controls Merrill Lynch; $1.05m; Regulatory fialure
Software issue




DA Davidson; $0.38m; Breach in security
Complex transaction Stock; $0.25m; Hacking
Regulatory issues, Crime
Multiple companies; $9.5m; Online scam
International transaction, Credit card
Regulatory issues Multiple comanies; $2.85m; Hacking
Poor controls
Genesis Securities; $0.6m; Hacking
Crime
SecureWorks Inc.; $9m; Hacking
Big banks involved Multiple companies; $11m; Unauthorized wire transaction
International transaction
U.S. Bank; $0.11m; Crime
Single person
Legal issue
Professional Business Bank; $0.47m; Hacking
Heartland Payment Systems; $41.4m; Data breach
Software issue
Poor controls
Capital One; $0.17m; Fraud
Crime, Big banks involved
TXJ; $75.18m; Computer hacking
Credit card
Ocean Bank; $0.59m; Cyber heist
Big banks involved
TD Bank; $0.38m; Computer hacking
Poor controls BoA; $0.05m; Hakcing
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.1m; ID theft
Single person, Complex transaction
Internal fraud
Several banks; $3m; Hacking
Multiple people
ATM BoA; $0.3m; Hacking
Poor controls, International transaction
BoA; $0.42m; Internal ATM fraud
Multiple people
M&T Bankl; $0.48m; Computer hacking
Crime
Several companies; $3.5m; Cyberattack
Carder Profit; $205m; Hacking
Credit card
International transaction
Several banks; $45m; Cybertheft
ATM
Several companies; 1.03m; Cyber gang
Money laundering
Unnamed; $850m; Cyber gang
Poor controls, Legal issue
Taylor, Bean & Whitaker; Ocala Funding LLC; $7.6b; Lawsuit
Bank cross selling
Lehman Brothers; $450m; Legal action
Big banks involved U.S. Bank; $30m; Risky investments
Complex products
Multiple banks; $700m; Legal action
Multiple people
Big banks involved
Morgan Stanley; $102m; Improper subprime lending
Derivatives Citigroup; $383m; Lawsuit
Complex products
JPMorgan; $100m; Distort price
Misleading information
BoA; $108m; Regulatory issue
Regulatory issues BoA; $137.3m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
Goldman Sachs; $100m; Lawsuit
Derivatives Wells Fargo; $1.4b; Mismarked investments
Regulatory issues
JPMorgan; $98m; Legal action
Regulatory issues
Internal fraud
Individual; $170m; International transaction
John Thomas Financial; $1.1m; Fraud
Employment issues
Citigroup; $1.3m; Wire fraud
Money laundering
Poor controls
Ozark Heritage Bank; $0.02m; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved
Citigroup; $0.5m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction Deutsche Bank; $550m; Tax traud
Complex products
UBS; $160.2m; Bond scheme
Misleading information
Atlas ATM Corp.; $0.05m; Fee notice failure
ATM
State Retirement Systems of Illinois; $2.2b; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
NYSE; $5m; Insider trading
Poor controls
MF Global; $10m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
Citigroup; $1.25m; Report error
Manual process




Morgan Stanley; $1.12m; Unfair pricing
BoA; $10m; Regulatory failure
Overcharging
Legal issue
Citigroup; $54.3m; Legal issue
Derivatives
Goldman Sachs; $25.73m; Regulatory breach
Morgan Stanley; $43.12m; Misleading investors
Complex products
International transaction
IRS; $7.67b; Regulatory issues
Offshore fund
Wegelin & Co. Privatbankiers; $1.2b; Tax evasion




Dwelling House Savings and Loan; $2.5m; Fraud
Money laundering
H&R Block; $0.29m; ID theft
Several companies; $13m; ID theft
International transaction
Big banks involved




ATM Citigroup; $2100; ATM skimming
Fidelity National Information Services; $13m; Online theft
Computer hacking
External fraud
Several banks; $10m; Fraud
Internal fraud
Multiple banks; $1.5m; Phishing
Computer hacking
JPMorgan; $384m; Legal issues
ATM
Eastern Bank; $0.02m; ATM skimming
Multiple people
Internal fraud West-Aircomm Federal Credit Union; $0.4m; ATM theft
ATS Uptime, Inc; $1.3m; Crime
Multiple people
International transaction RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; ATM heist
Unnamed; $45m; ATM cyberheist
Multiple people
Internal fraud UBS; $100m; legal action
Multiple people
Garda Cash Logistics; $2.3m; Crime
Single person, Software issue Cornerstone Bank; $6000; Robbery
Crime
CBOE; $6m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
Software issue
All banks; $15m; Regulatory issues
Regulatory issues
Nasdaq OMX; $40m; Software issues
Poor controls
Several companies; $300m; Data breach
Credit card
Goldman Sachs; $3m; Data theft
Crime
Nasdaq OMX; $13m; Software issues
Legal issue BGC; $1.7m; Legal action
AXA Rosenberg; $242m; IT error
Manual process
Regulatory issues
Infinium Capital Management; $0.85m; Computer error
Derivatives, Complex transaction
Big banks involved Goldman Sachs; $22m; Systems failure





Chase Bank; $0.03m; Fake ID
Ameriquest Mortgage Company; $0.15m; Internal fraud
Poor controls, Internal fraud
Wells Fargo; $0.02m; Fraud
ATM
Big banks involved
Charles Schwab & Co.; $1.8m; Employment issues
Employment issues
Poor controls
UBS; $10m; Human error
UBS; $2.75m; Insider trading
Single person
Goldman Sachs; $0.96m; Complex transactions
Complex transaction




Citigroup; $30m; Data breach
International transaction JPMorgan; $83.3m; Breaking US saction
Standard Chartered Bank; $300m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Offshore fund Credit Suisse; $3b; Tax evasion
International transaction, Credit card
Citigroup; $0.6m; Tax problem
Complex products
Several banks; $9.17m; Regulatory failure
Poor controls
State Street Corporation; $4.99m; Failed CDO
Several banks; $4.5b; Lawsuit
Legal issue
Internal fraud
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.14m; Currency trade fraud
UBS; $9m; Fraud
International transaction
TD Bank; $1.87m; IT issues
Software issue
Single person
Wells Fargo; $45m; fraud
Legal issue
ATM
U.S. Bank; $0.03m; Swindling customer
Crime Several banks; $0.4m; Hacking
Poor controls
BoA; $0.4m; ATM theft
Derivatives
JPMorgan; $0.03m; Bid rigging
Internal fraud
External fraud Goldman Sachs; $37m; Legal action
Legal issue
Several banks; $39.9m; Bank fraud
Misleading information Credit Suisse; $1.1b; Fraud
Internal fraud
BoA; $16.7b; Legal action
Bank cross selling
Complex products
Goldman Sachs; $0.06m; Insider trading
Multiple people
Poor controls Citigroup; $30b; Derivatives
Complex transaction
JPMorgan; $1.1b; Subprime CDO
Misleading information
Poor controls
MF Global; $1b; Poor controls
RANLife Home Loans; $0.1m; Human error
Single person
Manual process UBS; $0.14m; Rig LIBOR
Capital One; $210m; Deceptive marketing
Big banks involved
Money laundering
SunFirst Bank; $200m; Money laundering
International transaction
Internal fraud Unnamed; $53m; fraud
Luis Hiram Rivas; $18m; fraud
Misleading information
Crime, Single person
Pure Class, Inc.; $53m; Wire fraud
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $298m; US sactions
Internal fraud Countrywide; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Software issue
JPMorgan; $1.1m; Stealing clients
External fraud
Taylor Bean & Whitaker; $1.9b; fraud
Big banks involved
TD Bank; $0.56m; ID theft
Misleading information
Wells Fargo; $2.1m; Fraud
Legal issue BoA; $2.6m; Mortgage fraud
Money laundering
Chase Bank; $100m; Mortgage fraud
Multiple people
TD Bank; $1m; Bank fraud
Misleading information
BoA; $848.2m; Fraud
Wells Fargo; $0.23m; Fraud
Poor controls
Computer hacking Charles Schwab & Co.; $0.25m; Hcking
Several banks; $0.68m; Identity theft
International transaction
ATM
Chase Bank; $0.06m; ATM fraud
Software issue Citigroup; $2m; Crime
Multiple people
Citigroup; $5.75m; Cyber hacking
International transaction
Credit card
Eclipse Property Solutions; $0.03m; Stealing credit card
Single person
Several banks; $27.5m; Credit card scam
Computer hacking
Unnamed; $0.06m; Fraud




Crime Multiple banks; $0.77m; ID theft
Merrick bank; $16m; Computer hacking
Software issue
Poor controls
Copiah Bank; $0.25m; Bank fraud
Single person, Computer hacking
Big banks involved
Chase Bank; $0.01m; Fraud
ATM
Citigroup; $0.02m; Fraud
Legal issue HSBC; $74.9m; Fraud
Credit Suisse; $400m; Lwasuit
Derivatives
Software issue
Chelsea State Bank; $0.38m; Fraud
Crime
Citizens Financial Bank; $0.03m; Poor controls
Legal issue
Commerce Bank; $2m; System error
Legal issue
First Bank; $18.5m; Fraud
TCF Bank; $500; Fraud
Poor controls
Arrowhead Capital Management; $100m; fraud
Misleading information
Allied Home Mortgage Corp.; $834m; Lending fraud
Insurance
Complex transaction
Pierce Commercial Bank; $495m; Mortgage fraud
Poor controls, Complex products
Several banks; $1.6m; Fraud
Single person
Several companies; $2.3m; Mortgage fraud
Morgan Keegan & Co.; $64m; Fraud
Derivatives
Single person
KP Consulting; $0.56m; Wire fraud
M&T Bank; $0.22m; Mail fraud
Internal fraud
Crime Sherbourne Financial; $10.2m; Online stock scam
TD Bank; $0.02m; Crime
Big banks involved
Money laundering
Merrill Lynch; $0.78m; Fraud
Internal fraud, Employment issues
Wells Fargo; $6m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Rushford State Bank; $0.5m; Fraud
Multiple people
Multiple banks; $3.86m; Cyber attack
Computer hacking
Onyx Capital Advisors; $20m; Fraud
Money laundering 3 Hebrew Boys'; Capital Consortium Group; $82m; Money laundering
Wachovia; $3.5m; Loan fraud
Crime
Internal fraud First Community Bank of Hammond; $0.57m; Bank fraud
Countrywide; $0.13m; Fraud
Poor controls
ATM Unnamed; $2.3m; ATM skimming
Crime
Fidelity ATM; $4.2m; fraud
Complex transaction Several companies; $63.8m; Stock fraud
Internal fraud
First National Mortgage Solutions, LLC; $0.44m; Mortgage raud
Big banks involved
Deutsche Bank; $1m; Overcharging
Overcharging
JPMorgan; $549m; Misleading information
Misleading information, Manual process
Legal issue




Citigroup; $1.4m; Legal issues
Regulatory issues Morgan Stanley; $1.2m; Fraud
Internal fraud
UBS; $780m; Regulatory failure
Crime
International transaction Several banks; $303m; Tax issue
Ally Financial; $2.1b; Lawsuit
Derivatives
Derivatives
Several banks; $2.9b; Legal action
Misleading information
HSBC; $526m; Fraud
Credit Suisse; $296m; Misleading information
Insurance
Complex products UBS; $500m; Lawsuit
Goldman Sachs; $1b; Legal action
Overcharging
Legal issue
Investor Relations International; $1.7m; Insider trading
Multiple people
Barclays Capital; $8.8b; Lawsuit
Software issue
USAA; $0.38m; Hacking
Big banks involved HSBC; $5.5m; Legal issue
Visa; $13.3m; Data breach
Poor controls
Derivatives
Deutsche Bank; $1b; Legal action





State Strees Bank; $200m; Overcharging
Several companies; $7.2b; Overcharging
Credit card
Bank of New York Mellon; $2b; Lawsuit
Big banks involved
Complex transaction
Multiple companies; $10m; Law action
Merrill Lynch; $11m; Misleading information
Misleading information
Big banks involved
BoA; $1.74b; Legal issues
Poor controls BoA; $2.8b; Legal issues
Misleading information, Complex products
Wells Fargo; $100m; Improper bid
Regulatory issues ABN Amro; $1m; Regulatory issue
Tennessee Commerce Bank; $1m; Employment issue
Poor controls
Regulatory issues
KPMG; $25b; Inconsistent regulation
Complex transaction
Hold Brothers On-Line Investment Services; $4m; Stock manipulation
Offshore fund
Pentagon Capital Management Plc; $76.8m; Mutual fund trading
Derivatives Credit Suisse; $1.75m; Regulatory breach
Big banks involved
Multiple companies; $14.4m; Short sale crackdown
Big banks involved UBS; $8m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Multiple companies; $4b; Regulatory issues
Overcharging
Several firms; $0.91m; Overcharging
Big banks involved Bank of New York Mellon; $931.6m; Fruad
Morgan Stanley; $3.3m; Improper fee arrangement
Poor controls
Multiple people
Blue Index; $90m; Insider trading
International transaction
FINRA; $11.6m; Regulatory issues
Complex transaction
Trillium Brokerage Services; $2.26m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
ConvergEx Group; $150.8m; Fraud
Offshore fund
SEC; $17.7m; Penny stock
Big banks involved
JPMorgan; $722m; Unlawful pament scheme
Legal issue
Morgan Stanley; $8.01m; Employment issues
Employment issues
Multiple companies; $11m; Insider tradnig
Misleading information Deutsche Bank; $12b; Hi up loss
Poor controls
Goldman Sachs; $0.65m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Brookstone Securities; $2.6m; Misleading information
Complex products
Fannie Mae; $440b; Misleading investor
City of San Diego; $0.08m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
Internal fraud SafeNet; $2.98m; Option scandal
Prestige Financial Center Inc; $1.3m; Fraud
Complex transaction
Poor controls
Pacific National; $7m; Regulatory failure
Offshore fund
Square; $0.5m; Regulatory issue
Employment issues
TCF National Bank; $10m; Money laundering
Complex transaction Next Financial Group Inc.; $0.5m; Regulatory issues
Misleading information
Zions Bank; 8m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
Ernst & Young; $8.5m; Fraud
External fraud
Pequot Capital Management; $28m; Insider trading
Misleading information Jefferies & Company, Inc.; $1.93m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
ICAP; $25m; Regulatory failure
Money laundering HSBC; $1b; Money laundering
Big banks involved
Wachovia; $160m; Money laundering
Derivatives
Compass Group Management; $1.4m; Insider trading
Multiple people JP Turner & Company; $0.46m; Regulatory failure
Poor controls
Rodman & Renshaw Capital Group; $0.34m; Regulatory issue
Big banks involved
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.3m; Market manipulation
Misleading information
JPMorgan; $228m; Bid rigging
Complex products Deutsche Bank; $1.1b; Derivatives
JPMorgan; $3.62m; Sale of risky investment
Poor controls
Poor controls
Regions Bank; $200m; Mortgage securities fraud
Internal fraud
Deutsche Bank;$1.2m; Insider default-swap case
Multiple people
UBS; $0.3m; Fund priceing violation
Complex products Wells Fargo; 11.2m; Regulatory issues
Complex transaction
Wells Fargo; $2m; Regulatory failure
Poor controls
Guggenheim Securities; $0.87m; Poor controls
Bank of Montreal; $0.15m; Incorrect marking option
Single person
Misleading information Yorkville Advisors LLC; $280m; Fraud
Citigroup; $0.65m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
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Poor controls
RANLife Home Loans; $0.1m; Human error
Single person
MF Global; $1b; Poor controls
Manual process
UBS; $0.14m; Rig LIBOR
Capital One; $210m; Deceptive marketing
Big banks involved
Internal fraud New Mexico Finance Authority; $40m; Faked audit
Bank of the Commonwealth; $393.49m; Fraud
Misleading information
Money laundering
SunFirst Bank; $200m; Money laundering
International transaction
Regulatory issues
Associated Bank; $0.5m; Compliance issues
International transaction M&T Bank; $3.6m; Money laundering
Standard Chartered Bank; $300m; Money laundering
Big banks involved
Internal fraud
Citigroup; $1.3m; Wire fraud
Poor controls Chicago Development and Planning; $8.4m; Fraud
Misleading information
K1 Group; $311m; Hedge fund fraud
Poor controls, Internal fraud, Single person
KeyBank; $4.3m; Robbery
Crime
Southeast National Bank; $0.48m; Embezzlement
ATM
Guaranty Bank; $0.5m; Stealing clients
Misleading information Multiple companies; $1.8m; Internal fraud
EquityFX, Inc.; $8.19m; Investment scam
Bank cross selling
Regulatory issues
Institutional Shareholders Services; $0.33m; Information leaks
Individual; $0.35m; Fraud
Complex transaction
UBS; $0.5m; Tax issues
Big banks involved
Crime
TCF Bank; $0.09m; Crime
Single person
Barclays Bank; $298m; US sactions
Big banks involved
Pure Class, Inc.; $53m; Wire fraud
Cornerstone Bank; $6000; Robbery
Software issue
Big banks involved Chase Bank; $0.17m; ATM theft
ATM
TD Bank; $0.02m; Crime
External fraud
ATM
First Niagara Bank; $2200; ATM theft
Big banks involved Wells Fargo; $0.02m; Fraud
External fraud
Citigroup; $2100; ATM skimming
Multiple people
International transaction RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; ATM heist
Unnamed; $45m; ATM cyberheist
Multiple people




Dwelling House Savings and Loan; $2.5m; Fraud
Money laundering
H&R Block; $0.29m; ID theft
HSBC; $0.22m; ID theft
Credit card, Big banks involved
Eastern Bank; $0.02m; ATM skimming
ATM
Several companies; $13m; ID theft
International transaction
Software issue
All banks; $15m; Regulatory issues
Regulatory issues
CBOE; $6m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people, Single person
Nasdaq OMX; $40m; Software issues
Poor controls
Several companies; $300m; Data breach
Credit card
Goldman Sachs; $3m; Data theft
Crime
Nasdaq OMX; $13m; Software issues
External fraud Commerce Bank; $2m; System error
Chelsea State Bank; $0.38m; Fraud
Crime
External fraud
Taylor Bean & Whitaker; $1.9b; fraud
Single person
Sherbourne Financial; $10.2m; Online stock scam
Crime
KP Consulting; $0.56m; Wire fraud
Eclipse Property Solutions; $0.03m; Stealing credit card
Credit card
Several banks; $1.6m; Fraud
Complex transaction
Internal fraud M&T Bank; $0.22m; Mail fraud
Merrill Lynch; $0.78m; Fraud
Money laundering, Employment issues
Money laundering Rushford State Bank; $0.5m; Fraud
Wells Fargo; $6m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Multiple people
3 Hebrew Boys'; Capital Consortium Group; $82m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Onyx Capital Advisors; $20m; Fraud
Fidelity ATM; $4.2m; fraud
ATM
Crime
Unnamed; $2.3m; ATM skimming
ATM
Wachovia; $3.5m; Loan fraud
Money laundering
Several banks; $0.02m; Fraud
Big banks involved Several banks; $10m; Fraud
Internal fraud
JPMorgan; $384m; Legal issues
Complex transaction First National Mortgage Solutions, LLC; $0.44m; Mortgage raud
Several companies; $63.8m; Stock fraud
Internal fraud




Wells Fargo; $0.23m; Fraud
Poor controls
BoA; $848.2m; Fraud
TD Bank; $1m; Bank fraud
Misleading information
Complex transaction
Pierce Commercial Bank; $495m; Mortgage fraud
Poor controls, Complex products
Several companies; $2.3m; Mortgage fraud




Crime Merrick bank; $16m; Computer hacking
Software issue
Multiple banks; $0.77m; ID theft
Computer hacking
DA Davidson; $0.38m; Breach in security
Multiple people
Several companies; $3.5m; Cyberattack
External fraud
Multiple banks; $3.86m; Cyber attack
Big banks involved Several banks; $0.68m; Identity theft
International transaction
Charles Schwab & Co.; $0.25m; Hcking




Several banks; $45m; Cybertheft
ATM
Several companies; 1.03m; Cyber gang
Money laundering
Unnamed; $850m; Cyber gang
Credit card Carder Profit; $205m; Hacking
Monarch Bank; $0.2m; Fraud
External fraud
Big banks involved
TD Bank; $0.38m; Computer hacking
BoA; $0.02m; Hacking
External fraud
Poor controls Bank of New York Mellon; $1.1m; ID theft
Single person, Complex transaction
BoA; $0.05m; Hakcing
Single person JPMorgan; $0.64m; Hacking
Copiah Bank; $0.25m; Bank fraud
Poor controls, External fraud
Credit card Several banks; $27.5m; Credit card scam
External fraud
Multiple companies; $9.5m; Online scam
Complex transaction, International transaction
Crime
SecureWorks Inc.; $9m; Hacking
M&T Bankl; $0.48m; Computer hacking
Multiple people
Stock; $0.25m; Hacking
Regulatory issues, Complex transaction
Big banks involved
U.S. Bank; $0.11m; Crime
Single person
Capital One; $0.17m; Fraud
Poor controls, Legal issue
Multiple companies; $11m; Unauthorized wire transaction
International transaction
Multiple people Fidelity National Information Services; $13m; Online theft
ATM
Multiple banks; $1.5m; Phishing
External fraud
Misleading information
Maiden Capital; $9m; Fraud
Complex products Multiple banks; $1.7m;Supervisory failure
Multiple people
Stewardship Fund LP; $35m; Mortgage restructuring scheme
Complex transaction
Regulatory issues
Atlas ATM Corp.; $0.05m; Fee notice failure
ATM
State Retirement Systems of Illinois; $2.2b; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
NYSE; $5m; Insider trading
Complex products
Raymond James Financial Inc.; $300m; Regulatory issues
Derivatives
Brookstreet Securities Corp; $300m; Misleading information
Bank cross selling
Brookstone Securities; $2.6m; Misleading information
Multiple people
Legal issue
Professional Business Bank; $0.47m; Hacking
Computer hacking
Absolute Capital Management Holdings Ltd.; $200m; Stock manipulation
Internal fraud
Multiple companies; $10m; Law action
Complex transaction
State Strees Bank; $200m; Overcharging
Overcharging
Investor Relations International; $1.7m; Insider trading
Multiple people




First Republic Securities Company; $0.87m; Lawsuit
Complex transaction
Deutsche Bank; $1b; Legal action
Misleading information
Multiple institutions; $457m; High credit rating
Southridge Capital Management LLC; $26m; Regulatory failure
Regulatory issues, Overcharging
Big banks involved
Credit Suisse; $296m; Misleading information
Insurance
HSBC; $526m; Fraud
Complex products Goldman Sachs; $1b; Legal action
Overcharging
UBS; $500m; Lawsuit
External fraud, Big banks involved
Chase Bank; $100m; Mortgage fraud
Goldman Sachs; $37m; Legal action
Derivatives
BoA; $2.6m; Mortgage fraud
Money laundering




Tennessee Commerce Bank; $1m; Employment issue
Regulatory issues
Taylor, Bean & Whitaker; Ocala Funding LLC; $7.6b; Lawsuit
Bank cross selling
Lehman Brothers; $450m; Legal action
Principal Financial Group; $10m; Fraud
Misleading information
Big banks involved Multiple banks; $700m; Legal action
Multiple people
U.S. Bank; $30m; Risky investments
Complex products
Software issue
AXA Rosenberg; $242m; IT error
Manual process
BGC; $1.7m; Legal action
Visa; $13.3m; Data breach
Big banks involved
Misleading information Countrywide; $624m; Legal issues
Wilmington Trust Bank; $148m; fraud
Money laundering
Computer hacking Ocean Bank; $0.59m; Cyber heist
TXJ; $75.18m; Computer hacking
Credit card
Internal fraud




Certegy Check Services, Inc.; $0.98m; Data breach
American Express; $31m; Legal action
Misleading information
External fraud
Allied Home Mortgage Corp.; $834m; Lending fraud
Insurance
Arrowhead Capital Management; $100m; fraud
Misleading information
United Security Bank; $0.35m; Legal issue
Computer hacking
First Bank; $18.5m; Fraud
Poor controls Citizens Financial Bank; $0.03m; Poor controls
Software issue
TCF Bank; $500; Fraud
Credit card Several companies; $7.2b; Overcharging
Overcharging
GE Capital; $169m; Discrimination
Misleading information
Blackstone Group; $85m; Disclosure lawsuit
Merrill Lynch; $11m; Misleading information
Complex transaction
Complex products Goldman Sachs; $375m; Lawsuit
Oppenheimer Funds; $20m; Bond fund mismanagement
Poor controls
Big banks involved
HSBC; $1.92b; Money laundering
Money laundering
Citigroup; $1.4m; Legal issues
Several banks; $2.9b; Legal action
Derivatives
Bank of New York Mellon; $2b; Lawsuit
Overcharging
Insurance Citigroup; $110m; Overcharging
Overcharging
Wells Fargo; $3.2m; Legal issues




BoA; $0.93m; Emoployment issues
Poor controls




Morgan Stanley; $102m; Improper subprime lending
Derivatives JPMorgan; $100m; Distort price
Citigroup; $383m; Lawsuit
Complex products
Complex transaction Wells Fargo; $100m; Improper bid
Poor controls
BoA; $1.74b; Legal issues
International transaction Ally Financial; $2.1b; Lawsuit
Derivatives
Several banks; $303m; Tax issue
Misleading information
Discover Financial Services;$775m; Legal action
BoA; $150m; Fraud
Multiple people
Morgan Stanley; $5m; Employment issues
Employment issues
Complex products
Morgan Stanley; $43.12m; Misleading investors
Regulatory issues
MortgageIT; $1b; Fraud lawsuit
Poor controls BoA; $2.8b; Legal issues
Complex transaction
UBS; $0.4m; Misleading information
Poor controls
BoA; $108m; Regulatory issue
Derivatives Wells Fargo; $1.4b; Mismarked investments
Regulatory issues
JPMorgan; $98m; Legal action
Regulatory issues Goldman Sachs; $100m; Lawsuit
BoA; $137.3m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
Software issue USAA; $0.38m; Hacking
Heartland Payment Systems; $41.4m; Data breach
Computer hacking
Internal fraud
ClassicCloseouts.com; $5m; Wire fraud
Overcharging
Community State Bank; $2m; Fraud
Poor controls
First California Bank;$0.68m; Fraud
Misleading information
Coast Bank; $1.2m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Sterling Foster & Co.; $66m; Fraud
Multiple companies; $1.6m; Hedge fund scam
Complex transaction
Software issue Compass bank; $0.03m; Internal fraud
Credit card
CME Group; $0.5m; Code theft
Big banks involved
RBS; $0.62m; Embezzlement
Ameriquest Mortgage Company; $0.15m; Internal fraud
Crime, External fraud
BoA; $5.7m; Short sale fraud
Complex transaction
Goldman Sachs; $118m; Unauthorized trade
Derivatives
Wells Fargo Advisors; $0.65m; Check writing scam
Multiple people
Regulatory issues
Citigroup; $0.5m; Regulatory failure
Regions Bank; $200m; Mortgage securities fraud
Derivatives
Complex transaction UBS; $160.2m; Bond scheme
Deutsche Bank; $550m; Tax traud
Complex products
ATM Wells Fargo; $4000; Internal ATM theft
BoA; $0.3m; Hacking
Computer hacking, International transaction
Multiple people KL Group; $78m; Hedge fund fraud
Misleading information
Gryphon Holdings; $17.5m; Investment fraud
Money laundering Fleet Bank; $1.1m; Fraud
Homemaxx Title & Escrow LLC; $1.75m; Fraud
Single person
Regulatory issues
Individual; $170m; International transaction
John Thomas Financial; $1.1m; Fraud
Employment issues
Derivatives Several companies; $6m; Fraud
Single person
ICP Asset Management; $23.5m; Fraud
Derivatives
New Mexico Finance Authority; $40m; Fraud
Legal issue NAPFA; $46m; Fraud
Bank cross selling
Jefferies LLC; $25m; Mortgage bond trading
Big banks involved Credit Suisse; $1.1b; Fraud
Misleading information
JPMorgan; $0.03m; Bid rigging
Complex transaction InfrAegis, Inc.; $20m; Fraud
Misleading information
Credit Suisse; $540m; Price manipulation
Big banks involved
Poor controls MF Globa; $141m; Rogue trades
Commonwealth Advisors Inc.; $32m; Hiding losses
Complex transaction
Crime Garda Cash Logistics; $2.3m; Crime
West-Aircomm Federal Credit Union; $0.4m; ATM theft
ATM
Misleading information
SEC; $8.4m; Legal action





First Priority Pay; $0.5m; Embezzlment
Goldleaf Financial Solutions; $0.17m; Embzzling
Complex transaction, Complex products
Big banks involved
Wells Fargo; $45m; fraud
Legal issue
BoA; $6m; Steal from clients
ATM
U.S. Bank; $0.03m; Swindling customer
Crime BoA; $0.4m; ATM theft
Several banks; $0.4m; Hacking
Poor controls
Crime Countrywide; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Software issue
JPMorgan; $1.1m; Stealing clients
Money laundering
Universal Brokerage Services; $194m; Money laundering
Derivatives
Unnamed; $53m; fraud
Luis Hiram Rivas; $18m; fraud
Misleading information
Multiple people Multiple banks; $2.6m; fraud
Complex transaction
Webster Bank; $6.2m; Fraud
Multiple people
Chelsey Capital; $3.5m; Insider trading
Regulatory issues
Merrill Lynch; $400m; Trading loss
Allied Home Mortgage Corp.; $150m; Fraud
Legal issue, Insurance
Misleading information
Unnamed; $0.9m; Loan scam
Regulatory issues
Prestige Financial Center Inc; $1.3m; Fraud
Complex transaction
Multiple companies; $0.06m; Identity theft
Poor controls
SafeNet; $2.98m; Option scandal
Crime
UBS; $100m; legal action
BoA; $0.57m; Robbery
Big banks involved
ATS Uptime, Inc; $1.3m; Crime
ATM
Derivatives
FBI; $140m; Penny stock fraud
International transaction
Individuals; $1m; Securities fraud
External fraud
Fire Finance; $200m; Fraud
External fraud
First Community Bank of Hammond; $0.57m; Bank fraud
Big banks involved Citizens Bank; $0.65m; Fraud
Money laundering
TD Bank; $0.09m; Fraud
Poor controls Countrywide; $0.13m; Fraud




HSBC; $5.5m; Legal issue
Legal issue
ATM
TD Bank; $0.04m; ATM error
External fraud Citigroup; $2m; Crime
Multiple people
Citigroup; $5.75m; Cyber hacking
International transaction
External fraud
TD Bank; $0.56m; ID theft
Misleading information
Chase Bank; $0.06m; ATM fraud
ATM
Wells Fargo; $2.1m; Fraud
Internal fraud




Bank of New York Mellon; $1.14m; Currency trade fraud
ATM BoA; $0.42m; Internal ATM fraud
Computer hacking
JPMorgan; $0.13m; ATM theft
Derivatives
Several banks; $39.9m; Bank fraud
External fraud
JPMorgan; $1.1b; Subprime CDO
Poor controls, Misleading information, Complex products
Goldman Sachs; $0.06m; Insider trading
Multiple people, Complex products
Big banks involved
Charles Schwab & Co.; $1.8m; Employment issues
Employment issues
Deutsche Bank; $1m; Overcharging
Overcharging
Regulatory issues
JPMorgan; $83.3m; Breaking US saction
International transaction
Citigroup; $0.6m; Tax problem
Offshore fund
Citigroup; $30m; Data breach
Misleading information
Morgan Stanley; $1.12m; Unfair pricing
BoA; $800m; Credit card products
Credit card
Legal issue Goldman Sachs; $25.73m; Regulatory breach
Citigroup; $54.3m; Legal issue
Derivatives
Complex transaction Multiple companies; $4b; Regulatory issues
UBS; $8m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Legal issue
JPMorgan; $722m; Unlawful pament scheme
Multiple people
UBS; $780m; Regulatory failure
Crime
JPMorgan; $63.9m; Regulatory failure
Morgan Stanley; $1.2m; Fraud
Internal fraud
Complex products
Morgan Stanley; $275m; Misleading investors
Misleading information
Several banks; $9.17m; Regulatory failure
Poor controls
State Street Corporation; $4.99m; Failed CDO
Overcharging
BoA; $10m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Bank of New York Mellon; $931.6m; Fruad
Morgan Stanley; $3.3m; Improper fee arrangement
Poor controls
Poor controls
UBS; $10m; Human error
Misleading information
Bank of New York Mellon; $1b; Administrative error
Regulatory issues
Citigroup; $1.25m; Report error
Manual process




Goldman Sachs; $0.96m; Complex transactions
Derivatives
BoA; 4b; Less regulatory capital
Complex products Citigroup; $30b; Derivatives
Wells Fargo; 11.2m; Regulatory issues
Regulatory issues
External fraud Citigroup; $0.02m; Fraud
Chase Bank; $0.01m; Fraud
ATM
Single person
UBS; $2.75m; Insider trading




BoA; $16.7b; Legal action
Derivatives, Bank cross selling
BoA; $7.5m; Mislead investors
JPMorgan; $549m; Misleading information
Manual process
Regulatory issues
Several firms; $0.91m; Overcharging
Overcharging
KPMG; $25b; Inconsistent regulation
ABN Amro; $1m; Regulatory issue
Legal issue
Insurance First Federal Bank; $3000; Regulatory failure
Mutual of Omaha; $0.05m; Reglatory failure
Poor controls
International transaction
Wegelin & Co. Privatbankiers; $1.2b; Tax evasion
Blue Index; $90m; Insider trading
Multiple people
Offshore fund Credit Suisse; $3b; Tax evasion
Credit card, Big banks involved
IRS; $7.67b; Regulatory issues
Poor controls
Pacific National; $7m; Regulatory failure
Offshore fund
Square; $0.5m; Regulatory issue
Employment issues
TCF National Bank; $10m; Money laundering
Ozark Heritage Bank; $0.02m; Regulatory issues
Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Derivatives Wells Fargo; $2m; Regulatory failure
Complex products
UBS; $0.3m; Fund priceing violation
Software issue Goldman Sachs; $22m; Systems failure
Citigroup; $0.06m; Website vulnerability
Computer hacking
Money laundering HSBC; $1b; Money laundering
Big banks involved
Wachovia; $160m; Money laundering
Derivatives
Guggenheim Securities; $0.87m; Poor controls
Bank of Montreal; $0.15m; Incorrect marking option
Single person
Misleading information Yorkville Advisors LLC; $280m; Fraud
Citigroup; $0.65m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
Misleading information
MF Global; $10m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people Jefferies & Company, Inc.; $1.93m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
ICAP; $25m; Regulatory failure
Complex products Pipeline Trading Systems; $1m; IT issues
Merrill Lynch; $1.05m; Regulatory fialure
Software issue
Multiple people
FINRA; $11.6m; Regulatory issues
SEC; $17.7m; Penny stock
Complex transaction
Fannie Mae; $440b; Misleading investor
Misleading information
Poor controls Pequot Capital Management; $28m; Insider trading
Ernst & Young; $8.5m; Fraud
External fraud
Big banks involved
Morgan Stanley; $8.01m; Employment issues
Employment issues
Multiple companies; $11m; Insider tradnig
Misleading information Deutsche Bank; $12b; Hi up loss
Poor controls
Goldman Sachs; $0.65m; Regulatory failure
Computer hacking Genesis Securities; $0.6m; Hacking
Multiple comanies; $2.85m; Hacking
Poor controls
Complex transaction
HAP Trading LLC; $1.5m; Algorithm issue
Software issue
Pentagon Capital Management Plc; $76.8m; Mutual fund trading
Offshore fund ConvergEx Group; $150.8m; Fraud
Multiple people
Hold Brothers On-Line Investment Services; $4m; Stock manipulation
Poor controls
Zions Bank; 8m; Regulatory failure
Next Financial Group Inc.; $0.5m; Regulatory issues
Misleading information
Goldman Sachs; $0.8m; Process error
Big banks involved
Infinium Capital Management; $0.85m; Computer error
Derivatives, Software issue
Derivatives
Compass Group Management; $1.4m; Insider trading
Complex transaction Credit Suisse; $1.75m; Regulatory breach
Big banks involved
Multiple companies; $14.4m; Short sale crackdown
Multiple people
Rodman & Renshaw Capital Group; $0.34m; Regulatory issue
Trillium Brokerage Services; $2.26m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
City of San Diego; $0.08m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Poor controls Deutsche Bank;$1.2m; Insider default-swap case
Big banks involved
JP Turner & Company; $0.46m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.3m; Market manipulation
Misleading information
JPMorgan; $228m; Bid rigging
Complex products JPMorgan; $3.62m; Sale of risky investment
Poor controls
Deutsche Bank; $1.1b; Derivatives
Figure D.7: US Tree 2008-2014.
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SEB; $16.6m; Misleading information
Misleading information




Kaupthing Bank; $0.05m; Regulatory issues
Manual process
?kio Bankas; $2.1b; Money laundering
Money laundering
Goldman Sachs; $30.7m; Regulatory issues
Several banks; $502m; Market manipulation
Overcharging
BNP Paribas; 4.91b; Tax evasion
Complex products
Derivatives
Several banks; $3.44b; Derivatives fraud
Misleading information
Deutsche Bank; $596.8m; Regulatory issues
Poor controls
Credit Suisse; $9.24m; Mismarking
Human error
Morgan Stanley; $2.12m; Mismarking
Single person
Crime




Several banks; $49; Data missing
RBS; $0.13m; External fraud
External fraud
Bank of Ireland; $5.94m; Lawsuit
Legal issues
Employment issues
RBS; $9333; Emoloyment issues
Legal issues
Credit Suisse; $2.4m; Employment issues
Internal fraud
Banque de France; $3.1m; Crime
Crime
NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd.; $4.45m;Fraud
External fraud
SEB; $7.88m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Lloyds TSB; $1.5m; Internal fraud
Multiple people
DnB Nord Bank; $8.33m; Internal fraud
Cheshire Building Society; $0.26m; Fraud
Crime
Barclays Bank; $0.75m; Internal fraud
External fraud
Multiple people




Croatian Postal Bank; $53m; Illegal loan





HSBC; $0.17m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Clydesdale Bank; $0.05m; Fraud
Poor controls
Seymour Pierce; $0.25m; Internal fraud
Regulatory issues
JN Finance; $0.05m; Internal fraud
Legal issues
Upton & Co Accountants; $5.66m; Unauthorised scheme
Regulatory issues
CCC; $1b; Lawsuit








Credit Europe Bank; $0.3m;
Crime
Credit Europe Bank; $1.3m; Saving missing
Manual process
Yorkshire Bank; $29m; Caculation error
Big banks involved
Derivatives
TD Bank; $4.96m; Employment issues
Big banks involved, Software issues
PVM Oil Futures; $10m; Rouge trader
Regulatory issues
SocGen; $0.12m; Insider trading
Multiple people
Sibir; $0.5m; Misleading market
Misleading information
Deutsche Bundesbank; $67.76b; Regulatory change
Poor controls
Tenon Financial Services; $1.14m; Regulatory failure
Complex products
SocGen; $2.4m; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved
Case Funding Centre; $0.06m; External fraud
External fraud




PVM Oil Futures; $0.1m; Market manipulation
Derivatives
Nomura; $4.13m; Regulatory issues
Money laundering
Alpari; $0.23m; Regulatory issues
RBS; $8.9m; Money laundering
Big banks involved
ATM, Software issues
SEB; $0.22m; ATM theft
Poor controls, External fraud
Bank of Ireland; $3.83m; ATM glitch
Big banks involved
Money laundering
Northern Bank; $0.1m; Robbery
Crime




Unnamed; $12.48m; Computer hacking
Big banks involved
RBS; $8.9m; Computer hacking
ATM
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; Hacking
Crime




BAWAG P.S.K.; $1.8b; External fraud
Multiple people
Natwest; $29.28m; Money laundering
Money laundering




RBS; $0.14m; Bank fraud
Credit card
Unnamed; $0.1m; ATM fraud
ATM
ABN Amro; $7.37m; Computer hacking
Crime




Unnamed; $932; $ATM skimming
ATM
Unnamed; $1m; External fraud
Credit card
Big banks involved
Bank of Ireland; $0.14m; Robbery
ATM
BCR; $0.01m; ATM theft
Barclays Bank; $609; ATM theft
Credit card
Figure E.1: EU Tree 2008-2010.
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Computer hacking
PayPal; $5.6m; Computer hacking
HBOS; $2.3m; Computer hacking
Multiple people
Poor controls
Rosbank; $196m; Legal issues
Legal issues




Bank of Scotland; $6.7m; Inaccurate record
Regulatory issues
Ulster Bank; $132m; Technology breakdown
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $4.17b; Data breach
Computer hacking
Santander; $0.58m; Software issues
Internal fraud
Piraeus Bank; $3.2m; Embezzlement
CID; $0.7m; Credit card scam
Credit card
Multiple people, Complex transaction
Otkritie Fiancial Corporation; $103.36m; Fraudulent trade
International transaction
Bank of Moscow; $31.17m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
AIB; $4m; Selling activity
Credit card, Insurance, Bank cross selling
Swedbank; $851.7m; Mistake
Deutsche Bank; Insider trading
Multiple people
Barclays Bank; $4.8m; Banking error
Legal issues
International transaction
AIB; $30.82m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved, Employment issues
Individual; $3.2b; Scam
Fondservisbank; $3.38b; Money transfer scam
Regulatory issues, Complex transaction, Offshore fund
Unnamed; $31.3m; Card fraud
Multiple people, Credit card
Internal fraud
Natwest; $0.6m; Internal fraud
Single person
Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $3.39m; $Internal fraud
Lloyds Banking Group; $3.89m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
HBOS; $1.12m; Internal fraud
ATM
Big banks involved
Credit Suisse; $10.9m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Crime




Erste Bank; $0.08; Robbery
Multiple people
Unnamed; $1m; External fraud
Money laundering




Deutsche Bank; $0.5m; Robbery
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $1.1m; Internal fraud
Poor controls
Poor controls
Sberbank of Russia; $0.08m; Crime
ATM
Barclays Bank; $2277; ATM Skimming
Credit card
AIB; $12.3m; ATM glitch
Software issues
AIB; $112m; Software issues
Crime, ATM
Several banks; $86.4m; ATM skimming
UniCredit; $0.01m; Software problem
Multiple people
Computer hacking
VTB Bank; $0.44m; Computer hacking
Multiple people
Several banks; $10m; Computer hacking
Single person
Rabobank; $11.87m; Computer hacking
Internal fraud
Barclays Bank; $1268; Internal fraud
Human error
Barclays Bank; $0.07m; Internal fraud
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $0.02m; Internal fraud
Credit card
Multiple people
Lloyds TSB; $0.4m; Fraud
External fraud
Rabobank; $63.4m; Options mbezzlement
Derivatives
Poor controls
HSBC; $2620; Internal fraud
Single person
Barclays Bank; $0.15m; Internal fraud
Regulatory issues
Standard Chartered Bank; $17b; Regulatory issues
Derivatives
Deutsche Bank; $0.77m; Regulatory issues
Misleading information
RBS; $25.65m; Regulatory failure
HSBC; $0.2m; Regulatory fialure
Legal issues
Misleading information




Barclays Bank; $452.8m; Regulatory issues
Santander; $2.4m; Product failing
Complex products
Poor controls
Several banks; $4.36m; Regulatory issues
Manual process
Barclays Bank; $776m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
State Street Corporation; $4.1m; Transaction error
Complex transaction
MCO Capital; $0.8m; Regulatory breach
External fraud
Morgan Stanley; $0.05m; Trade error
Software issues
Several banks; $1.5m; Regulatory issues
Money laundering
Fundservicebank; $104m; Money laundering
Vatican Bank; $33m; Money laundering
Offshore fund
Regulatory issues
ATEbank; $9.9m; Money laundering
Big banks involved
Commerzbank; $150m; Money laundering
Offshore fund
International transaction
Coutts and Co; $13m; Money laundering
Poor controls
UBS; $90m; Money laundering
Misleading information
Delta Lloyd; $0.02m; Misleading information
Big banks involved
Lloyds Banking Group; $812.49m; Misleading information
Barclays Bank; $3.2b; Misselling
Insurance
Derivatives
Several banks; $119m; Misselling
Complex products
Barclays Bank; $25.26m; Misselling
Credit Suisse; $9.5m; Product failing
Poor controls
Manual process
Deutsche Bundesbank; $31; External fraud
External fraud
Croatian Postal Bank; $530m; Bank error
Human error
External fraud
Unnamed; $9951; External fraud
Multiple people
Swift Loans Finance; $0.2m; Fraud
Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $15.7m; External fraud
Offshore fund
Unnamed; $0.01m; ATM fraud
ATM





UBS; $2.3b; Trading scandal
Multiple people
Barclays Bank; $0.06m; External fraud
Software issues
Bank of Ireland; $91m; External fraud
Single person
HBOS; $20.66m; External fraud
Barclays Bank; $1.5m; Mortgage fraud
Big banks involved
Regulatory issues
Natixis; $0.5m; Insider trading
Derivatives
The Pentecostal Credit Union; $1m; Regulatory issues
Ulster Bank; $2.5m; Regulatory breach
Employment issues
Misleading information
Topps Rogers Financial Management; $0.15m; Investment scheme
Bank cross selling
Cattles; $0.96m; Misleading information
Friesland Bank; $0.3m; Regulatory breach
Insurance
Poor controls
MWL; $0.02m; Regulatory breach
Offshore fund
Turkish Bank Ltd.; $0.5m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Ashcourt Rowan; $0.6m; Suitability failing
Overcharging
Banque de France; $514m; Overcharging
Legal issues





Multiple banks; $6.5b; Lawsuit
Misleading information
Derivatives
HSBC; $5.1m; Legal issues
Complex products
Morgan Stanley; Legal issues
Crime
Raiffeisen-Regionalbank G?nserndorf; $0.15m; Crime
ATM




International Asset Bank; $0.02m; Robbery
Multiple people
Multiple banks; $66.4m; ATM fraud
ATM
Credito Emiliano; $0.01m; Robbery
Figure E.2: EU Tree 2011-2012.
APPENDIX E. TREES FOR EU MARKET WITH DATASET DERIVED CHARACTERISTICS130
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Software issues
The Money Shop; $1.2m; System error
RBS; $194.6m; Software failure
Big banks involved
Poor controls
Multiple banks; $0.01m; Computer hacking
Computer hacking
Volksbank; $5623.8; Software issues
ATM




Goldman Sachs; $50m; Regulatory failure
Lloyds Banking Group; $98.98m; Cut compensation
Multiple people, Insurance
Santander; $0.17m; Legal action
External fraud
Employment issues
RBS; $8.7m; Employment issues
Internal fraud
Bank of Ireland; $0.04m; Employmnet issues
Regulatory issues




RBS; $250m; Regulatory issues
Regulatory issues, Complex products




GLG Partners Inc.; $32.8m; Lawsuit
Poor controls, Derivatives
Big banks involved
RBS; $707m; Misleading information
Rabobank; $1.03m; Interest fraud
Derivatives
Multiple people
RBS; $66.79m; Legal issues
Deutsche Bank; $1.28b; Lawsuit
Internal fraud
Poor controls
AIB; $2.6m; Legal issues
Central Bank of Ireland; $3.13b; Lawsuit
Regulatory issues
Employment issues
Lehman Brothers; $308m; Employment issues
Legal issues
Deutsche Bank; $1.5m;Employment issues
Big banks involved
Ulster Bank; $0.06m; Internal fraud
External fraud
Weyl Beef Products; $77m; Fraud
Russian Regional Development Bank; $990m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Permanent TSB; $0.05m; External fraud
Single person
Poor controls
Tinkoff Credit Systems; $0.73m; External fraud
Credit card
Post; $0.07m; External fraud
Manual process
Sparkasse Salzburg Bank AG; $0.1m; Human error
Poor controls
BAWAG P.S.K.; $571m; Swap fraud
Multiple people, Derivatives
Frankfurter Volksbank; $294.5m; Human error
Human error
Bank of Italy; $6.4m; Poor controls
Big banks involved
Rabobank; $0.5m; Poor controls
Barclays Bank; $113m; LIBOR rigging
Derivatives
Internal fraud




Loomis; $0.08m; ATM theft
ATM
Poor controls
Gaixa Penedes; $38m; Internal fraud
Multiple people
Bank of Moscow; $29m; Internal fraud;
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $3.5m;Internal fraud
Regulatory issues
Barclays Bank; $43.9m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives, Single person
Lloyds Banking Group; $384m; Market manipulation
Multiple people
Single person
Whiteaway Laidlaw Bank; $ 0.05m; Internal fraud
SocGen; $6.7b; Unauthorized transactions
Poor controls
Santander; $0.04m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Regulatory issues
Squared Financial Services; $0.13m; Regulatory breach
EFG; $24m; Regulatory failure
Offshore fund
Complex transaction
Multiple banks; $87m; Lawsuit
Derivatives
BCP; $0.83m; Market manipulation
Multiple people
Misleading information
Several banks; $33.6b; Regulatory issues
Insurance
1 Stop Financial Services; $188m; Regulatory breach
Poor controls
LGT Capital Partners; $0.13m; Regulatory breach
Clydesdale Bank; $14m; Regulatory failure
Human error
Invesco Limited; $31.3m; Poor management
Misleading information
Overcharging
Multiple banks; $1.7m; Overcharging
Multiple banks; $0.3m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
Derivatives
Multiple banks; $0.78m; Misselling
Misleading information
Multiple banks; $43.3m; Regulatory failure
Money laundering
AXA MPS; $0.07m; Regulatory issues
EFG Private Bank; $6.9m; Regulatory failure
Poor controls
Big banks involved
BNP; $ 8.2b; Broke trade saction
International transaction
KBC; $220m; Regulatory change
UBS; $1.5b; Regulatory failure
Money laundering
Complex transaction
Barclays Bank; $470m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
Rabobank; $1b; Rate rigging
Misleading information
Credit Suisse; $6m; Regulatory failure
Complex products
Santander; $20.6m; Poor advice
Insurance
Barclays Bank; $892m; Regulatory issues
Derivatives
Multiple banks; $2b; Misselling
Credit card
Multiple banks; $34m; Regulatory issues
Poor controls
Lloyds Banking Group; $6.7m; Regulatory failure
Insurance
Barclays Bank; $159m; Regulatory issues
Human error
Deutsch banks; $7.8m; Regulatory failure
Lloyds Banking Group; $46m; Regulatory failure
Employment issues
Standard Bank; $12.6m; Regulatory issues;
Money laundering
UniCredit; $0.44m; Regulatory fialure
Derivatives
Software issues
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $4.6m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
ABN Amro; $0.05m; Regulatory failure
Poor controls
Ulster Bank; $53m; Wrong billing




Central Co-operative Bank Ltd; $0.04m; Crime
ATM
Single person
Ulster Bank; $0.26m; ATM theft
ATM
Cassa di Risparmio di Lucca Pisa Livorno; $5551; Robbery
Multiple people
Ulster Bank; $0.26m; ATM scam
ATM
Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank; $2m; Crime
Big banks involved






Bank of Ireland; $0.3m; Robbery




Mizuho Financial Group; $0.15m; Insider trading
Multiple people
Santander; $0.14m; Internal fraud
Derivatives







Barclays Bank; $12.7m; Credit card scam
ATM, Computer hacking
AIB; $1.1b; External fraud




Unnamed; $0.1m; External fraud
Credit card
Barclays Bank; 2.2m; Exernal fraud
Big banks involved
Unnamed; $1.3m; External fraud
Several banks; $61.8m; ATM fraud
ATM
Computer hacking
Barclays Bank; $2m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Unnamed; $0.5m; Computer hacking
Crime





Ateka Resource AS; $83.6m; Money laundering
Bank of Settlements and Savings; $51m; Money laundering
Big banks involved
Big banks involved, Poor controls
Santander; $0.02m; External fraud
Computer hacking
Misleading information




Coutts bank; $182m; Misleading information
Misleading information
Multiple banks; $1.68b; Mis-selling
Overcharging
Figure E.3: EU Tree 2013-2014.
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FSA; $0.2m; Employment issues
Big banks involved
Credit Suisse; $2.4m; Employment issues
AIB; $30.82m; Internal fraud
International transaction
Legal issues
RBS; $9333; Emoloyment issues
Big banks involved
Individual; $0.1m; Employment issues
Big banks involved
Crime









UniCredit; $0.01m; Software problem
Multiple people
Several banks; $86.4m; ATM skimming
Poor controls
Barclays Bank; $2277; ATM Skimming
Credit card
AIB; $12.3m; ATM glitch
Internal fraud
Barclays Bank; $1268; Internal fraud
Human error
Credit Suisse; $3737; Internal fraud
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $0.02m; Internal fraud
Credit card
Credit Suisse; $1.3m; Internal fraud
Poor controls
Multiple people
Deutsche Bank; $0.5m; Robbery
Crime
DnB Nord Bank; $8.33m; Internal fraud
Rabobank; $63.4m; Options mbezzlement
Derivatives
Software issues
AIB; $112m; Software issues
Bank of Ireland; $3.83m; ATM glitch
ATM
Computer hacking
Several banks; $10m; Computer hacking
Single person
Rabobank; $11.87m; Computer hacking
Money laundering
Northern Bank; $0.1m; Robbery
Crime
Czech National Bank; $276.6m; Money laundering
Credit Suisse; $10.9m; Money laundering
Big banks involved





Unnamed; $12.48m; Computer hacking
Big banks involved
RBS; $8.9m; Computer hacking
ATM
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; Hacking
Crime
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; Computer hacking
Misleading information
Delta Lloyd; $0.02m; Misleading information
SEB; $16.54m; Lawsuit
Legal issues, Derivatives
Sibir; $0.5m; Misleading market
Regulatory issues
Big banks involved




Credit Europe Bank; $1.3m; Saving missing
Big banks involved
KBC Bank; $33.2m; Improper activity
Derivatives
Credit Suisse; $9.5m; Product failing
Misleading information, Complex products
Regulatory issues
Credit Suisse; $9.24m; Mismarking
Human error
Morgan Stanley; $2.12m; Mismarking
Single person
Internal fraud
CID; $0.7m; Credit card scam
Credit card
Piraeus Bank; $3.2m; Embezzlement
Manual process
PVM Oil Futures; $10m; Rouge trader
Derivatives
Big banks involved
TD Bank; $4.96m; Employment issues
Derivatives, Software issues
Yorkshire Bank; $29m; Caculation error
Regulatory issues
Seymour Pierce; $0.6m; Regulatory issues
SocGen; $0.12m; Insider trading
Multiple people
Upton & Co Accountants; $5.66m; Unauthorised scheme
Legal issues
Derivatives
Natixis; $0.5m; Insider trading
Big banks involved
RBS; $25.65m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Deutsche Bank; $0.77m; Regulatory issues
Poor controls
MWL; $0.02m; Regulatory breach
Offshore fund
Integrated Financial Arrangements; $5.5m; Client money breach
Seymour Pierce; $0.25m; Internal fraud
Internal fraud
Tenon Financial Services; $1.14m; Regulatory failure
Complex products
Manual process
Nomura; $4.13m; Regulatory issues
PVM Oil Futures; $0.1m; Market manipulation
Derivatives
Several banks; $4.36m; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved
Money laundering
Postfinance; $0.28m; Money laundering
RBS; $8.9m; Money laundering
Big banks involved
Big banks involved
Erste Bank; $0.05m; Regulatory issues
Kaupthing Bank; $0.05m; Regulatory issues
Manual process
BNP Paribas; 4.91b; Tax evasion
Complex products
Money laundering
?kio Bankas; $2.1b; Money laundering
Commerzbank; $150m; Money laundering
Offshore fund
Poor controls
Nordea Group; $0.9m; Regulatory issues
Bank of Nova Scotia; $0.9m; Regulatory breach
Software issues
Overcharging




HSBC; $16.39m; Regulatory issues
Barclays Bank; $12.24m; Regulatory issues
Poor controls
Lloyds TSB; $5.25m; Regulatory failure
Insurance
Internal fraud
IBRC; $11m; Internal fraud
Single person




Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $3.39m; $Internal fraud
Multiple people
Croatian Postal Bank; $53m; Illegal loan
Poor controls




NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd.; $4.45m;Fraud
Internal fraud
SEB; $0.22m; ATM theft
Poor controls, ATM, Software issues
Unnamed; $384m; Fraud
Single person
BAWAG P.S.K.; $1.8b; External fraud
Deutsche Bundesbank; $31; External fraud
Manual process
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $19.2m; External fraud
Poor controls
RBS; $0.13m; External fraud
Case Funding Centre; $0.06m; External fraud
Regulatory issues
Multiple people
Natwest; $29.28m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Bank of Scotland; $15.5m; Mortgage fraud
Big banks involved
RBS; $0.14m; Bank fraud
Credit card
Unnamed; $0.1m; ATM fraud
ATM
Mortgage Express; $1.6m; External fraud
Internal fraud
Piraeus Bank; $1m; Internal fraud
Poor controls
Nomura; $85.54m; Fraud
Lloyds TSB; $0.4m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Legal issues
Lloyds TSB; $40.67b; Lawsuit
Big banks involved
Standard Bank; $150m; Lawsuit
Poor controls
Rosbank; $196m; Legal issues
Barclays Bank; $109.77m; Lawsuit
Big banks involved
Crime
Berliner Sparkasse; $3.9; Robbery
Single person
Banque de France; $3.1m; Crime
Internal fraud
Credit Europe Bank; $0.3m;
Poor controls
Raiffeisen-Regionalbank G?nserndorf; $0.15m; Crime
ATM
Multiple people
Unnamed; $1m; External fraud
Credit card
TNT Express Services; $0.2m; Crime
ATM
Tesco Bank; $0.02m; ATM theft
Big banks involved
AIB; $0.3m; ATM theft
Barclays Bank; $609; ATM theft
Credit card
Figure E.4: EU Tree 2008-2011.
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Individual; $3.2b; Scam
International transaction
FSA; $0.2m; Employment issues
Employment issues
PayPal; $5.6m; Computer hacking
Computer hacking
Money laundering
Vatican Bank; $33m; Money laundering
Offshore fund
Fundservicebank; $104m; Money laundering
Legal issues






HSBC; $5.1m; Legal issues
Complex products
Morgan Stanley; Legal issues
Misleading information





Barclays Bank; $4.8m; Banking error
Big banks involved
Rosbank; $196m; Legal issues
Regulatory issues
Natixis; $0.5m; Insider trading
Derivatives
Ulster Bank; $2.5m; Regulatory breach
Employment issues
SocGen; $0.12m; Insider trading
Multiple people
Upton & Co Accountants; $5.66m; Unauthorised scheme
Legal issues
The Pentecostal Credit Union; $1m; Regulatory issues
Poor controls
Ashcourt Rowan; $0.6m; Suitability failing
Seymour Pierce; $0.25m; Internal fraud
Internal fraud
Tenon Financial Services; $1.14m; Regulatory failure
Complex products
Software issues
Morgan Stanley; $0.05m; Trade error
Big banks involved
Bank of Scotland; $6.7m; Inaccurate record
Big banks involved
Standard Chartered Bank; $17b; Regulatory issues
Kaupthing Bank; $0.05m; Regulatory issues
Manual process
Deutsche Bank; $0.77m; Regulatory issues
Derivatives
Complex products
Santander; $2.4m; Product failing
Misleading information
BNP Paribas; 4.91b; Tax evasion
Offshore fund
MWL; $0.02m; Regulatory breach
Poor controls
Fondservisbank; $3.38b; Money transfer scam
Complex transaction, International transaction
Misleading information
Topps Rogers Financial Management; $0.15m; Investment scheme
Bank cross selling
Cattles; $0.96m; Misleading information
Insurance




Banque de France; $514m; Overcharging
Big banks involved




ATEbank; $9.9m; Money laundering
Poor controls
Turkish Bank Ltd.; $0.5m; Money laundering
RBS; $8.9m; Money laundering
Big banks involved
Big banks involved
?kio Bankas; $2.1b; Money laundering
Commerzbank; $150m; Money laundering
Offshore fund
International transaction
Coutts and Co; $13m; Money laundering
Poor controls
UBS; $90m; Money laundering
Internal fraud
Natwest; $0.6m; Internal fraud
NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd.; $4.45m;Fraud
External fraud
Single person
HBOS; $1.12m; Internal fraud
ATM
Lloyds Banking Group; $3.89m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $3.39m; $Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Credit Suisse; $10.9m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Poor controls
AIB; $4m; Selling activity
Credit card, Insurance, Bank cross selling
Swedbank; $851.7m; Mistake
Deutsche Bank; Insider trading
Multiple people
Crime
Sberbank of Russia; $0.08m; Crime
ATM
Barclays Bank; $2277; ATM Skimming
Credit card
AIB; $12.3m; ATM glitch
Regulatory issues
Several banks; $1.5m; Regulatory issues
State Street Corporation; $4.1m; Transaction error
Complex transaction
Barclays Bank; $12.24m; Regulatory issues
Misleading information
Derivatives
Barclays Bank; $776m; Regulatory failure
Morgan Stanley; $2.12m; Mismarking
Single person
Credit Suisse; $9.24m; Mismarking
Human error
Internal fraud
HSBC; $2620; Internal fraud
Single person
Barclays Bank; $0.15m; Internal fraud
Software issues
AIB; $112m; Software issues
ATM
Bank of Ireland; $3.83m; ATM glitch
Several banks; $86.4m; ATM skimming
Crime
External fraud
Barclays Bank; $1.5m; Mortgage fraud
Single person
UBS; $2.3b; Trading scandal
Poor controls
MCO Capital; $0.8m; Regulatory breach
Regulatory issues
RBS; $0.13m; External fraud
Computer hacking
Several banks; $10m; Computer hacking
Single person
Rabobank; $11.87m; Computer hacking
Employment issues
AIB; $30.82m; Internal fraud
International transaction
Credit Suisse; $2.4m; Employment issues
RBS; $9333; Emoloyment issues
Legal issues
Internal fraud
Barclays Bank; $1268; Internal fraud
Human error
Barclays Bank; $0.07m; Internal fraud
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $0.02m; Internal fraud
Credit card
Multiple people
Rabobank; $63.4m; Options mbezzlement
Derivatives
DnB Nord Bank; $8.33m; Internal fraud
Multiple people
External fraud
Swift Loans Finance; $0.2m; Fraud
Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $15.7m; External fraud
Offshore fund





Barclays Bank; $0.06m; External fraud
Software issues
Bank of Ireland; $91m; External fraud
RBS; $0.14m; Bank fraud
Credit card
Lloyds TSB; $0.4m; Fraud
Internal fraud
ATM
Unnamed; $0.1m; ATM fraud
Big banks involved
Unnamed; $0.01m; ATM fraud
Internal fraud
Dnipropetrovsk Bank; $0.2m; Embezzlement
Poor controls
Croatian Postal Bank; $53m; Illegal loan
Piraeus Bank; $1m; Internal fraud
External fraud
Complex transaction
Otkritie Fiancial Corporation; $103.36m; Fraudulent trade
International transaction
Bank of Moscow; $31.17m; Internal fraud
Credit card
Unnamed; $31.3m; Card fraud
International transaction
Unnamed; $47m; Card fraud
External fraud
Crime
Credito Emiliano; $0.01m; Robbery









Deutsche Bank; $0.5m; Robbery
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $1.1m; Internal fraud
Poor controls
ATM
Multiple banks; $66.4m; ATM fraud
Big banks involved
Raiffeisenbank Leonding; $0.06m; ATM theft
Barclays Bank; $609; ATM theft
Credit card
UniCredit; $0.01m; Software problem
Software issues
Computer hacking
HBOS; $2.3m; Computer hacking
Big banks involved
VTB Bank; $0.44m; Computer hacking
ATM
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; Hacking
Crime
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; Computer hacking
Misleading information
Delta Lloyd; $0.02m; Misleading information
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $452.8m; Regulatory issues
Regulatory issues
Barclays Bank; $3.2b; Misselling
Insurance
Lloyds Banking Group; $812.49m; Misleading information
Derivatives
Several banks; $119m; Misselling
Complex products
Barclays Bank; $25.26m; Misselling
Credit Suisse; $9.5m; Product failing
Poor controls
Regulatory issues
HSBC; $0.2m; Regulatory fialure
Legal issues
RBS; $25.65m; Regulatory failure
Manual process
Croatian Postal Bank; $530m; Bank error
Human error




Yorkshire Bank; $29m; Caculation error
TD Bank; $4.96m; Employment issues
Derivatives, Software issues
Derivatives
PVM Oil Futures; $10m; Rouge trader
PVM Oil Futures; $0.1m; Market manipulation
Regulatory issues
Regulatory issues
Nomura; $4.13m; Regulatory issues
Several banks; $4.36m; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved
Crime
International Asset Bank; $0.02m; Robbery
Northern Bank; $0.1m; Robbery
Money laundering
Credit Europe Bank; $0.3m;
Poor controls
Raiffeisen-Regionalbank G?nserndorf; $0.15m; Crime
ATM
Single person




IBRC; $68.3m; External fraud
External fraud






HBOS; $20.66m; External fraud
Single person
Unnamed; $9951; External fraud
Poor controls
Natwest; $0.16m; Regulatory failure
Internal fraud
Piraeus Bank; $3.2m; Embezzlement
CID; $0.7m; Credit card scam
Credit card
Software issues
Ulster Bank; $132m; Technology breakdown
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $4.17b; Data breach
Computer hacking
Santander; $0.58m; Software issues
External fraud
SEB; $0.22m; ATM theft
ATM, Software issues
Volksbank; $111M; Fraud
Figure E.5: EU Tree 2008-2012.
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The Co-operative Bank; $307m; IT failure
Software issues
External fraud
Unnamed; $9951; External fraud
NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd.; $4.45m;Fraud
Internal fraud
Single person
Barclays Bank; $1.5m; Mortgage fraud
Big banks involved
Permanent TSB; $0.05m; External fraud
Poor controls




Yorkshire Bank; $31.73m; Lawsuit
Upton & Co Accountants; $5.66m; Unauthorised scheme
Regulatory issues
Big banks involved




Bank of Ireland; $0.04m; Employmnet issues
RBS; $8.7m; Employment issues
Internal fraud
Derivatives
Morgan Stanley; Legal issues
Complex products
RBS; $250m; Regulatory issues
Regulatory issues
HSBC; $5.1m; Legal issues
Money laundering
Fundservicebank; $104m; Money laundering
Russian Regional Development Bank; $990m; Money laundering
External fraud
Northern Bank; $0.1m; Robbery
Crime
Vatican Bank; $33m; Money laundering
Offshore fund
Multiple people
Ateka Resource AS; $83.6m; Money laundering
Natwest; $29.28m; Money laundering
External fraud
Big banks involved
Unnamed; $1m; External fraud
Crime
Bank of Settlements and Savings; $51m; Money laundering
Regulatory issues
AXA MPS; $0.07m; Regulatory issues
Poor controls
RBS; $8.9m; Money laundering
Big banks involved
EFG Private Bank; $6.9m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information













Credit Suisse; $9.5m; Product failing
Poor controls
Barclays Bank; $25.26m; Misselling
Regulatory issues
Laiki Bank; $0.14m; Regulatory failure
Friesland Bank; $0.3m; Regulatory breach
Insurance
Topps Rogers Financial Management; $0.15m; Investment scheme
Bank cross selling
Big banks involved
Santander; $2.4m; Product failing
Complex products
Lloyds Banking Group; $15m; Lawsuit
Barclays Bank; $12.24m; Regulatory issues
Poor controls
International transaction
Unnamed; $31.3m; Card fraud
Multiple people, Credit card
Individual; $3.2b; Scam
Employment issues
Ulster Bank; $2.5m; Regulatory breach
Regulatory issues
IBRC; $7.8m; Emoloyment issues
Samba Financial Group; $0.09m; Employment issues
Legal issues
Big banks involved
Deutsche Bank; $1.5m;Employment issues
AIB; $30.82m; Internal fraud
International transaction
Manual process
Sparkasse Salzburg Bank AG; $0.1m; Human error
Deutsche Bundesbank; $31; External fraud
External fraud
Poor controls
Nomura; $4.13m; Regulatory issues
Regulatory issues
Bank of Italy; $6.4m; Poor controls
Derivatives
PVM Oil Futures; $10m; Rouge trader
PVM Oil Futures; $0.1m; Market manipulation
Regulatory issues
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $113m; LIBOR rigging
TD Bank; $4.96m; Employment issues
Software issues
Human error
Frankfurter Volksbank; $294.5m; Human error
Poor controls
Croatian Postal Bank; $530m; Bank error
Regulatory issues
FBME Bank; $531m; Regulatory breach
Big banks involved
Kaupthing Bank; $0.05m; Regulatory issues
Manual process
AIB; $0.67m; Regulatory beach
BNP Paribas; 4.91b; Tax evasion
Complex products
Deutsche Bank; $0.77m; Regulatory issues
Derivatives
Complex transaction
Fondservisbank; $3.38b; Money transfer scam
International transaction, Offshore fund
Big banks involved
Rabobank; $1b; Rate rigging
Barclays Bank; $470m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
Derivatives
Multiple banks; $87m; Lawsuit
Complex transaction
Multiple banks; $43.3m; Regulatory failure
Overcharging
Banque de France; $514m; Overcharging
Several banks; $502m; Market manipulation
Big banks involved
Poor controls
MWL; $0.02m; Regulatory breach
Offshore fund
Clydesdale Bank; $14m; Regulatory failure
Human error
Novagalicia Banco; $6500; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Credit Union Amber; $3487; Regulatory failure
Seymour Pierce; $0.25m; Internal fraud
Internal fraud
Tenon Financial Services; $1.14m; Regulatory failure
Complex products
Internal fraud
Natwest; $0.6m; Internal fraud
G4S; $1.8m; Internal fraud
Crime
Loomis; $0.08m; ATM theft
ATM
Poor controls
HBOS; $0.2m; Internal fraud
CID; $0.7m; Credit card scam
Credit card
Multiple people
Croatian Postal Bank; $53m; Illegal loan
Piraeus Bank; $1m; Internal fraud
External fraud
Complex transaction
Bank of Moscow; $31.17m; Internal fraud
Otkritie Fiancial Corporation; $103.36m; Fraudulent trade
International transaction
Single person
HBOS; $1.12m; Internal fraud
ATM








JPMorgan Chase & Co; $1.1m; Internal fraud
Poor controls
Deutsche Bank; $0.5m; Robbery
Crime
Central Co-operative Bank Ltd; $0.04m; Crime
ATM
Bulgarian Postbank; $4841; Robbery
Single person
Openbank; $0.06m; Robbery
Ulster Bank; $0.26m; ATM theft
ATM
Multiple people




VTB Bank; $0.44m; Computer hacking
Barclays Bank; $2m; Computer hacking
Crime
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; Computer hacking
ATM
Crime
Unicredit Bulbank; $0.02m; Robbery
ATM
Raiffeisenbank Leonding; $0.06m; ATM theft
Barclays Bank; $609; ATM theft
Credit card
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; Hacking
Computer hacking
Crime
Ulster Bank; $0.26m; ATM scam
ATM
HBOS; $0.4m; Robbery
Unnamed; $1m; External fraud
Credit card
External fraud
Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $15.7m; External fraud
Offshore fund




Several banks; $61.8m; ATM fraud
Unnamed; $0.1m; ATM fraud
Big banks involved
Credit card
Unnamed; $0.1m; External fraud
RBS; $0.14m; Bank fraud
Big banks involved
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; 2.2m; Exernal fraud
Barclays Bank; $0.06m; External fraud
Software issues
Poor controls
Ulster Bank; $53m; Wrong billing
HBOS; $0.01m; Legal issues
Legal issues
Credit Europe Bank; $0.3m;
Crime
Software issues
Ulster Bank; $132m; Technology breakdown
BinckBank; $4531; Software issues
Derivatives
SEB; $0.22m; ATM theft
External fraud, ATM
Regulatory issues
Bank of Scotland; $6.7m; Inaccurate record
Big banks involved
ABN Amro; $0.05m; Regulatory failure
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $4.6m; Regulatory failure
Misleading information
Big banks involved
AIB; $1.1b; External fraud
External fraud
Misleading information
Lloyds Banking Group; $812.49m; Misleading information
Legal issues
RBS; $18.5b; Legal issues
RBS; $66.79m; Legal issues
Multiple people
Derivatives
HSBC; $0.2m; Regulatory fialure
Regulatory issues
Barclays Bank; $2.3m; Misselling
Insurance
Barclays Bank; $3.2b; Misselling
Regulatory issues
Barclays Bank; $892m; Regulatory issues
Derivatives
Multiple banks; $2b; Misselling
Credit card
Multiple banks; $34m; Regulatory issues
Money laundering
Credit Suisse; $10.9m; Money laundering
Regulatory issues
Nordea Group; $4.6m; Regulatory failure
Commerzbank; $150m; Money laundering
Offshore fund
International transaction
UBS; $90m; Money laundering
Coutts and Co; $13m; Money laundering
Poor controls
Internal fraud
Barclays Bank; $1268; Internal fraud
Human error
Santander; $0.14m; Internal fraud
Santander; $0.04m; Internal fraud
Single person
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $0.02m; Internal fraud
Credit card
Multiple people
Mizuho Financial Group; $0.15m; Insider trading
Rabobank; $63.4m; Options mbezzlement
Derivatives




Deutsche Bank; Insider trading
Multiple people
Yorkshire Bank; $91.6m; Poor controls
External fraud
Rabobank; $0.5m; Poor controls
Manual process
Regulatory issues
MCO Capital; $0.8m; Regulatory breach
External fraud
State Street Corporation; $4.1m; Transaction error
Complex transaction
Barclays Bank; $159m; Regulatory issues
Human error
Lloyds Banking Group; $46m; Regulatory failure
Employment issues
Citigroup; $0.76m; Reporting breach
AIB; $2.6m; Overcharging
Overcharging
Several banks; $4.36m; Regulatory issues
Manual process
Derivatives
Barclays Bank; $776m; Regulatory failure
Morgan Stanley; $2.12m; Mismarking
Single person
Credit Suisse; $9.24m; Mismarking
Human error
Software issues
Santander; $0.58m; Software issues
Barclays Bank; $4.17b; Data breach
Computer hacking
Internal fraud
Lloyds Banking Group; $59.7m; Internal fraud
HSBC; $2620; Internal fraud
Single person
Crime
Sberbank of Russia; $0.08m; Crime
ATM
Barclays Bank; $2277; ATM Skimming
Credit card
AIB; $12.3m; ATM glitch
Insurance
AIB; $4m; Selling activity
Credit card, Bank cross selling




AIB; $2.6m; Legal issues
Legal issues
Computer hacking
Rabobank; $11.87m; Computer hacking
Several banks; $10m; Computer hacking
Single person
Crime
IBRC; $68.3m; External fraud
External fraud
Bank of Ireland; $0.3m; Robbery
Barclays Bank; $3208; Robbery
Single person
Software issues
RBS; $194.6m; Software failure
ATM
Bank of Ireland; $3.83m; ATM glitch
Crime
Several banks; $86.4m; ATM skimming
UniCredit; $0.01m; Software problem
Multiple people
Computer hacking
Unnamed; $0.5m; Computer hacking
Multiple people
PayPal; $5.6m; Computer hacking
Figure E.6: EU Tree 2008-2013.
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Ulster Bank; $0.06m; Internal fraud
Employment issues
Computer hacking
PayPal; $5.6m; Computer hacking
Multiple people
Unnamed; $0.5m; Computer hacking
Big banks involved
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; Computer hacking
ATM
Barclays Bank; $2m; Fraud
Crime Barclays Bank; $2m; Computer hacking
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; Hacking
ATM
Big banks involved
Santander; $0.02m; External fraud
Poor controls
Several banks; $10m; Computer hacking
Single person
Rabobank; $11.87m; Computer hacking
Internal fraud
Natwest; $0.6m; Internal fraud
Loomis; $0.08m; ATM theft
ATM
Single person
Whiteaway Laidlaw Bank; $ 0.05m; Internal fraud
HBOS; $1.12m; Internal fraud
ATM
Poor controls HSBC; $2620; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
SocGen; $6.7b; Unauthorized transactions
Poor controls
CID; $0.7m; Credit card scam
Credit card
Bank of Moscow; $29m; Internal fraud;
Seymour Pierce; $0.25m; Internal fraud
Regulatory issues
Multiple people
Dnipropetrovsk Bank; $0.2m; Embezzlement
Big banks involved
Mizuho Financial Group; $0.15m; Insider trading
Rabobank; $63.4m; Options mbezzlement
Derivatives
Crime RBS; $0.23m; Internal fraud
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $1.1m; Internal fraud
Poor controls
Poor controls
Piraeus Bank; $1m; Internal fraud
External fraud
Gaixa Penedes; $38m; Internal fraud
Complex transaction Bank of Moscow; $31.17m; Internal fraud
Otkritie Fiancial Corporation; $103.36m; Fraudulent trade
International transaction
Big banks involved
Deutsche Bank; $1.5m;Employment issues
Employment issues
Credit Suisse; $10.9m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Crime




Bank of Ireland; $0.3m; Robbery
ATM
Unicredit; $0.05m; Crime
Poor controls Barclays Bank; $2277; ATM Skimming
Credit card
AIB; $12.3m; ATM glitch
Multiple people Raiffeisenbank Leonding; $0.06m; ATM theft
Barclays Bank; $609; ATM theft
Credit card
Internal fraud
Barclays Bank; $3.5m;Internal fraud
Poor controls
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $0.02m; Internal fraud
Credit card
Santander; $0.04m; Internal fraud
Single person
Santander; $0.14m; Internal fraud
Barclays Bank; $1268; Internal fraud
Human error
Legal issues
Goldman Sachs; $50m; Regulatory failure
Lloyds Banking Group; $98.98m; Cut compensation
Multiple people, Insurance
Santander; $0.17m; Legal action
External fraud
Derivatives
Goldman Sachs; $1.1b; Lawsuit
Complex transaction
Morgan Stanley; Legal issues
Complex products RBS; $250m; Regulatory issues
Regulatory issues
HSBC; $5.1m; Legal issues
Employment issues Bank of Ireland; $0.04m; Employmnet issues
RBS; $8.7m; Employment issues
Internal fraud




Sberbank of Russia; $0.08m; Crime
Crime
Swedbank; $851.7m; Mistake
Deutsche Bank; Insider trading
Multiple people
Bank cross selling Multiple banks; $1.68b; Mis-selling
Overcharging
AIB; $4m; Selling activity
Credit card, Insurance
Manual process
Rabobank; $0.5m; Poor controls
Derivatives TD Bank; $4.96m; Employment issues
Software issues
Barclays Bank; $113m; LIBOR rigging
External fraud
Yorkshire Bank; $91.6m; Poor controls
Poor controls
AIB; $1.1b; External fraud
Barclays Bank; $1.5m; Mortgage fraud
Single person
IBRC; $68.3m; External fraud
Crime
ATM Barclays Bank; $12.7m; Credit card scam
Computer hacking




G4S; $1.8m; Internal fraud
Internal fraud
Credit Europe Bank; $0.3m;
Poor controls
ATM
Ulster Bank; $0.26m; ATM scam
Multiple people
Central Co-operative Bank Ltd; $0.04m; Crime
Ulster Bank; $0.26m; ATM theft
Single person
Multiple people
Unnamed; $1m; External fraud
Credit card
Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank; $2m; Crime
Internal fraud Natwest; $0.58m; Robbery
HBOS; $3.4m; Fraud
Computer hacking
Single person Loomis; $17.22m; Robbery
Internal fraud
Cassa di Risparmio di Lucca Pisa Livorno; $5551; Robbery
Money laundering
Fundservicebank; $104m; Money laundering
Northern Bank; $0.1m; Robbery
Crime
Vatican Bank; $33m; Money laundering
Offshore fund
Multiple people
Ateka Resource AS; $83.6m; Money laundering
Natwest; $29.28m; Money laundering
External fraud
Big banks involved Unnamed; $1m; External fraud
Crime




Permanent TSB; $0.05m; External fraud
Single person
Russian Regional Development Bank; $990m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Weyl Beef Products; $77m; Fraud
Poor controls Tinkoff Credit Systems; $0.73m; External fraud
Credit card
Post; $0.07m; External fraud
Multiple people
Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $15.7m; External fraud
Offshore fund
Unnamed; $0.1m; External fraud
Credit card
Unnamed; $1.3m; External fraud





Barclays Bank; $0.06m; External fraud
Software issues
Barclays Bank; 2.2m; Exernal fraud
RBS; $0.14m; Bank fraud
Credit card
Lloyds TSB; $0.4m; Fraud
Internal fraud
Manual process
Sparkasse Salzburg Bank AG; $0.1m; Human error
Deutsche Bundesbank; $31; External fraud
External fraud
Human error Croatian Postal Bank; $530m; Bank error
Frankfurter Volksbank; $294.5m; Human error
Poor controls
Poor controls
Bank of Italy; $6.4m; Poor controls
Derivatives BAWAG P.S.K.; $571m; Swap fraud
Multiple people
PVM Oil Futures; $10m; Rouge trader
Regulatory issues PVM Oil Futures; $0.1m; Market manipulation
Derivatives
Nomura; $4.13m; Regulatory issues
Legal issues
Lehman Brothers; $308m; Employment issues
Employment issues
Yorkshire Bank; $31.73m; Lawsuit
Julius Baer; $179m; Legal action
Poor controls
Regulatory issues Barclays Bank; $546m; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved
Upton & Co Accountants; $5.66m; Unauthorised scheme
Misleading information




RBS; $707m; Misleading information
Multiple people Deutsche Bank; $1.28b; Lawsuit
Internal fraud
RBS; $66.79m; Legal issues
Derivatives Rabobank; $1.03m; Interest fraud
HSBC; $0.2m; Regulatory fialure
Regulatory issues




Barclays Bank; $3.2b; Misselling
Insurance
Lloyds Banking Group; $812.49m; Misleading information
Poor controls
AXA; $2.8m; Mis-selling
Coutts bank; $182m; Misleading information
Bank cross selling
Legal issues Central Bank of Ireland; $3.13b; Lawsuit
Regulatory issues
AIB; $2.6m; Legal issues
Derivatives
RBS; $42.2m; Lawsuit
Regulatory issues UBS; $14.8m; Misselling
Barclays Bank; $892m; Regulatory issues
Insurance
Complex products Credit Suisse; $9.5m; Product failing
Poor controls
Barclays Bank; $25.26m; Misselling
International transaction
Individual; $3.2b; Scam
Unnamed; $31.3m; Card fraud
Multiple people, Credit card
Big banks involved
AIB; $30.82m; Internal fraud
Employment issues
Regulatory issues
BNP; $ 8.2b; Broke trade saction
Money laundering UBS; $90m; Money laundering
Coutts and Co; $13m; Money laundering
Poor controls
Poor controls
Ulster Bank; $53m; Wrong billing
Software issues
Multiple banks; $0.01m; Computer hacking
Computer hacking
Ulster Bank; $132m; Technology breakdown
BinckBank; $4531; Software issues
Derivatives
ATM SEB; $0.22m; ATM theft
External fraud
Volksbank; $5623.8; Software issues
Software issues
The Money Shop; $1.2m; System error
Big banks involved
RBS; $194.6m; Software failure
Poor controls Barclays Bank; $4.17b; Data breach
Computer hacking
Santander; $0.58m; Software issues
ATM
Bank of Ireland; $3.83m; ATM glitch
Crime Several banks; $86.4m; ATM skimming
UniCredit; $0.01m; Software problem
Multiple people
Regulatory issues
Squared Financial Services; $0.13m; Regulatory breach
Ulster Bank; $2.5m; Regulatory breach
Employment issues
Multiple people
SocGen; $0.12m; Insider trading
Complex transaction BCP; $0.83m; Market manipulation
Barclays Bank; $470m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
Overcharging
Multiple banks; $1.7m; Overcharging
Big banks involved Multiple banks; $0.3m; Regulatory failure
AIB; $2.6m; Overcharging
Poor controls
Money laundering AXA MPS; $0.07m; Regulatory issues
EFG Private Bank; $6.9m; Regulatory failure
Poor controls
Derivatives Multiple banks; $87m; Lawsuit
Complex transaction
Multiple banks; $43.3m; Regulatory failure
Offshore fund
EFG; $24m; Regulatory failure
Fondservisbank; $3.38b; Money transfer scam
Complex t ansaction, International transaction
MWL; $0.02m; Regulatory breach
Poor controls
Big banks involved
KBC; $220m; Regulatory change
Rabobank; $1b; Rate rigging
Complex transaction
BNP Paribas; 4.91b; Tax evasion
Complex products
Manual process Kaupthing Bank; $0.05m; Regulatory issues
Several banks; $4.36m; Regulatory issues
Poor controls
Poor controls
MCO Capital; $0.8m; Regulatory breach
External fraud
State Street Corporation; $4.1m; Transaction error
Complex transaction
Lloyds Banking Group; $6.7m; Regulatory failure
Insurance
ABN Amro; $0.05m; Regulatory failure
Software issues
Barclays Bank; $159m; Regulatory issues
Human error
Lloyds Banking Group; $384m; Market manipulation
Multiple people, Internal fraud
Deutsch banks; $7.8m; Regulatory failure
Lloyds Banking Group; $46m; Regulatory failure
Employment issues
Misleading information JPMorgan Chase & Co; $4.6m; Regulatory failure
Software issues
RBS; $24m; Regulatory failure
Money laundering
Standard Bank; $12.6m; Regulatory issues;
Poor controls
UBS; $1.5b; Regulatory failure
Commerzbank; $150m; Money laundering
Offshore fund
Derivatives
Lloyds Banking Group; $370m; Market manipulation
Poor controls
Credit Suisse; $9.24m; Mismarking
Human error
UniCredit; $0.44m; Regulatory fialure
Single person Barclays Bank; $43.9m; Regulatory failure
Internal fraud
Morgan Stanley; $2.12m; Mismarking
Misleading information
1 Stop Financial Services; $188m; Regulatory breach
Invesco Limited; $31.3m; Poor management
Poor controls
Topps Rogers Financial Management; $0.15m; Investment scheme
Bank cross selling
Multiple banks; $0.78m; Misselling
Derivatives
Insurance
Several banks; $33.6b; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved Multiple banks; $2b; Misselling
Credit card
Multiple banks; $34m; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved Santander; $20.6m; Poor advice
Credit Suisse; $6m; Regulatory failure
Complex products
Poor controls
LGT Capital Partners; $0.13m; Regulatory breach
Tenon Financial Services; $1.14m; Regulatory failure
Complex products
Clydesdale Bank; $14m; Regulatory failure
Human error
Bank of Scotland; $6.7m; Inaccurate record
Software issues
Figure E.7: EU Tree 2008-2014.
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0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Discrimination, $0.47m, Hickinbotham Group
Discrimination
Fraud, $1.8m, Suncorp Metway
Systems security
Theft and fraud (internal) Fraud, $3.1m, Bendigo and Adelaide Bank
Crime, $2.9m, Bank of Queensland
Systems
Improper practices Fraud, $68m, Several companies
Spamming, $0.06m, Commonwealth Securities
Systems
uitability, disclosure and fiduciary
Legal issues, $450m, NAB
Products flaws
Regulatory issues, $2.2m, ANZ
Improper practices Unauthorised trade, $30m, Sonray Capital Markets
Unauthorised activity
Lawsuit, $7b, Several banks
Theft and fraud (external)
Theft and fraud (internal) Fraud, $2m, Several banks
Fraud, $1.1m, Westpac
Suitability, disclosure and fiduciary







Advisory activities Legal issues, $25.5m, Several banks
Regulatory issue, $0.02m, Storm Financial
Improper practices
Figure F.1: AU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2010.
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Disaster, $50m, CBA
Disasters and other events
Tech problem, $520m, CBA
Systems
Imporper practice, $6m, JPMorgan
Employee relations
Working relations, $5.8m, CBA
Discrimination
Crime, $0.05m, Unnamed
Theft and fraud (external), Multiple people
Regulatory issue, $0.08m, Barclays Bank
Improper practices
Theft and fraud (external)
Crime, $0.5m, Citigroup
Fraud, $0.2m, Several banks
Improper practices
Credit card Fraud, $0.11m, Coles group
Multiple people
Fraud, $7.1m, Unnamed
Single person Card skimming, $0.09m, CBA
Crime, $0.12m, Bank of Queensland
ATM
Suitability, disclosure and fiduciary
Misleading, $1.6m, Single
Unauthorized transactions, $0.51m, Citigroup
Unauthorised activity
Fraud, $3,9m, Blanshard
Theft and fraud (internal)
Systems security Fraud, $0.3m, Bank of Queensland
Fraud, $0.2m, CBA
ATM
Theft and fraud (internal)
Internal fraud, $0.25m, CBA
Single person
Internal fraud, $0.13m, NAB
Bribe, $17.2m, Innovia Security
Multiple people
Regulatory issue, $0.04m, ABN Amro
Improper practices
Theft and fraud (external), ATM Crime, $0.18m, ANZ
ATM scam, $0.04m, Several companies
Credit card
Figure F.2: AU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2011-2012.
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Theft and fraud (internal), ATM, Single person
Theft and fraud (external)
Multiple people
Fraud, $100m, CBA




Theft and fraud (internal)
uitability, disclosure and fiduciary
Fraud, $4m, Westpac
Multiple people
Trio fall, $176m, Trio Capital
Improper practices
Overcharging, $57m, ANZ NAB
Fraud, $250m, CBA
Advisory activities
Theft and fraud (internal)
Scandal, $65m, RBA
Insider trading, $7m, NAB
Multiple people
Figure F.3: AU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2013-2014.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Discrimination, $0.47m, Hickinbotham Group
Discrimination
Disaster, $50m, CBA
Disasters and other events
Imporper practice, $6m, JPMorgan
Employee relations
Regulatory issue, $0.18m, Tomarchio
Improper practices
Fraud, $1.8m, Suncorp Metway
Systems security
Theft and fraud (internal)
Regulatory issue, $0.04m, ABN Amro
Improper practices
Bribe, $17.2m, Innovia Security
Multiple people
Fraud, $26.6m, Trio Capital
Fraud, $8.8m, Stockbrokers Pty Ltd
Single person
Fraud, $2m, Several banks
Theft and fraud (external)
Suitability, disclosure and fiduciary Fraud, $3,9m, Blanshard
Fraud, $1.1m, Westpac
Theft and fraud (external)






Fraud, $0.2m, Several banks
Improper practices
ATM Crime, $0.04m, CBA
Crime, $0.12m, Bank of Queensland
Single person
Credit card Fraud, $7.1m, Unnamed
ATM scam, $0.04m, Several companies
ATM
uitability, disclosure and fiduciary
Legal issues, $450m, NAB
Products flaws
Misleading, $1.6m, Single
Lawsuit, $7b, Several banks
Improper practices
Unauthorised activity Unauthorised trade, $30m, Sonray Capital Markets
Improper practices
Unauthorized transactions, $0.51m, Citigroup
Advisory activities Regulatory issue, $0.02m, Storm Financial
Improper practices
Legal issues, $25.5m, Several banks
Systems
Tech problem, $520m, CBA
Crime, $2.9m, Bank of Queensland
Theft and fraud (internal)
Spamming, $0.06m, Commonwealth Securities
Improper practices
Figure F.4: AU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2010-2011.
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Legal issues, $25.5m, Several banks
Advisory activities
Disaster, $50m, CBA
Disasters and other events
Imporper practice, $6m, JPMorgan
Employee relations
Working relations, $5.8m, CBA
Discrimination
Fraud, $0.3m, Bank of Queensland
Systems security
ATM
Theft and fraud (external)
Crime, $0.12m, Bank of Queensland
Single person





Systems Crime, $2.9m, Bank of Queensland
Theft and fraud (internal)
Tech problem, $520m, CBA
uitability, disclosure and fiduciary
Legal issues, $450m, NAB
Products flaws
Unauthorized transactions, $0.51m, Citigroup
Unauthorised activity
Misleading, $1.6m, Single
Theft and fraud (internal) Fraud, $3,9m, Blanshard
Fraud, $1.1m, Westpac
Theft and fraud (external)
Improper practices Lawsuit, $7b, Several banks
Unauthorised trade, $30m, Sonray Capital Markets
Unauthorised activity
Improper practices
Spamming, $0.06m, Commonwealth Securities
Systems
Regulatory issue, $0.08m, Barclays Bank
Fraud, $0.2m, Several banks
Theft and fraud (external)
Regulatory issue, $0.04m, ABN Amro
Theft and fraud (internal)
Regulatory issue, $0.02m, Storm Financial
Advisory activities
Theft and fraud (internal)
Bribe, $17.2m, Innovia Security
Multiple people
Internal fraud, $0.13m, NAB
Internal fraud, $0.25m, CBA
Single person




Card skimming, $0.09m, CBA
Single person
Fraud, $2m, Several banks
Theft and fraud (internal)
Multiple people Crime, $0.05m, Unnamed
Fraud, $0.11m, Coles group
Credit card
Figure F.5: AU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2010-2012.
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Tech problem, $520m, CBA
Systems
Imporper practice, $6m, JPMorgan
Employee relations
Working relations, $5.8m, CBA
Discrimination
Theft and fraud (internal)
Fraud, $70m, CBA
Theft and fraud (external)
Bribe, $17.2m, Innovia Security
Multiple people
Internal fraud, $0.13m, NAB
Scandal, $65m, RBA
Improper practices
Crime, $2.9m, Bank of Queensland
Systems
Single person Internal fraud, $0.25m, CBA
Crime, $0.2m, Unnamed
ATM
Suitability, disclosure and fiduciary Fraud, $1.1m, WestpacTheft and fraud (external)
Fraud, $3,9m, Blanshard
uitability, disclosure and fiduciary
Unauthorised activity Unauthorised trade, $30m, Sonray Capital MarketsImproper practices
Unauthorized transactions, $0.51m, Citigroup
Fraud, $4m, Westpac
Trio fall, $176m, Trio Capital
Multiple people
Legal issues, $450m, NAB
Products flaws
Disasters and other events
Disaster, $50m, CBA
Advisory activities Legal issues, $25.5m, Several banks
Regulatory issue, $0.02m, Storm Financial
Improper practices
Systems security Fraud, $0.2m, CBAATM
Hacking, $1m, TradeFortress






Credit card ATM scam, $0.04m, Several companies
ATM
Fraud, $7.1m, Unnamed
Fraud, $0.11m, Coles group
Multiple people
Single person Crime, $0.12m, Bank of QueenslandATM
Card skimming, $0.09m, CBA
Improper practices
Lawsuit, $7b, Several banks
Suitability, disclosure and fiduciary
Spamming, $0.06m, Commonwealth Securities
Systems
Fraud, $0.2m, Several banks
Theft and fraud (external)
Overcharging, $57m, ANZ NAB
Figure F.6: AU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2010-2013.
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Disaster, $50m, CBA
Disasters and other events
Imporper practice, $6m, JPMorgan
Employee relations
Working relations, $5.8m, CBA
Discrimination
Systems security Hacking, $1m, TradeFortress
Fraud, $0.2m, CBA
ATM
Theft and fraud (external)
Fraud, $95m, ANZ
Multiple people Fraud, $100m, CBA
Fraud, $0.11m, Coles group
Credit card
Credit card Fraud, $7.1m, Unnamed
ATM
ATM scam, $0.04m, Several companies
Theft and fraud (internal) Fraud, $70m, CBA
Fraud, $1.1m, Westpac
Suitability, disclosure and fiduciary
ATM Crime, $0.18m, ANZ
Crime, $0.12m, Bendigo and Adelaide Bank
Multiple people
Single person Crime, $0.12m, Bank of QueenslandATM
Card skimming, $0.09m, CBA
Theft and fraud (internal)
Fraud, $3,9m, Blanshard
Suitability, disclosure and fiduciary
Internal fraud, $0.13m, NAB
Multiple people Insider trading, $7m, NABImproper practices
Bribe, $17.2m, Innovia Security
Single person Crime, $0.2m, UnnamedATM
Internal fraud, $0.25m, CBA
Advisory activities Fraud, $250m, CBAImproper practices
Legal issues, $25.5m, Several banks
Improper practices Overcharging, $57m, ANZ NAB
Fraud, $0.2m, Several banks
Theft and fraud (external)
Scandal, $65m, RBA
Theft and fraud (internal)
Systems Spamming, $0.06m, Commonwealth Securities
Improper practices
Crime, $2.9m, Bank of Queensland
Theft and fraud (internal)
Tech problem, $520m, CBA
Suitability, disclosure and fiduciary
Legal issues, $450m, NAB
Products flaws
Trio fall, $176m, Trio Capital
Multiple people
Fraud, $4m, Westpac
Lawsuit, $7b, Several banks
Improper practices
Unauthorised activity Unauthorized transactions, $0.51m, Citigroup
Unauthorised trade, $30m, Sonray Capital Markets
Improper practices
Figure F.7: AU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2010-2014.
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0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Luis Hiram Rivas; $18m; fraud
Advisory activies KL Group; $78m; Hedge fund fraud
Multiple people
Paramount Partners; $10m; Fraud
Improper practices
Coast Bank; $1.2m; Money laundering
Big banks involved JPMorgan; $722m; Unlawful pament scheme
Multiple people
BoA; $0.05m; Legal issue
Multiple people
FINRA; $11.6m; Regulatory issues
Employee relations
American Home Mortgage Investment Corp; $38m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Multiple companies; $20m; Insider trading
Wells Fargo; $0.23m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Theft and fraud (External) Multiple companies; $19m; fraud
Federal Reserve Banks; $0.98m; ID theft
Systems security
Derivatives
Brookstrees Securities Corp; $18m; Fraud
Advisory activies
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary Multiple banks; $1.7m;Supervisory failure
Excecution
Merrill Lynch; $400m; Trading loss




Value Line Securities; $45m; Fraud
Unauthorised activity
ICAP; $25m; Regulatory failure
UBS; $100m; legal action
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Big banks involved Multiple banks; $700m; Legal action
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary, Products flaws
Deutsche Bank;$1.2m; Insider default-swap case
Systems security
M&T Bankl; $0.48m; Computer hacking
Charles Schwab & Co.; $0.25m; Hcking
Big banks involved
ATM BECU; $0.17m; ID theft
RBS; $9m; Crime
Credit card
Theft and fraud (External)
Multiple banks; $0.09m; fraud
Fidelity ATM; $4.2m; fraud
ATM
Multiple banks; $2.6m; fraud
Improper practices
Credit card Wal-Mart; $0.01m; fraud
Multiple banks; $80m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Systems security Multiple companies; $0.06m; Identity theft
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
PNC Financial Services; $1m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Citigroup; $0.59m; Fraud
Systems security Citigroup; $2m; Crime
Several banks; $0.1m; ATM theft
ATM
Systems security
Ocean Bank; $0.59m; Cyber heist
Citizens Financial Bank; $0.03m; Poor controls
Account management
PlainsCapital Bank; $0.8m; Legal action
Improper practices
Systems




DA Davidson; $0.38m; Breach in security
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Merrick bank; $16m; Computer hacking
Capital One; $0.17m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Theft and fraud (External)
Multiple banks; $1200; Phone phishing
Unnamed; $0.2m; Fraud
Single person
Ameriquest Mortgage Company; $0.15m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Heartland Payment Systems; $41.4m; Data breach
Chicago Development and Planning; $8.4m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Improper practices
Certegy Check Services, Inc.; $0.98m; Data breach
Systems
MF Global; $10m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
Brookstreet Securities Corp; $300m; Misleading information
Advisory activies
Big banks involved Deutsche bank; $182m; Misleading information
Products flaws
Credit Suisse; $296m; Misleading information
Big banks involved
Charles Schwab & Co.; $60m; Misleading information
Derivatives
TD Bank; $1.87m; IT issues
Systems security
UBS; $780m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
Improper practices
Citigroup; $0.6m; Tax problem
Deutsche Bank; $0.6m; System breach
Systems
Wells Fargo; $45m; fraud
Single person
BoA; $33m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
Derivatives Morgan Stanley; $43.12m; Misleading investors
Advisory activies
Multiple companies; $70m; Regulatory failure
Products flaws Credit Suisse; $0.15m; Poor controls
Deutsche Bank; $7.5m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
Systems security
TD Bank; $0.38m; Computer hacking
Not named; $0.7m; Identity theft
Single person
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Countrywide; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary, Single person
ATM Bank of New York Mellon; $1.1m; ID theft
Single person
BoA; $0.3m; Hacking
Excecution Multiple banks; $0.85m; Regulatory failure
Systems, Vendors & suppliers
Credit Suisse; $0.28m; Regualtory failure
Advisory activies Wells Fargo; $1.4b; Mismarked investments
Products flaws, Derivatives
HSBC; $0.695m; Regulatory failure
Single person
Bank of Montreal; $0.15m; Incorrect marking option
Products flaws
Several companies; $6m; Fraud
Improper practices
Copiah Bank; $0.25m; Bank fraud
Systems security
Theft and fraud (Internal)




Multiple companies; $1.8m; Internal fraud
Unauthorised activity
Farmers and Merchants Bank; $0.05m; Embezzlement
MF Global; $141.5m; Poor controls
Improper practices
Theft and fraud (Internal) Lone Star National Bank; $0.6m; Embezzling
Citizens Bank; $0.34m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Theft and fraud (External)
Paypal; $0.44m; fraud
ATM
Compass bank; $0.03m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; ATM heist
Systems security




Citigroup; $5.75m; Cyber hacking
Improper practices
Chase Bank; $0.07m; ATM theft
Single person Tenens Corp.; $20m; Fraud
Piedmont Bank; $0.27m; Embezzling
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Credit card
Capital One; $5885; Credit card fraud
Big banks involved
Several banks; $27.5m; Credit card scam
Eclipse Property Solutions; $0.03m; Stealing credit card
Single person
Improper practices
ANZ; $5.75m; Regulatory failure
AIG; $6.1m; Regulatory failure
Discrinimation
BGC; $1.7m; Legal action
Systems
Multiple companies; $0.88m; Insider trading
Unauthorised activity
Oppenheimer Funds; $20m; Bond fund mismanagement
Derivatives
Multiple companies; $10m; Law action
Excecution
Products flaws Scottrade; $0.6m; Failure in process





Theft and fraud (External)
BoA; $0.15; Crime
ATM BOA; $0.12m; ATM fraud
Chase Bank; $0.2m; ATM skimming
Advisory activies
Single person Citigroup; $0.07m; ATM skimming
Disasters and other events, ATM
Multiple banks; $4.5m; Fraud
Employee relations
Tennessee Commerce Bank; $1m; Employment issue
Big banks involved Several banks; $1.58b; Regulatory issues
Improper practices
Charles Schwab & Co.; $1.8m; Employment issues
Figure G.1: US with Basel Characteristics Tree 2008-2010.
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Drake Asset Management; $1.16m; Regulatory breach
Unauthorised activity
Several companies; $9.5b; Regulatory failure
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Advisory activies
Southwest Securities; $0.65m; Improper short sale
Aladdin Capital Management LLC; $1.6m; CDO misstatement
Derivatives
Big banks involved
Wells Fargo; $1m; Regulatory failure
Excecution
Theft and fraud (External)
Chase Bank; $0.03m; ATM theft
ATM
Wells Fargo; $0.02m; Fraud
Multiple people
Citigroup; $2.9m; Wire fraud
Citigroup; $1.5m; ATM skimming
ATM
Single person
Wells Fargo; $0.8m; Robbery
ATM
BoA; $0.3m; ATM theft
Disasters and other events
BoA; $0.18m; ATM theft
Systems
BoA; $1.5m; IT issues
ATM
Goldman Sachs; $22m; Systems failure
Improper practices
BoA; $2.8b; Legal issues
Derivatives
Morgan Stanley; $28m; Legal action
Charles Schwab & Co.; $119m; Misleading information
Advisory activies
Theft and fraud (Internal)
UBS; $0.6m; Insider trading
Wells Fargo; $4000; Internal ATM theft
ATM
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $27m; Regulatory issues
Wells Fargo; 11.2m; Regulatory issues
Derivatives
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Systematic Financial Associates Inc; $7m; Fraud
CME Group; $0.5m; Code theft
Systems security
Multiple people
Several companies; $30.6m; Securities fraud
Big banks involved
Goldman Sachs; $0.06m; Insider trading
Several banks; $10m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Improper practices
NIR Group; $1m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Citigroup; $0.5m; Regulatory failure
BoA; $10m; Regulatory failure
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Single person
First National Bank; $0.26m; Internal ATM theft
ATM
SAC Capital Advisors; $4m; Fraud
Big banks involved
UBS; $5.4m; Fraud
Several banks; $0.4m; Hacking
ATM
Systems security
Canandaigua National Bank & Trust; $0.14m; Hacking
Big banks involved
Multiple companies; $11m; Unauthorized wire transaction
CitiGroup; $1m; ATM theft
Systems
ATM
BoA; $0.42m; Internal ATM fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Chase Bank; $0.44m; Crime
Theft and fraud (External)
Chase Bank; $0.02m; Crime
Multiple people
Chase Bank; $0.03m; Crime
Single person




Several companies; $300m; Data breach
Single person
U.S. Bank; $0.11m; Crime
Big banks involved
Unnamed; $36m; Hacking
Several companies; $0.2m; Crime
ATM
Multiple people
Twin Capital Management; $25m; Computer hacking
Theft and fraud (External)
Carder Profit; $205m; Hacking
Big banks involved
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $1m; Crime




Theft and fraud (Internal), Derivatives
Zions Bank; 8m; Regulatory failure
Employee relations
Merrill Lynch; $10.2m; Regulatory failure
BoA; $0.93m; Emoployment issues
Big banks involved
Improper practices
Lehman Brothers; $450m; Legal action





Several companies; $7.2b; Overcharging
Derivatives
Fire Finance; $200m; Fraud
Multiple people
Several banks; $385m; Legal action
Multiple people
Pinehurst Bank; $2.2m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
JPMorgan; $384m; Legal issues
Big banks involved
Several companies; $63.8m; Stock fraud
Employee relations
Merrill Lynch; $1m; Regulatory failure
Morgan Stanley; $5m; Employment issues
Big banks involved
Single person
UBS; $0.5m; Tax issues
Big banks involved
Individual; $0.35m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
BB&T Bank; $100; Fack bill
North Community Bank; $500; Robbery
Single person
Several companies; $14m; Fraud
Multiple people
ATM
Sun Trust Bank; $0.05m; ATM skimming
Systems security
Susquehanna Bank; $1950; ATM scheme
Single person
Capitol CUSO Credit Union Service Center; $0.03m; Crime
Multiple people
Multiple banks; $0.13m; ATM fraud
Eastern Bank; $0.02m; ATM skimming
Systems security
Disasters and other events
Community Bank; $1000; ATM theft
Multiple people
South Carolina Federal Credit Union; $3000; Crime
Single person
Sovereign Bank; $0.02m; Crime
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Community State Bank; $2m; Fraud
Texas National Bank; $0.35m; Bank fraud
Multiple people
Systems
Chelsea State Bank; $0.38m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Rosenthal Collins Group LLC; $1m; Software issues
Improper practices
AXA Rosenberg; $242m; IT error
Discrinimation
SEC; $0.6m; Employment issues
First Republic Securities Company; $0.87m; Lawsuit
Derivatives
Big banks involved
UBS; $10.59m; Employment issue
Wells Fargo; $32m; Lawsuit
Multiple people
Figure G.2: US with Basel Characteristics Tree 2011-2012.
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HAP Trading LLC; $1.5m; Algorithm issue
Products flaws
Big banks involved
Morgan Stanley; $5m; Sales of IPO
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Advisory activies
UBS; $0.4m; Misleading information
Regions Bank; $7.4m; Bond swaps
Derivatives
Employee relations
Goldman Sachs; $20m; Legal issues
Improper practices
Goldman Sachs; $4m; Lawsuit
Morgan Stanley; $8.01m; Employment issues
Multiple people
Discrinimation
BoA; $39m; Gender bias
Multiple people
Wells Fargo; $0.34m; Lawaction
Theft and fraud (External)
ING Groep NV; $0.08m; Bank fraud
Multiple people
BoA; $0.57m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Several banks; $1.5m; fraud
ATM
Citizens Bank; $0.01m; ATM skimming
Systems security
JPMorgan; $0.13m; ATM theft
Theft and fraud (Internal)
TD Bank; $0.04m; ATM error
Systems
Systems security
Several companies; $1m; Hacking
Single person
Park Sterling Bank; $0.34m; Hacking
Big banks involved




Unnamed; $45m; ATM cyberheist
Multiple people
Publix Supermarkets; $1000; ATM skimming
Multiple people
Several banks; $45m; Cybertheft
Multiple banks; $300m; Credit card fraud
Credit card
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Institutional Shareholders Services; $0.33m; Information leaks
Single person
Liquidnet; $2m; Improper data
Unauthorised activity
Merrill Lynch; $11m; Misleading information
Big banks involved
Goldman Sachs; $118m; Unauthorized trade
Systems
Consumer Bankers' Association; $172m; Data breach
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Knight Capital Group; $12m; IT meltdown
Improper practices
LavaFlow Inc.; $5m; Regulatory failure
Citigroup; $0.06m; Website vulnerability
Big banks involved
Improper practices
Paradigm Capital Management; $2.2m; Employment issues
Employee relations
Jefferies LLC; $25m; Mortgage bond trading
Derivatives
New Castle Funds; $0.15m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Wegelin & Co. Privatbankiers; $1.2b; Tax evasion
Big banks involved
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $389m; Regulatory failure
Credit card




Credit Suisse; $540m; Price manipulation
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Deutsche Bank; $17.5m; Regulatory issues
Multiple people
CBOE; $6m; Regulatory failure
Single person
Petro America Corp.; $7.2m; Stock fraud
Discrinimation
First Intercontinental Bank; $0.03m; Lending discrimination
Improper practices
GE Capital; $169m; Discrimination
Ally Financial; $98m; regulatory issues
Big banks involved
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Gaffken & Barriger Fund; $12.6m; Fraud
Single person
Individuals; $1m; Securities fraud
Multiple people
Compagnie Financiere Tradition; $0.01m; Bond bid rigging
Big banks involved
TD Bank; $0.02m; Crime
Single person
Wells Fargo Advisors; $0.65m; Check writing scam
Multiple people
Morgan Stanley; $1.2m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Wilmington Trust Bank; $148m; fraud
Improper practices
First Financial Credit Union; $0.84m; fraud
Multiple people
Comfort Inn & Suites; $0.02m; Fraud
Credit card
Pierce Commercial Bank; $10m; Mortgage fraud
ATM
AMVETS; $3000; Crime
Disasters and other events




Unnamed; $221m; ATM heist
Big banks involved
Chase Bank; $0.05m; ATM theft
Multiple people
Several banks; $0.2m; ATM theft
Systems security
U.S. Bank; $3000; ATM skimming
Big banks involved
Bank of Prairie du Sac; $3.3m; Crime
Single person
CO-OP Financial Services; $1000; Robbery
Big banks involved
Chase Bank; $0.02m; Robbery
ATM
BoA; $0.1m; ATM skimming
Systems security
Several banks; $0.18m; ATM thefts
Figure G.3: US with Basel Characteristics Tree 2013-2014.
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SEC; $0.6m; Employment issues
Discrinimation
Heartland Payment Systems; $41.4m; Data breach
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Southwest Securities; $0.65m; Improper short sale
Advisory activies
Systems
AXA Rosenberg; $242m; IT error
Chelsea State Bank; $0.38m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Systems security
TXJ; $75.18m; Computer hacking
Vendors & suppliers
DA Davidson; $0.38m; Breach in security
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Merrick bank; $16m; Computer hacking
Big banks involved
Charles Schwab & Co.; $1.8m; Employment issues
Employee relations
Theft and fraud (Internal) UBS; $0.6m; Insider trading
BoA; $2.25m; Fraud
Single person
Advisory activies Wells Fargo; $1.4b; Mismarked investments
Products flaws, Derivatives
HSBC; $0.695m; Regulatory failure
Discrinimation Wells Fargo; $32m; Lawsuit
Multiple people
Citigroup;$33m; Sex discrimination
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
UBS; $780m; Regulatory failure
Charles Schwab & Co.; $60m; Misleading information
Derivatives
Systems security Countrywide; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal), Single person
TD Bank; $1.87m; IT issues
Systems security
Capital One; $0.17m; Fraud
Systems
TD Bank; $0.38m; Computer hacking
Not named; $0.7m; Identity theft
Single person
Charles Schwab & Co.; $0.25m; Hcking
Multiple people
Theft and fraud (External)






Citigroup; $5.75m; Cyber hacking
Improper practices
Chase Bank; $0.07m; ATM theft
Theft and fraud (External)
Multiple banks; $4.5m; Fraud
Single person
BoA; $0.15; Crime




Excecution Multiple banks; $0.85m; Regulatory failure
Systems, Vendors & suppliers
Credit Suisse; $0.28m; Regualtory failure
Unauthorised activity
Drake Asset Management; $1.16m; Regulatory breach
Multiple companies; $0.88m; Insider trading
Improper practices
Farmers and Merchants Bank; $0.05m; Embezzlement
Single person
Single person
Bank of Montreal; $0.15m; Incorrect marking option
Products flaws
Improper practices MF Global; $141.5m; Poor controls
Unauthorised activity
Several companies; $6m; Fraud
Employee relations Tennessee Commerce Bank; $1m; Employment issue
FINRA; $11.6m; Regulatory issues
Multiple people
ATM
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Compass bank; $0.03m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Big banks involved
Wells Fargo; $4000; Internal ATM theft
Systems security BoA; $0.3m; Hacking
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.1m; ID theft
Single person
Systems security
Several companies; $0.2m; Crime
Single person
Wachovia; $0.06m; ATM theft
Theft and fraud (External)
Multiple people
BECU; $0.17m; ID theft
RBS; $9m; Crime
Credit card
Big banks involved Several banks; $0.1m; ATM theft
Theft and fraud (External)
Fidelity National Information Services; $13m; Online theft
Theft and fraud (External)
Sovereign Bank; $0.02m; Crime
Disasters and other events
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; ATM heist
Big banks involved BOA; $0.12m; ATM fraud
Chase Bank; $0.2m; ATM skimming
Advisory activies
Single person
BoA; $0.18m; ATM theft
Big banks involved
Susquehanna Bank; $1950; ATM scheme
Disasters and other events Citigroup; $0.07m; ATM skimming
Big banks involved
South Carolina Federal Credit Union; $3000; Crime
Systems security
Multiple banks; $1200; Phone phishing
Theft and fraud (External)
Ocean Bank; $0.59m; Cyber heist






Theft and fraud (External)
Copiah Bank; $0.25m; Bank fraud
Multiple people
M&T Bankl; $0.48m; Computer hacking
Theft and fraud (External) Multiple companies; $0.06m; Identity theft
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
PNC Financial Services; $1m; Fraud
Improper practices
ANZ; $5.75m; Regulatory failure
PlainsCapital Bank; $0.8m; Legal action
Systems security
AIG; $6.1m; Regulatory failure
Discrinimation
MF Global; $10m; Regulatory failure
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Multiple companies; $10m; Law action
Excecution
Multiple people
Value Line Securities; $45m; Fraud
Unauthorised activity
ICAP; $25m; Regulatory failure
UBS; $100m; legal action
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Multiple banks; $2.6m; fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Big banks involved
Citigroup; $0.6m; Tax problem
Several banks; $1.58b; Regulatory issues
Employee relations
Wells Fargo; $45m; fraud
Single person
BoA; $33m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
Products flaws
Credit Suisse; $0.15m; Poor controls
Derivatives Deutsche Bank; $7.5m; Regulatory failure
Deutsche bank; $182m; Misleading information
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Theft and fraud (Internal) BoA; $0.05m; Legal issue
BoA; $10m; Regulatory failure
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Multiple people
Deutsche Bank;$1.2m; Insider default-swap case
JPMorgan; $722m; Unlawful pament scheme
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Multiple banks; $700m; Legal action
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary, Products flaws
Derivatives
Multiple companies; $70m; Regulatory failure
Credit Suisse; $296m; Misleading information
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Morgan Stanley; $43.12m; Misleading investors
Advisory activies
Products flaws Scottrade; $0.6m; Failure in process
Multiple institutions; $457m; High credit rating
Derivatives
Derivatives Oppenheimer Funds; $20m; Bond fund mismanagement
Brookstreet Securities Corp; $300m; Misleading information
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary, Advisory activies
Systems
Deutsche Bank; $0.6m; System breach
Big banks involved
Certegy Check Services, Inc.; $0.98m; Data breach
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
BGC; $1.7m; Legal action
Multiple people
American Home Mortgage Investment Corp; $38m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
Derivatives
Brookstrees Securities Corp; $18m; Fraud
Advisory activies
Improper practices Madoff; $64.8b; fraud
SafeNet; $2.98m; Option scandal
Monitoring and reporting
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary Merrill Lynch; $400m; Trading loss
Multiple banks; $1.7m;Supervisory failure
Excecution
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Multiple companies; $20m; Insider trading
Theft and fraud (External) Federal Reserve Banks; $0.98m; ID theft
Systems security
Multiple companies; $19m; fraud
Big banks involved Wells Fargo; $0.23m; Fraud
Several banks; $10m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Theft and fraud (External)
Chicago Development and Planning; $8.4m; Fraud
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Paypal; $0.44m; fraud
Tenens Corp.; $20m; Fraud
Single person
Credit card
Several banks; $27.5m; Credit card scam
Eclipse Property Solutions; $0.03m; Stealing credit card
Single person
Multiple people Wal-Mart; $0.01m; fraud
Multiple banks; $80m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Multiple people
Multiple banks; $0.09m; fraud
ATM
Community Bank; $1000; ATM theft
Disasters and other events
Fidelity ATM; $4.2m; fraud
Citigroup; $1.5m; ATM skimming
Big banks involved
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Community State Bank; $2m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Luis Hiram Rivas; $18m; fraud
Single person
Merrill Lynch; $0.78m; Fraud
Employee relations
Piedmont Bank; $0.27m; Embezzling
Theft and fraud (External)
Multiple companies; $1.8m; Internal fraud
ATM First National Bank; $0.26m; Internal ATM theft
Several banks; $0.4m; Hacking
Big banks involved
Unauthorised activity Lone Star National Bank; $0.6m; Embezzling
Citizens Bank; $0.34m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Advisory activies Paramount Partners; $10m; Fraud
KL Group; $78m; Hedge fund fraud
Multiple people
Improper practices
Pinehurst Bank; $2.2m; Fraud
Multiple people
Coast Bank; $1.2m; Money laundering
Stock; $0.25m; Hacking
Systems security, Derivatives
Figure G.4: US with Basel Characteristics Tree 2008-2011.
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Heartland Payment Systems; $41.4m; Data breach
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Systems security
Ocean Bank; $0.59m; Cyber heist
Citizens Financial Bank; $0.03m; Poor controls
Account management
Single person
Copiah Bank; $0.25m; Bank fraud




Several companies; $0.2m; Crime
ATM
Multiple people
M&T Bankl; $0.48m; Computer hacking
Theft and fraud (External) Multiple companies; $0.06m; Identity theft
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
PNC Financial Services; $1m; Fraud




TXJ; $75.18m; Computer hacking
Vendors & suppliers
DA Davidson; $0.38m; Breach in security
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Merrick bank; $16m; Computer hacking
Discrinimation
SEC; $0.6m; Employment issues
First Republic Securities Company; $0.87m; Lawsuit
Derivatives
Big banks involved Wells Fargo; $32m; Lawsuit
Multiple people
Citigroup;$33m; Sex discrimination
Theft and fraud (External)
Chicago Development and Planning; $8.4m; Fraud
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Paypal; $0.44m; fraud
ATM
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; ATM heist
Compass bank; $0.03m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Disasters and other events
Sovereign Bank; $0.02m; Crime
Single person South Carolina Federal Credit Union; $3000; Crime
Citigroup; $0.07m; ATM skimming
Big banks involved
Big banks involved
BoA; $0.18m; ATM theft
Single person
Chase Bank; $0.2m; ATM skimming
Advisory activies
BOA; $0.12m; ATM fraud
Credit card
Eclipse Property Solutions; $0.03m; Stealing credit card
Single person
Several banks; $27.5m; Credit card scam
Wal-Mart; $0.01m; fraud
Multiple people
Big banks involved Multiple banks; $80m; Fraud
Multiple people
Capital One; $5885; Credit card fraud
Systems security
Multiple banks; $1200; Phone phishing
Unnamed; $0.2m; Fraud
Single person
Ameriquest Mortgage Company; $0.15m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
ATM
Wachovia; $0.06m; ATM theft





Several banks; $0.1m; ATM theft
Multiple people
Citigroup; $5.75m; Cyber hacking
Improper practices
Chase Bank; $0.07m; ATM theft
Multiple people
Multiple banks; $0.09m; fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Several banks; $10m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Federal Reserve Banks; $0.98m; ID theft
Systems security
Multiple companies; $19m; fraud




Community Bank; $1000; ATM theft
Disasters and other events
Fidelity ATM; $4.2m; fraud
Citigroup; $1.5m; ATM skimming
Big banks involved
Single person
Bank of Montreal; $0.15m; Incorrect marking option
Products flaws
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Multiple companies; $1.8m; Internal fraud
Merrill Lynch; $0.78m; Fraud
Employee relations




Countrywide; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Systems security, Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Citizens Bank; $0.34m; Internal fraud
Unauthorised activity
Theft and fraud (External) Susquehanna Bank; $1950; ATM scheme
ATM
Tenens Corp.; $20m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Credit Suisse; $0.28m; Regualtory failure
Excecution
Charles Schwab & Co.; $1.8m; Employment issues
Employee relations
Systems security
TD Bank; $1.87m; IT issues
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
TD Bank; $0.38m; Computer hacking
Chase Bank; $0.44m; Crime
ATM
Multiple people Fidelity National Information Services; $13m; Online theft
ATM
Charles Schwab & Co.; $0.25m; Hcking
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary UBS; $780m; Regulatory failure
Charles Schwab & Co.; $60m; Misleading information
Derivatives
Theft and fraud (External) BoA; $0.15; Crime
Multiple banks; $4.5m; Fraud
Single person
Improper practices
BoA; $33m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
Citigroup; $0.6m; Tax problem
Derivatives Credit Suisse; $296m; Misleading information
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Multiple companies; $70m; Regulatory failure
Unauthorised activity
Drake Asset Management; $1.16m; Regulatory breach
Single person Lone Star National Bank; $0.6m; Embezzling
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Farmers and Merchants Bank; $0.05m; Embezzlement
Improper practices
Multiple companies; $0.88m; Insider trading
MF Global; $141.5m; Poor controls
Single person
Value Line Securities; $45m; Fraud
Multiple people
Employee relations
FINRA; $11.6m; Regulatory issues
Multiple people
Tennessee Commerce Bank; $1m; Employment issue
Improper practices Several banks; $1.58b; Regulatory issues
Big banks involved
Merrill Lynch; $1m; Regulatory failure
Advisory activies
Southwest Securities; $0.65m; Improper short sale
HSBC; $0.695m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
Theft and fraud (Internal) KL Group; $78m; Hedge fund fraud
Multiple people
Paramount Partners; $10m; Fraud
Derivatives
Brookstrees Securities Corp; $18m; Fraud
Multiple people
Aladdin Capital Management LLC; $1.6m; CDO misstatement
Big banks involved Morgan Stanley; $43.12m; Misleading investors
Improper practices
Wells Fargo; $1.4b; Mismarked investments
Products flaws
Theft and fraud (Internal)
CME Group; $0.5m; Code theft
Systems security
Luis Hiram Rivas; $18m; fraud
Big banks involved
UBS; $0.6m; Insider trading
ATM
Wells Fargo; $4000; Internal ATM theft
Several banks; $0.4m; Hacking
Single person
Systems security Bank of New York Mellon; $1.1m; ID theft
Single person
BoA; $0.3m; Hacking
Improper practices BoA; $10m; Regulatory failure
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
BoA; $0.05m; Legal issue
Theft and fraud (External) Piedmont Bank; $0.27m; Embezzling
Single person
Community State Bank; $2m; Fraud
Multiple people Multiple companies; $20m; Insider trading
Wells Fargo; $0.23m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Systems
Chelsea State Bank; $0.38m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
AXA Rosenberg; $242m; IT error
Big banks involved
Multiple banks; $0.85m; Regulatory failure
Excecution, Vendors & suppliers
BoA; $1.5m; IT issues
ATM
Capital One; $0.17m; Fraud
Systems security
Goldman Sachs; $22m; Systems failure
Improper practices BGC; $1.7m; Legal action
Deutsche Bank; $0.6m; System breach
Big banks involved
Multiple people
American Home Mortgage Investment Corp; $38m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary, Derivatives Multiple banks; $1.7m;Supervisory failure
Excecution
Merrill Lynch; $400m; Trading loss
Improper practices
ANZ; $5.75m; Regulatory failure
Multiple companies; $10m; Law action
Excecution
AIG; $6.1m; Regulatory failure
Discrinimation
Single person Wells Fargo; $45m; fraud
Big banks involved




PlainsCapital Bank; $0.8m; Legal action
Stock; $0.25m; Hacking
Theft and fraud (Internal), Derivatives
Credit card JPMorgan; $100m; Lawsuit
Big banks involved
Several companies; $7.2b; Overcharging
Derivatives
Oppenheimer Funds; $20m; Bond fund mismanagement
Products flaws
Multiple institutions; $457m; High credit rating
Big banks involved Deutsche Bank; $7.5m; Regulatory failure
Deutsche bank; $182m; Misleading information
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Multiple people Madoff; $64.8b; fraud
SafeNet; $2.98m; Option scandal
Monitoring and reporting
Theft and fraud (Internal) Pinehurst Bank; $2.2m; Fraud
Multiple people
Coast Bank; $1.2m; Money laundering
Products flaws Credit Suisse; $0.15m; Poor controls
Big banks involved
Scottrade; $0.6m; Failure in process
Multiple people
ICAP; $25m; Regulatory failure
Multiple banks; $2.6m; fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Big banks involved JPMorgan; $722m; Unlawful pament scheme
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Deutsche Bank;$1.2m; Insider default-swap case
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Brookstreet Securities Corp; $300m; Misleading information
Advisory activies, Derivatives
MF Global; $10m; Regulatory failure
Certegy Check Services, Inc.; $0.98m; Data breach
Systems
Multiple people Multiple banks; $700m; Legal action
Products flaws, Big banks involved
UBS; $100m; legal action
Figure G.5: US with Basel Characteristics Tree 2008-2012.
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Advisory activies
Southwest Securities; $0.65m; Improper short sale
HSBC; $0.695m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
Theft and fraud (Internal) Paramount Partners; $10m; Fraud
KL Group; $78m; Hedge fund fraud
Multiple people
Derivatives
Brookstrees Securities Corp; $18m; Fraud
Multiple people
Aladdin Capital Management LLC; $1.6m; CDO misstatement
Big banks involved Morgan Stanley; $43.12m; Misleading investors
Improper practices
Wells Fargo; $1.4b; Mismarked investments
Products flaws
Theft and fraud (External)
Chicago Development and Planning; $8.4m; Fraud
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Paypal; $0.44m; fraud
Systems security
Multiple banks; $1200; Phone phishing
Multiple people
PNC Financial Services; $1m; Fraud
Federal Reserve Banks; $0.98m; ID theft
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Eastern Bank; $0.02m; ATM skimming
ATM
Multiple companies; $0.06m; Identity theft
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Big banks involved Citigroup; $2m; Crime
Several banks; $0.1m; ATM theft
ATM
ATM
Wachovia; $0.06m; ATM theft
Big banks involved Citigroup; $5.75m; Cyber hacking
Improper practices
Chase Bank; $0.07m; ATM theft
Big banks involved BoA; $0.15; Crime
Ameriquest Mortgage Company; $0.15m; Internal fraud
Systems security
Credit card
Several banks; $27.5m; Credit card scam
Wal-Mart; $0.01m; fraud
Multiple people
Big banks involved Capital One; $5885; Credit card fraud
Multiple banks; $80m; Fraud
Multiple people
ATM
Sovereign Bank; $0.02m; Crime
Disasters and other events
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; ATM heist
Compass bank; $0.03m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Multiple people
Community Bank; $1000; ATM theft
Disasters and other events
Fidelity ATM; $4.2m; fraud
Citigroup; $1.5m; ATM skimming
Big banks involved
Big banks involved BOA; $0.12m; ATM fraud
Chase Bank; $0.2m; ATM skimming
Advisory activies
Unauthorised activity
Goldman Sachs; $118m; Unauthorized trade
Big banks involved
Multiple companies; $0.88m; Insider trading
Improper practices
Drake Asset Management; $1.16m; Regulatory breach
Employee relations Tennessee Commerce Bank; $1m; Employment issue
FINRA; $11.6m; Regulatory issues
Multiple people
Multiple people
American Home Mortgage Investment Corp; $38m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting




Credit Suisse; $0.28m; Regualtory failure
Excecution
Employee relations Morgan Stanley; $8.01m; Employment issues
Multiple people
Charles Schwab & Co.; $1.8m; Employment issues
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary Charles Schwab & Co.; $60m; Misleading information
Derivatives
UBS; $780m; Regulatory failure
Single person
Bank of Montreal; $0.15m; Incorrect marking option
Products flaws
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Merrill Lynch; $0.78m; Fraud
Employee relations
Piedmont Bank; $0.27m; Embezzling
Theft and fraud (External)
Multiple companies; $1.8m; Internal fraud
ATM Several banks; $0.4m; Hacking
Big banks involved
First National Bank; $0.26m; Internal ATM theft
Unauthorised activity Citizens Bank; $0.34m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Lone Star National Bank; $0.6m; Embezzling
Big banks involved BoA; $2.25m; Fraud
Countrywide; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Systems security, Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Unauthorised activity MF Global; $141.5m; Poor controls
Improper practices
Farmers and Merchants Bank; $0.05m; Embezzlement
Theft and fraud (External)




Eclipse Property Solutions; $0.03m; Stealing credit card
Credit card
Tenens Corp.; $20m; Fraud
ATM
Susquehanna Bank; $1950; ATM scheme
South Carolina Federal Credit Union; $3000; Crime
Disasters and other events
Big banks involved
BoA; $0.18m; ATM theft
BoA; $0.02m; Crime
Systems security
Citigroup; $0.07m; ATM skimming
Disasters and other events
Systems
Chelsea State Bank; $0.38m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
AXA Rosenberg; $242m; IT error
BGC; $1.7m; Legal action
Improper practices
Big banks involved
Multiple banks; $0.85m; Regulatory failure
Excecution, Vendors & suppliers
BoA; $1.5m; IT issues
ATM
Capital One; $0.17m; Fraud
Systems security
Goldman Sachs; $22m; Systems failure
Improper practices
ANZ; $5.75m; Regulatory failure
Merrill Lynch; $1m; Regulatory failure
Employee relations
Multiple companies; $10m; Law action
Excecution
Wilmington Trust Bank; $148m; fraud
Theft and fraud (External)




Oppenheimer Funds; $20m; Bond fund mismanagement
Big banks involved Credit Suisse; $540m; Price manipulation
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Multiple companies; $70m; Regulatory failure
Products flaws
Multiple institutions; $457m; High credit rating
Derivatives
Scottrade; $0.6m; Failure in process
Big banks involved Deutsche Bank; $7.5m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
Credit Suisse; $0.15m; Poor controls
Discrinimation Ally Financial; $98m; regulatory issues
Big banks involved




PlainsCapital Bank; $0.8m; Legal action
Stock; $0.25m; Hacking
Theft and fraud (Internal), Derivatives
Multiple people
Value Line Securities; $45m; Fraud
Unauthorised activity
ICAP; $25m; Regulatory failure
Multiple banks; $2.6m; fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Derivatives Madoff; $64.8b; fraud
SafeNet; $2.98m; Option scandal
Monitoring and reporting




Citigroup; $0.6m; Tax problem
Several banks; $1.58b; Regulatory issues
Employee relations
Deutsche Bank; $0.6m; System breach
Systems
BoA; $33m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
Single person
CBOE; $6m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
Several companies; $6m; Fraud
Wells Fargo; $45m; fraud
Big banks involved
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Heartland Payment Systems; $41.4m; Data breach
Institutional Shareholders Services; $0.33m; Information leaks
Single person
Multiple people, Derivatives Merrill Lynch; $400m; Trading loss
Multiple banks; $1.7m;Supervisory failure
Excecution
Improper practices
Certegy Check Services, Inc.; $0.98m; Data breach
Systems
MF Global; $10m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people UBS; $100m; legal action
Multiple banks; $700m; Legal action
Products flaws, Big banks involved
Derivatives
Brookstreet Securities Corp; $300m; Misleading information
Advisory activies
Big banks involved Credit Suisse; $296m; Misleading information
Deutsche bank; $182m; Misleading information
Products flaws
Systems security
Ocean Bank; $0.59m; Cyber heist
Citizens Financial Bank; $0.03m; Poor controls
Account management
ATM
Several companies; $0.2m; Crime
Single person
Publix Supermarkets; $1000; ATM skimming
Chase Bank; $0.44m; Crime
Big banks involved
Multiple people
Fidelity National Information Services; $13m; Online theft
Big banks involved






Not named; $0.7m; Identity theft
Big banks involved
Copiah Bank; $0.25m; Bank fraud
Systems
TXJ; $75.18m; Computer hacking
Vendors & suppliers
DA Davidson; $0.38m; Breach in security
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Merrick bank; $16m; Computer hacking
Multiple people M&T Bankl; $0.48m; Computer hacking
Multiple banks; $300m; Credit card fraud
Credit card
Big banks involved
Charles Schwab & Co.; $0.25m; Hcking
Multiple people
TD Bank; $1.87m; IT issues
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
TD Bank; $0.38m; Computer hacking
Discrinimation
SEC; $0.6m; Employment issues
First Republic Securities Company; $0.87m; Lawsuit
Derivatives
Big banks involved Citigroup;$33m; Sex discrimination
Wells Fargo; $32m; Lawsuit
Multiple people
Theft and fraud (Internal)
CME Group; $0.5m; Code theft
Systems security
Luis Hiram Rivas; $18m; fraud
Big banks involved
UBS; $0.6m; Insider trading
ATM
Wells Fargo; $4000; Internal ATM theft




JPMorgan; $722m; Unlawful pament scheme
Multiple people
BoA; $10m; Regulatory failure
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
BoA; $0.05m; Legal issue
Theft and fraud (External)
Community State Bank; $2m; Fraud
Multiple people Several banks; $10m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Multiple companies; $19m; fraud
Improper practices Pinehurst Bank; $2.2m; Fraud
Multiple people
Coast Bank; $1.2m; Money laundering
Theft and fraud (Internal), Multiple people Wells Fargo; $0.23m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Multiple companies; $20m; Insider trading
Figure G.6: US with Basel Characteristics Tree 2008-2013.
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Drake Asset Management; $1.16m; Regulatory breach
Unauthorised activity
Systems security
Ocean Bank; $0.59m; Cyber heist
Citizens Financial Bank; $0.03m; Poor controls
Account management
Big banks involved
Not named; $0.7m; Identity theft
Single person
TD Bank; $0.38m; Computer hacking
Ameriquest Mortgage Company; $0.15m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Multiple people Charles Schwab & Co.; $0.25m; Hcking
Citigroup; $2m; Crime
Theft and fraud (External)
Multiple people M&T Bankl; $0.48m; Computer hacking
Multiple banks; $300m; Credit card fraud
Credit card
Theft and fraud (External)
Multiple banks; $1200; Phone phishing
Unnamed; $0.2m; Fraud
Single person
Multiple people PNC Financial Services; $1m; Fraud
Multiple companies; $0.06m; Identity theft
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
ATM
Several companies; $0.2m; Crime
Single person
Publix Supermarkets; $1000; ATM skimming
Theft and fraud (External) Eastern Bank; $0.02m; ATM skimming
Multiple people




BECU; $0.17m; ID theft




Theft and fraud (Internal)
Chase Bank; $0.44m; Crime
Theft and fraud (External)
Chase Bank; $0.07m; ATM theft
Citigroup; $5.75m; Cyber hacking
Improper practices









Merrick bank; $16m; Computer hacking
USAA; $0.38m; Hacking
Improper practices
Theft and fraud (External)
Paypal; $0.44m; fraud
ATM
RBS WorldPay; $9.5m; ATM heist
Multiple people Fidelity ATM; $4.2m; fraud
Citigroup; $1.5m; ATM skimming
Big banks involved
Big banks involved Chase Bank; $0.2m; ATM skimming
Advisory activies
BOA; $0.12m; ATM fraud
Disasters and other events Sovereign Bank; $0.02m; Crime
Community Bank; $1000; ATM theft
Multiple people
Theft and fraud (Internal) Compass bank; $0.03m; Internal fraud
ATM
Community State Bank; $2m; Fraud
Big banks involved






Eclipse Property Solutions; $0.03m; Stealing credit card
Single person
Several banks; $27.5m; Credit card scam
Capital One; $5885; Credit card fraud
Big banks involved
Multiple people Wal-Mart; $0.01m; fraud
Multiple banks; $80m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Single person
Tenens Corp.; $20m; Fraud
Piedmont Bank; $0.27m; Embezzling
Theft and fraud (Internal)
ATM
Susquehanna Bank; $1950; ATM scheme
BoA; $0.18m; ATM theft
Big banks involved
Disasters and other events Citigroup; $0.07m; ATM skimming
Big banks involved
South Carolina Federal Credit Union; $3000; Crime
Big banks involved
Credit Suisse; $0.28m; Regualtory failure
Excecution
Goldman Sachs; $118m; Unauthorized trade
Unauthorised activity
Discrinimation
Ally Financial; $98m; regulatory issues
Improper practices
Citigroup;$33m; Sex discrimination
Wells Fargo; $32m; Lawsuit
Multiple people
Advisory activies
HSBC; $0.695m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
Regions Bank; $7.4m; Bond swaps
Morgan Stanley; $43.12m; Misleading investors
Improper practices
Wells Fargo; $1.4b; Mismarked investments
Products flaws
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Wells Fargo; $4000; Internal ATM theft
ATM
UBS; $0.6m; Insider trading
Single person
BoA; $2.25m; Fraud
Citizens Bank; $0.34m; Internal fraud
Unauthorised activity
ATM Several banks; $0.4m; Hacking
Bank of New York Mellon; $1.1m; ID theft
Systems security
Improper practices
Credit Suisse; $0.15m; Poor controls
Products flaws
Multiple companies; $70m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
Deutsche Bank;$1.2m; Insider default-swap case
Multiple people
BoA; $33m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
Wells Fargo; $45m; fraud
Single person
Several banks; $1.58b; Regulatory issues
Employee relations
Citigroup; $0.6m; Tax problem
Theft and fraud (Internal) BoA; $10m; Regulatory failure
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
BoA; $0.05m; Legal issue
Products flaws
Bank of Montreal; $0.15m; Incorrect marking option
Single person
HAP Trading LLC; $1.5m; Algorithm issue
Improper practices
Scottrade; $0.6m; Failure in process
Derivatives
Multiple institutions; $457m; High credit rating
Big banks involved Deutsche Bank; $7.5m; Regulatory failure
Deutsche bank; $182m; Misleading information
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Heartland Payment Systems; $41.4m; Data breach
Chicago Development and Planning; $8.4m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Institutional Shareholders Services; $0.33m; Information leaks
Single person
Improper practices
MF Global; $10m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people Multiple banks; $700m; Legal action
Products flaws, Big banks involved
UBS; $100m; legal action
Derivatives
Improper practices Credit Suisse; $296m; Misleading information
Big banks involved
Brookstreet Securities Corp; $300m; Misleading information
Advisory activies
Multiple people Merrill Lynch; $400m; Trading loss
Multiple banks; $1.7m;Supervisory failure
Excecution
Big banks involved
UBS; $780m; Regulatory failure
Charles Schwab & Co.; $60m; Misleading information
Derivatives
Systems security Countrywide; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal), Single person
TD Bank; $1.87m; IT issues
Employee relations Tennessee Commerce Bank; $1m; Employment issue
Charles Schwab & Co.; $1.8m; Employment issues
Big banks involved
Improper practices
ANZ; $5.75m; Regulatory failure
AIG; $6.1m; Regulatory failure
Discrinimation
BGC; $1.7m; Legal action
Systems
Wilmington Trust Bank; $148m; fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
PlainsCapital Bank; $0.8m; Legal action
Systems security
Oppenheimer Funds; $20m; Bond fund mismanagement
Derivatives
Multiple companies; $10m; Law action
Excecution
Merrill Lynch; $1m; Regulatory failure
Employee relations
Multiple people
Value Line Securities; $45m; Fraud
Unauthorised activity
ICAP; $25m; Regulatory failure






SafeNet; $2.98m; Option scandal
Monitoring and reporting
Credit card JPMorgan; $100m; Lawsuit
Big banks involved
Several companies; $7.2b; Overcharging
Unauthorised activity Multiple companies; $0.88m; Insider trading
MF Global; $141.5m; Poor controls
Single person
Single person
Several companies; $6m; Fraud
Improper practices
Copiah Bank; $0.25m; Bank fraud
Systems security
Unauthorised activity Lone Star National Bank; $0.6m; Embezzling
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Farmers and Merchants Bank; $0.05m; Embezzlement
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Multiple companies; $1.8m; Internal fraud
Merrill Lynch; $0.78m; Fraud
Employee relations
First National Bank; $0.26m; Internal ATM theft
ATM
Advisory activies
Southwest Securities; $0.65m; Improper short sale
Derivatives Brookstrees Securities Corp; $18m; Fraud
Multiple people
Aladdin Capital Management LLC; $1.6m; CDO misstatement
Discrinimation SEC; $0.6m; Employment issues
First Republic Securities Company; $0.87m; Lawsuit
Derivatives
Multiple people
American Home Mortgage Investment Corp; $38m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
Employee relations Morgan Stanley; $8.01m; Employment issues
Big banks involved
FINRA; $11.6m; Regulatory issues
Theft and fraud (External) Multiple banks; $0.09m; fraud
Multiple banks; $2.6m; fraud
Improper practices
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Multiple companies; $20m; Insider trading
Wells Fargo; $0.23m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Theft and fraud (External)
Several banks; $10m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Federal Reserve Banks; $0.98m; ID theft
Systems security
Multiple companies; $19m; fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
CME Group; $0.5m; Code theft
Systems security
Luis Hiram Rivas; $18m; fraud
Advisory activies
Paramount Partners; $10m; Fraud
Multiple people
KL Group; $78m; Hedge fund fraud
Improper practices
Coast Bank; $1.2m; Money laundering
Derivatives Stock; $0.25m; Hacking
Systems security
Credit Suisse; $540m; Price manipulation
Big banks involved
Multiple people JPMorgan; $722m; Unlawful pament scheme
Big banks involved
Pinehurst Bank; $2.2m; Fraud
Systems
Chelsea State Bank; $0.38m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
AXA Rosenberg; $242m; IT error
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Consumer Bankers' Association; $172m; Data breach
DA Davidson; $0.38m; Breach in security
Systems security
Certegy Check Services, Inc.; $0.98m; Data breach
Improper practices
Big banks involved
Multiple banks; $0.85m; Regulatory failure
Excecution, Vendors & suppliers
Deutsche Bank; $0.6m; System breach
Improper practices
BoA; $1.5m; IT issues
ATM
Capital One; $0.17m; Fraud
Systems security
Goldman Sachs; $22m; Systems failure
Figure G.7: US with Basel Characteristics Tree 2008-2014.
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T-Mobile; $14.5m; ID theft
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
SEB; $7.88m; Internal fraud
Discrinimation




HSBC; $0.3m; Internal fraud
Account management
TD Bank; $4.96m; Employment issues
Employee relations
Credit Suisse; $6.39m; Data failure
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
RBS; $12.4m; Lawsuit
Single person
Lloyds TSB; $3140; Robbery
Products flaws
HSBC; $0.17m; Internal fraud
Lloyds TSB; $0.01m; Robbery
Monitoring and reporting
Theft and fraud (Internal)
TD Bank; $11.43m; Control failure
Advisory activies
RBS; $8.9m; Money laundering
Credit Suisse; $2.4m; Employment issues
Theft and fraud (External)
Theft and fraud (External)
HSBC; $5.23m; Protection failure
Credit card






Nationwide Building Society; $0.17m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Theft and fraud (Internal)
BAWAG P.S.K.; $1.8b; External fraud
HASPA; $2087; Robbery
Multiple people
Theft and fraud (External)
Northern Bank; $0.1m; Robbery
Undisclosed; $0.05m; External fraud
Single person
Theft and fraud (External)
Hansabank; $13.24m; Cyber-attack
Single person
Bulgarian Postbank; $4138; Robbery; Robbery
ATM
Sparkasse Uecker-Randow; $0.13m; Robbery
ATM
Alpari; $0.23m; Regulatory issues
BNP Paribas; 4.91b; Tax evasion
Big banks involved
Single person, Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $0.04m; Robbery
UBS; $0.2m; Internal fraud
Disasters and other events, ATM
Unauthorised activity
Seymour Pierce; $0.25m; Internal fraud
Improper practices






Credit Europe Bank; $1.3m; Saving missing
Hypo Real Estate Bank; $4.49m; Employment issues









National-Bank AG; $0.16m; Robbery
Multiple people
Romanian Exchange Office; $0.05m; Robbery
Unauthorised activity, Derivatives
Independent Currency Exchange; $0.01m; Theft
Disasters and other events
Big banks involved
Cheshire Building Society; $80.8m; Mortgage fraud
Discrinimation
RBS; $0.14m; Bank fraud
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Barclays Bank; $0.75m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
ABN Amro; $7.37m; Computer hacking
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Systems security
Several banks; $700m; External fraud
ATM
BCR; $0.01m; ATM theft
Systems
Bradford & Bingley; $55.4m; Mortgage fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
BRD Group; $0.03m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
AltaiEnergoBank; $0.2m; Robbery
Credit card
Unnamed; $932; $ATM skimming
ATM
DSK Bank; $0.01m; Robbery
Systems security
Bartek and Patrycja; $0.01m; Crime
Advisory activies
Unnamed; $12.48m; Computer hacking
RBS; $8.9m; Computer hacking
Big banks involved
Improper practices
Clydesdale Bank; $0.12m; Internal fraud
Products flaws
Czech National Bank; $276.6m; Money laundering
Multiple people
Unnamed; $0.06m; ATM theft
Theft and fraud (External)




Piraeus Bank; $1m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)




Unicredit Tiriac Bank; $0.01m; ATM theft
Monitoring and reporting
Unnamed; $0.1m; ATM fraud
Single person
Stadtkasse der Stadt Z rich; $0.02m; Robbery





VR Bank; $1.65m; Internal fraud
Unnamed; $1.57b; Money laundering
Suitability, Disclosure fiduciary
Big banks involved
Lloyds TSB; $1.5m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
AIB; $81.82m; Property scam
Figure H.1: EU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2008-2010.
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Rosbank; $196m; Legal issues
Products flaws
Individual; $3.2b; Scam
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Habib Bank AG Zurich; $0.88m; Regulatory failure
Employee relations
Soiete Generale; $17.9m; Employment issues
Multiple people
Banca della Provincia di Macerata; $0.04m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (External)
Unnamed; $0.01m; ATM fraud
Derivatives
HBOS; $2.3m; Computer hacking
Theft and fraud (External)
Ulster Bank; $125.8m; Software issues
Big banks involved
Intesa SanPaolo; $0.16m; Robbery
Multiple people
Barclays Bank; $4.8m; Banking error
Theft and fraud (External)
Natixis; $0.06m; Discrimination
ATM
Raiffeisen Bank International; $3141; Regulatory breach
Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia dell'Aquila; $0.02m; Robbery
Multiple people
Credit Suisse; $1.3m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Disasters and other events
Ulster Bank; $132m; Technology breakdown
Big banks involved
Dexia; $0.2m; Computer hacking
Multiple people
Bank of Italy; $24m; Market rigging
Systems security
BTG Pactual; $0.46m; Insider trading
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Blue Index; $2.98m; Insider trading
Multiple people
VTB Bank; $0.44m; Computer hacking
Big banks involved
Unnamed; $31.3m; Card fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Banca Popolare di Fondi; $0.02m; Robbery
Exposure
Erste Bank; $0.05m; Regulatory issues
Account management, Big banks involved
Access Bank Plc; $5.4m; Fraud
Advisory activies
Swedbank; $4194; Forged document
Big banks involved




Vatican Bank; $33m; Money laundering
Multiple people
Raiffeisen Bank International; $6043; Robbery
Barclays Bank; $0.06m; External fraud
Big banks involved
Multiple people
Banca Carige; $0.01m; Robbery
Discrinimation
Bank of Moscow; $31.17m; Internal fraud
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Credito Emiliano; $0.01m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (External)
Improper practices
Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Vignole; $0.02m; Robbery
Account management
ATEbank; $0.08m; ATM heist
Advisory activies
Sparkasse Barnim; $2.3m; Robbery
Monitoring and reporting
Operation High Roller; $74.9m; Computer hacking
Unnamed; $47m; Card fraud
Derivatives
CEC Bank; $2734; Robbery
Exposure
Systems
Sberbank of Russia; $0.08m; Crime
Big banks involved





Imex bank; $0.02m; Robbery
ATM
Big banks involved
Several banks; $48.79m; External fraud
Barclays Bank; $1073; ATM theft
Systems security
Big banks involved
Coutts and Co; $13m; Money laundering
Unauthorised activity
Theft and fraud (External)
State Street Corporation; $4.1m; Transaction error
Systems security
Barclays Bank; $776m; Regulatory failure
Credit card
Multiple banks; $6.5b; Lawsuit
Multiple people




Multiple banks; $47m; Computer hacking
Derivatives
Ulster Bank; $2.5m; Regulatory breach
Natwest; $0.16m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
Employee relations
Topps Rogers Financial Management; $0.15m; Investment scheme
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Systems security
Theft and fraud (Internal)
UBS; $2.3b; Trading scandal
Single person
UBS; $21.6m; Internal fraud
Intesa SanPaolo; $7895; Robbery







AIB; $0.3m; ATM theft
Credit card
Improper practices




UBS; $2m; Internal fraud
Derivatives
Several banks; $119m; Misselling
Products flaws
Greenlight Capital; $0.55m; Insider trading
Improper practices
AIB; $114m; Software issue
Single person
Barclays Bank; $2m; Internal fraud
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary, Big banks involved
De Nederlandsche Bank; $1.6m; Internal fraud
Discrinimation
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Natwest; $2712; Robbery
HBOS; $20.66m; External fraud
Monitoring and reporting
Improper practices





Theft and fraud (External)
Raiffeisenbank Klosterneuburg; $0.02m; Robbery
Lloyds Banking Group; $3.89m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $3.39m; $Internal fraud
ATM
Figure H.2: EU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2011-2012.
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1 Stop Financial Services; $188m; Regulatory breach
Theft and fraud (Internal), Systems security








RBS; $0.23m; Internal fraud
Systems
RBS; $66.79m; Legal issues
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $2m; Fraud
Exposure, Multiple people





JPMorgan Chase & Co; $4.6m; Regulatory failure
Improper practices




RBS; $24m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
HBOS; $1.1m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
Sparkasse Salzburg Bank AG; $0.1m; Human error
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Theft and fraud (Internal)




BAWAG P.S.K.; $571m; Swap fraud
Big banks involved
Lloyds Banking Group; $384m; Market manipulation
Improper practices
Deutsche Bank; $1.28b; Lawsuit
Single person
Whiteaway Laidlaw Bank; $ 0.05m; Internal fraud
Raiffeisen Regionalbank; $0.13m; Robbery
Big banks involved
Ulster Bank; $0.02m; Crime
ATM
Systems
The Money Shop; $1.2m; System error
Improper practices
Sesame Bankhall Group; $9.3m; Regulatory issues
Unauthorised activity
HBOS; $0.2m; Internal fraud
Employee relations
Lehman Brothers; $308m; Employment issues
AIB; $2.6m; Legal issues
Big banks involved
Gruppo Battistolli; $12.9m; Robbery
Improper practices
Big banks involved
Multiple banks; $2.3b; Rate rigging
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Theft and fraud (External)
Santander; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Systems security
Santander; $0.02m; External fraud
Monitoring and reporting
Santander; $0.17m; Legal action
Improper practices
Barclays Bank; $43.9m; Regulatory failure
Single person
Goldman Sachs; $50m; Regulatory failure
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Deutsch banks; $7.8m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
Coutts bank; $182m; Misleading information
Multiple people
Unicredit Bulbank; $0.02m; Robbery
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Several banks; $0.33m; Robbery
Derivatives
Bank of Settlements and Savings; $51m; Money laundering
Multiple people
UniCredit; $0.44m; Regulatory fialure
Theft and fraud (External)
Volksbank; $5623.8; Software issues
Wonga;$4.4m; Regulatory failure
Theft and fraud (Internal)
G4S; $1.8m; Internal fraud
Credit card
The Co-operative Bank; $0.07m; Robbery
Single person




Disasters and other events
Ulster Bank; $53m; Wrong billing
Ulster Bank; $0.26m; ATM scam
Multiple people
Big banks involved
AIB; $0.67m; Regulatory beach
Disasters and other events




BCP; $0.83m; Market manipulation
Credit card
Barclays Bank; $470m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
Unnamed; $1.4m; Money laundering
Systems security
Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank; $2m; Crime
Improper practices
Julius Baer; $179m; Legal action
Larkhill & District Credit Union; $0.5m; Fraud
Products flaws
Nomura Holdings Inc.; $2.3b; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
ABN Amro; $0.04m; Regulatory breach
Exposure
Single person
SocGen; $6.7b; Unauthorized transactions
G4S; $1m; Robbery
Monitoring and reporting
Alpha Bank; $0.02m; Robbery
Discrinimation
Multiple people
Several banks; $61.8m; ATM fraud
Exposure
Allgemeine Sparkasse Ober?sterreich Bank AG; $0.27m; Crime
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary




Figure H.3: EU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2013-2014.
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Rosbank; $196m; Legal issues
Products flaws
SEB; $7.88m; Internal fraud
Discrinimation
Individual; $3.2b; Scam
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Multiple people
Independent Currency Exchange; $0.01m; Theft
Disasters and other events
Discrinimation
BFS Corporation; $29.8m; Fraud
Improper practices
Cheshire Building Society; $80.8m; Mortgage fraud
Big banks involved
Banca Carige; $0.01m; Robbery
Big banks involved
AIB; $114m; Software issue
Products flaws
Account management
Erste Bank; $0.05m; Regulatory issues
Exposure
HSBC; $0.3m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
Theft and fraud (Internal)
TD Bank; $11.43m; Control failure
Advisory activies
Nationwide Building Society; $0.17m; Robbery
Single person
Credit Suisse; $2.4m; Employment issues
Theft and fraud (External)
Rabobank; $11.87m; Computer hacking
Theft and fraud (External)
Credit Suisse; $1.3m; Internal fraud
ATM
HSBC; $5.23m; Protection failure
Credit card
Commerzbank; $150m; Money laundering
Single person
Several banks; $0.5m; Robbery
Intesa SanPaolo; $7895; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Improper practices
Unnamed; $1m; External fraud
Multiple people
Credit Suisse; $3737; Internal fraud
TD Bank; $4.96m; Employment issues
Employee relations
Lloyds TSB; $5.25m; Regulatory failure
Derivatives
Theft and fraud (External)
Bank of Ireland; $3.83m; ATM glitch
Lloyds TSB; $1.5m; Internal fraud
Derivatives
Single person
AIB; $1970; Bank theft
UBS; $0.1m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Monitoring and reporting
Financial Planning; $0.03m; Regulatory issues
Lloyds TSB; $0.01m; Robbery
Single person
Unicredit Tiriac Bank; $0.01m; ATM theft
Multiple people
Products flaws
Bank of Scotland; $5.66m; Regulatory issues
Lloyds TSB; $3140; Robbery
Single person
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Barclays Bank; $2m; Internal fraud
Single person
RBS; $0.14m; Bank fraud
Multiple people
Credit Suisse; $6.39m; Data failure
Improper practices
Systems




Hypo Real Estate Bank; $4.49m; Employment issues
Theft and fraud (External)
Credit Europe Bank; $1.3m; Saving missing




Clydesdale Bank; $0.05m; Fraud
ATM
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Natixis; $0.5m; Insider trading
Theft and fraud (External)
Record Bank; $0.03m; Robbery
Single person
Standard Bank; $150m; Lawsuit
Multiple people
Banca di Credito Cooperativo del Centro Calabria; $0.14m; Robbery
Big banks involved
Santander; $0.25m; Robbery
AIB; $0.3m; ATM theft
Credit card
Unauthorised activity
Romanian Exchange Office; $0.05m; Robbery
Multiple people, Derivatives
Seymour Pierce; $0.25m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
Photo-Me International plc; $0.74m; Regulatory failure
Theft and fraud (External)
Davy Stockbrokers; $0.07m; Regulatory issues
Single person
Banca Toscana; $9160m; Robbery
Undisclosed; $0.05m; External fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $3.39m; $Internal fraud
ATM
ATM
Raiffeisen-Regionalbank G?nserndorf; $0.15m; Crime
Disasters and other events
CID; $0.7m; Credit card scam
Big banks involved
Bank of Italy; $24m; Market rigging
UBS; $0.2m; Internal fraud
Single person
Multiple people
DSK Bank; $0.01m; Robbery
Systems security
Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia dell'Aquila; $0.02m; Robbery
National Bank of Greece; $0.14m; Robbery
Big banks involved
Multiple people





Banca della Provincia di Macerata; $0.04m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Improper practices
Seymour Pierce; $0.6m; Regulatory issues
Clydesdale Bank; $0.12m; Internal fraud
Products flaws
Derivatives
VR Bank; $1.65m; Internal fraud
Unnamed; $1.57b; Money laundering
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Single person
Berliner Sparkasse; $3.9; Robbery
Loomis; $17.22m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)










Several banks; $700m; External fraud
Barclays Bank; $1073; ATM theft
Systems
ATM
BCR; $0.01m; ATM theft
Systems
Bradford & Bingley; $55.4m; Mortgage fraud
Advisory activies
Unnamed; $12.48m; Computer hacking
RBS; $8.9m; Computer hacking
Big banks involved
Improper practices
Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Vignole; $0.02m; Robbery
Account management
TNT Express Services; $0.2m; Crime
Unnamed; $0.06m; ATM theft
Theft and fraud (External)
BCR; $1073; Robbery
Derivatives
Piraeus Bank; $1m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Bucharest Currency Exchange Office; $1528; Robbery
Monitoring and reporting
CEC Bank; $2734; Robbery
Exposure
Employee relations
Vatican Bank; $33m; Money laundering
Single person
National-Bank AG; $0.16m; Robbery
Bancpost; $5603; Robbery
Systems, Derivatives
Figure H.4: EU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2008-2011.
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Access Bank Plc; $5.4m; Fraud
Exposure
Discrinimation
Banca Carige; $0.01m; Robbery
Multiple people
De Nederlandsche Bank; $1.6m; Internal fraud
Single person
SEB; $7.88m; Internal fraud
Systems




Several banks; $48.79m; External fraud
Big banks involved
Nomura; $85.54m; Fraud
Imex bank; $0.02m; Robbery
ATM
Theft and fraud (External)




Credito Emiliano; $0.01m; Robbery




Banca della Provincia di Macerata; $0.04m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Big banks involved
Lloyds Banking Group; $3.89m; Internal fraud
Single person
Barclays Bank; $776m; Regulatory failure
Credit card
Multiple banks; $6.5b; Lawsuit
Multiple people
UniCredit; $0.2m; Robbery
Intesa SanPaolo; $0.16m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
ATM
Raiffeisen Bank International; $3141; Regulatory breach
Credit Suisse; $1.3m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $3.39m; $Internal fraud
Single person
Multiple people
DSK Bank; $0.01m; Robbery
Systems security
Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia dell'Aquila; $0.02m; Robbery
Big banks involved
Dexia; $0.2m; Computer hacking
Disasters and other events
Bank of Ireland; $91m; External fraud
Disasters and other events
Ulster Bank; $132m; Technology breakdown
Big banks involved
Bank of Italy; $24m; Market rigging
UBS; $0.2m; Internal fraud
Single person
Unauthorised activity
Coutts and Co; $13m; Money laundering
Big banks involved
Romanian Exchange Office; $0.05m; Robbery
Multiple people, Derivatives
Seymour Pierce; $0.25m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
Photo-Me International plc; $0.74m; Regulatory failure
Systems security
Blue Index; $2.98m; Insider trading
Barclays Bank; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Big banks involved
Theft and fraud (External)
State Street Corporation; $4.1m; Transaction error
Big banks involved
Unnamed; $31.3m; Card fraud
Multiple people
Hypo Real Estate Bank; $4.49m; Employment issues
Multiple people
Banca Popolare di Fondi; $0.02m; Robbery
Big banks involved
VTB Bank; $0.44m; Computer hacking
Barclays Bank; $1073; ATM theft
Systems
ATM
Bradford & Bingley; $55.4m; Mortgage fraud




Sberbank of Russia; $0.08m; Crime
UniCredit; $1m; Robbery
Single person, ATM
Theft and fraud (Internal)
RBS; $37.7m; Lawsuit
Improper practices
UBS; $2.3b; Trading scandal
TD Bank; $11.43m; Control failure
Advisory activies
Advisory activies
Swedbank; $4194; Forged document
Big banks involved




ATEbank; $0.08m; ATM heist
Improper practices
RBS; $8.9m; Computer hacking
Big banks involved
Unnamed; $12.48m; Computer hacking
Improper practices
Ulster Bank; $2.5m; Regulatory breach
Clydesdale Bank; $0.12m; Internal fraud
Products flaws
Multiple people
Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Vignole; $0.02m; Robbery
Account management
Operation High Roller; $74.9m; Computer hacking
Unnamed; $47m; Card fraud
Derivatives
BFS Corporation; $29.8m; Fraud
Discrinimation
Piraeus Bank; $1m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
CEC Bank; $2734; Robbery
Exposure
Derivatives
Multiple banks; $47m; Computer hacking
Unnamed; $1.57b; Money laundering
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Monitoring and reporting
Sparkasse Barnim; $2.3m; Robbery
Multiple people
Natwest; $0.16m; Regulatory failure
Products flaws
AIB; $114m; Software issue
Big banks involved
Rosbank; $196m; Legal issues
Employee relations
Topps Rogers Financial Management; $0.15m; Investment scheme
Improper practices
Habib Bank AG Zurich; $0.88m; Regulatory failure
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Vatican Bank; $33m; Money laundering
Multiple people
Barclays Bank; $0.06m; External fraud
Big banks involved
Raiffeisen Bank International; $6043; Robbery
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Individual; $3.2b; Scam
BTG Pactual; $0.46m; Insider trading
Systems security
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $2m; Internal fraud
Single person
Credit Suisse; $6.39m; Data failure
Improper practices
Multiple people
Bank of Moscow; $31.17m; Internal fraud








Several banks; $119m; Misselling
Bank of Ireland; $3.83m; ATM glitch
Theft and fraud (External)
Products flaws
Greenlight Capital; $0.55m; Insider trading
Lloyds TSB; $3140; Robbery
Single person
Derivatives
Lloyds TSB; $1.5m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
UBS; $2m; Internal fraud
Monitoring and reporting
Financial Planning; $0.03m; Regulatory issues
Lloyds TSB; $0.01m; Robbery
Single person




Theft and fraud (Internal)
TD Bank; $4.96m; Employment issues
Account management
Erste Bank; $0.05m; Regulatory issues
Exposure
HSBC; $0.3m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
Multiple people
Independent Currency Exchange; $0.01m; Theft
Disasters and other events
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Unnamed; $0.01m; ATM fraud
Derivatives
HBOS; $2.3m; Computer hacking
Single person
Employee relations





Clydesdale Bank; $0.05m; Fraud
ATM
Improper practices
Danish Police; $0.5m; Robbery
Derivatives
Natwest; $1452; Fraud
Multiple people, Big banks involved
Cheshire Building Society; $80.8m; Mortgage fraud
Discrinimation
Theft and fraud (Internal)
AIB; $0.3m; ATM theft
Credit card
Santander; $0.25m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Soiete Generale; $17.9m; Employment issues
Theft and fraud (External)
Ulster Bank; $125.8m; Software issues
Barclays Bank; $4.8m; Banking error
Big banks involved









UBS; $21.6m; Internal fraud
UBS; $0.1m; Robbery
Improper practices
Intesa SanPaolo; $7895; Robbery
Theft and fraud (External)
Figure H.5: EU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2008-2012.
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Rosbank; $196m; Legal issues
Products flaws
Access Bank Plc; $5.4m; Fraud
Exposure
Discrinimation
De Nederlandsche Bank; $1.6m; Internal fraud
Single person
Frankfurter Volksbank; $294.5m; Human error
Multiple people
Banca Carige; $0.01m; Robbery
Cheshire Building Society; $80.8m; Mortgage fraud
Big banks involved
BFS Corporation; $29.8m; Fraud
Improper practices
Systems
HBOS; $0.2m; Internal fraud
Multiple people
Imex bank; $0.02m; Robbery
ATM
Nomura; $85.54m; Fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Multiple banks; $43.3m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
Unnamed; $0.06m; ATM theft
Improper practices
Unnamed; $2.6m; Computer hacking
Ulster Bank; $0.26m; ATM scam
ATM
ATM
Ulster Bank; $53m; Wrong billing
Ulster Bank; $132m; Technology breakdown
Disasters and other events
Big banks involved
AIB; $0.67m; Regulatory beach
Disasters and other events
RBS; $8.5m; Regulatory failure
UBS; $0.2m; Internal fraud
Single person
Multiple people
Dexia; $0.2m; Computer hacking
Disasters and other events




G4S; $1.8m; Internal fraud
Barclays Bank; $776m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Ulster Bank; $125.8m; Software issues
Banca della Provincia di Macerata; $0.04m; Robbery
Multiple people
Big banks involved
Intesa SanPaolo; $0.16m; Robbery
Multiple people
Barclays Bank; $4.8m; Banking error
Single person
The Co-operative Bank; $0.07m; Robbery
Undisclosed; $0.05m; External fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $3.39m; $Internal fraud
ATM
Big banks involved
Lloyds Banking Group; $3.89m; Internal fraud
Intesa SanPaolo; $7895; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Multiple people
Independent Currency Exchange; $0.01m; Theft
Disasters and other events
Romanian Exchange Office; $0.05m; Robbery
Unauthorised activity, Derivatives
Systems security
BTG Pactual; $0.46m; Insider trading
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Blue Index; $2.98m; Insider trading
Hypo Real Estate Bank; $4.49m; Employment issues
Theft and fraud (External)
Single person
Openbank; $0.06m; Robbery
Clydesdale Bank; $0.05m; Fraud
ATM
Multiple people
Banca Popolare di Fondi; $0.02m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (External)
DSK Bank; $0.01m; Robbery
ATM
Unnamed; $1.4m; Money laundering
Big banks involved
RBS; $66.79m; Legal issues
ATM
BCR; $0.01m; ATM theft
Systems
Bradford & Bingley; $55.4m; Mortgage fraud
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Santander; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (External)
Employee relations
Habib Bank AG Zurich; $0.88m; Regulatory failure
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Raiffeisen Bank International; $6043; Robbery
Multiple people
Gruppo Battistolli; $12.9m; Robbery
Improper practices




National-Bank AG; $0.16m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Aberdeen Asset Management plc; $11.2m; Poor controls
Big banks involved
Deutsche Bank; $835m; Legal issues
Multiple people
AIB; $0.3m; ATM theft
Credit card
Mizuho Financial Group; $0.15m; Insider trading
Multiple people
Unnamed; $0.01m; ATM fraud
Derivatives
Unnamed; $0.1m; External fraud
Single person
HBOS; $20.66m; External fraud
Monitoring and reporting
Raiffeisen Regionalbank; $0.13m; Robbery
Big banks involved
Ulster Bank; $0.26m; ATM theft
Ulster Bank; $0.02m; Crime
ATM
Improper practices
Nomura Holdings Inc.; $2.3b; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
FBME Bank; $531m; Regulatory breach
Theft and fraud (External)
Credit Union Amber; $3487; Regulatory failure
Clydesdale Bank; $0.12m; Internal fraud
Products flaws
Single person
Monte dei Paschi di Siena; $6675; Robbery





Theft and fraud (Internal)
Danish Police; $0.5m; Robbery
Derivatives
Exposure
ABN Amro; $0.04m; Regulatory breach
Several banks; $61.8m; ATM fraud
Multiple people
Derivatives
Multiple banks; $47m; Computer hacking
First Trust Bank; $3.1m; Employment issues
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Advisory activies
ATEbank; $0.08m; ATM heist
Multiple people
HBOS; $1.1m; Internal fraud
Multiple people
Piraeus Bank; $1m; Internal fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
HBOS; $0.4m; Robbery
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Unnamed; $12m; External fraud
Unnamed; $47m; Card fraud
Derivatives




Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Vignole; $0.02m; Robbery
Account management
Big banks involved
AIB; $114m; Software issue
Products flaws
Improper practices
Citigroup; $0.76m; Reporting breach
Theft and fraud (Internal)
UBS; $0.1m; Robbery
Single person




Sberbank of Russia; Robbery
Unicredit Tiriac Bank; $0.01m; ATM theft
Monitoring and reporting
Derivatives
Bank of Settlements and Savings; $51m; Money laundering
Multiple people
Lloyds Banking Group; $1.6m; Employment issues
Monitoring and reporting
Lloyds TSB; $0.01m; Robbery
Single person
Yorkshire Bank; $91.6m; Poor controls
Systems
Financial Planning; $0.03m; Regulatory issues
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Credit Suisse; $6.39m; Data failure
Unicredit Bulbank; $0.02m; Robbery
Multiple people
Products flaws
Lloyds TSB; $3140; Robbery
Single person
Greenlight Capital; $0.55m; Insider trading
Theft and fraud (External)
Lloyds TSB; $1.5m; Internal fraud
Derivatives
Bank of Ireland; $3.83m; ATM glitch
Theft and fraud (External)
Barclays Bank; $470m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
RBS; $250m; Regulatory issues
Advisory activies
Swedbank; $4194; Forged document
TD Bank; $11.43m; Control failure
Theft and fraud (Internal)
RBS; $8.9m; Computer hacking
Multiple people
Systems




Barclays Bank; $1073; ATM theft
Systems security
Several banks; $48.79m; External fraud
Account management
HSBC; $0.3m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
Erste Bank; $0.05m; Regulatory issues
Exposure
Employee relations
TD Bank; $4.96m; Employment issues
Improper practices
AIB; $2.6m; Legal issues
Barclays Bank; $0.06m; External fraud
Multiple people
Unauthorised activity
Coutts and Co; $13m; Money laundering
Big banks involved
Sesame Bankhall Group; $9.3m; Regulatory issues
Systems
Seymour Pierce; $0.25m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
Photo-Me International plc; $0.74m; Regulatory failure
Advisory activies
Croatian Postal Bank; $530m; Bank error
G4S; $0.04m; Crime
Single person
Sparkasse Salzburg Bank AG; $0.1m; Human error
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Unnamed; $12.48m; Computer hacking
Multiple people
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary




RBS; $0.14m; Bank fraud
Multiple people
Multiple banks; $2.3b; Rate rigging
Barclays Bank; $2m; Internal fraud
Single person
Figure H.6: EU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2008-2013.
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0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Exposure
Erste Bank; $0.05m; Regulatory issues
Account management, Big banks involved
Access Bank Plc; $5.4m; Fraud
ABN Amro; $0.04m; Regulatory breach
Improper practices
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $2m; Fraud
Exposure, Multiple people
Barclays Bank; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Systems security
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Credit Suisse; $6.39m; Data failure
Improper practices
Multiple banks; $2.3b; Rate rigging
Barclays Bank; $2m; Internal fraud
Single person
Advisory activies
TD Bank; $11.43m; Control failure
Theft and fraud (Internal)
RBS; $24m; Regulatory failure
Theft and fraud (External)
Santander; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Systems security
Santander; $0.02m; External fraud
Monitoring and reporting
Santander; $0.17m; Legal action
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Individual; $3.2b; Scam
BTG Pactual; $0.46m; Insider trading
Systems security
Sparkasse Salzburg Bank AG; $0.1m; Human error
Advisory activies
Multiple people
RBS; $0.14m; Bank fraud
Big banks involved
Bank of Moscow; $31.17m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
HBOS; $0.4m; Robbery
Unicredit Bulbank; $0.02m; Robbery
Big banks involved
Systems
HBOS; $0.2m; Internal fraud
Multiple people




JPMorgan Chase & Co; $4.6m; Regulatory failure
Improper practices




Several banks; $48.79m; External fraud
Systems security
BCR; $0.01m; ATM theft
ATM






Frankfurter Volksbank; $294.5m; Human error
Single person
De Nederlandsche Bank; $1.6m; Internal fraud
Alpha Bank; $0.02m; Robbery
Improper practices
Theft and fraud (Internal)
1 Stop Financial Services; $188m; Regulatory breach
Systems security




Piraeus Bank; $1m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
BAWAG P.S.K.; $571m; Swap fraud
Unnamed; $0.01m; ATM fraud
Derivatives
Single person
Whiteaway Laidlaw Bank; $ 0.05m; Internal fraud
HBOS; $20.66m; External fraud
Monitoring and reporting









Bank of Montrel; $0.88m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
AIB; $0.3m; ATM theft
Credit card
Deutsche Bank; $1.28b; Lawsuit
Improper practices
Julius Baer; $179m; Legal action
Nomura Holdings Inc.; $2.3b; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
FBME Bank; $531m; Regulatory breach
Theft and fraud (External)
Gruppo Battistolli; $12.9m; Robbery
Employee relations
Multiple people
Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Vignole; $0.02m; Robbery
Account management
Sparkasse Barnim; $2.3m; Robbery
Monitoring and reporting
Allgemeine Sparkasse Ober?sterreich Bank AG; $0.27m; Crime
Several banks; $61.8m; ATM fraud
Exposure
Advisory activies
HBOS; $1.1m; Internal fraud





The Money Shop; $1.2m; System error
Derivatives
Danish Police; $0.5m; Robbery
Single person
First Trust Bank; $3.1m; Employment issues
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Unnamed; $47m; Card fraud
Multiple people
Multiple banks; $47m; Computer hacking
Single person




Greenlight Capital; $0.55m; Insider trading
Big banks involved
Larkhill & District Credit Union; $0.5m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Deutsch banks; $7.8m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
HSBC; $0.3m; Internal fraud
Account management
UniCredit; $0.44m; Regulatory fialure
Derivatives
Coutts bank; $182m; Misleading information
Single person
Barclays Bank; $43.9m; Regulatory failure
Lloyds TSB; $3140; Robbery
Products flaws
Lloyds TSB; $0.01m; Robbery
Monitoring and reporting
Multiple people
Unicredit Tiriac Bank; $0.01m; ATM theft
Monitoring and reporting
Lloyds Banking Group; $384m; Market manipulation
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Bank of Settlements and Savings; $51m; Money laundering
Derivatives
Several banks; $0.33m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Goldman Sachs; $50m; Regulatory failure
RBS; $317m; Misselling
Employee relations
Theft and fraud (External)
Bank of Ireland; $3.83m; ATM glitch
Lloyds TSB; $1.5m; Internal fraud
Derivatives
Theft and fraud (External)
Volksbank; $5623.8; Software issues
Hypo Real Estate Bank; $4.49m; Employment issues
Systems security
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Wonga;$4.4m; Regulatory failure
Banca della Provincia di Macerata; $0.04m; Robbery
Multiple people
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $4.8m; Banking error
Intesa SanPaolo; $0.16m; Robbery
Multiple people
Single person
The Co-operative Bank; $0.07m; Robbery
Undisclosed; $0.05m; External fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $3.39m; $Internal fraud
ATM
Big banks involved
Lloyds Banking Group; $3.89m; Internal fraud
Intesa SanPaolo; $7895; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Multiple people
Unnamed; $0.06m; ATM theft
Improper practices
Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank; $2m; Crime
Barclays Bank; $470m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved




Disasters and other events
Ulster Bank; $53m; Wrong billing
Multiple people
Ulster Bank; $0.26m; ATM scam
DSK Bank; $0.01m; Robbery
Systems security
Big banks involved
AIB; $0.67m; Regulatory beach
Disasters and other events
Credit Suisse; $6m; Regulatory failure




Disasters and other events
Bank of Ireland; $91m; External fraud
Credit card
G4S; $1.8m; Internal fraud
Barclays Bank; $776m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
Systems security
Blue Index; $2.98m; Insider trading
Single person





Unnamed; $1.4m; Money laundering
Theft and fraud (External)
Big banks involved
RBS; $66.79m; Legal issues
Bradford & Bingley; $55.4m; Mortgage fraud
ATM
Employee relations




National-Bank AG; $0.16m; Robbery
Big banks involved
AIB; $2.6m; Legal issues





Croatian Postal Bank; $530m; Bank error
Products flaws
Rosbank; $196m; Legal issues
AIB; $114m; Software issue
Big banks involved
Multiple people
Independent Currency Exchange; $0.01m; Theft
Disasters and other events
Discrinimation
Banca Carige; $0.01m; Robbery
Cheshire Building Society; $80.8m; Mortgage fraud
Big banks involved
BFS Corporation; $29.8m; Fraud
Improper practices
Advisory activies
RBS; $8.9m; Computer hacking
Big banks involved
Unnamed; $12.48m; Computer hacking
Employee relations
Barclays Bank; $0.06m; External fraud
Big banks involved
Raiffeisen Bank International; $6043; Robbery
Unauthorised activity
Multiple banks; $36b; Lawsuit
Big banks involved
Sesame Bankhall Group; $9.3m; Regulatory issues
Systems
Romanian Exchange Office; $0.05m; Robbery
Multiple people, Derivatives
Seymour Pierce; $0.25m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
Photo-Me International plc; $0.74m; Regulatory failure
Figure H.7: EU with Basel Characteristics Tree 2008-2014.
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Internal fraud
Merrill Lynch; $400m; Trading loss
Regulatory issues
Individual; $170m; International transaction
Poor controls
Regions Bank; $200m; Mortgage securities fraud
Derivatives
K1 Group; $311m; Hedge fund fraud
Money laundering
Complex transaction Deutsche Bank; $550m; Tax traud
Complex products
UBS; $160.2m; Bond scheme
Derivatives
Universal Brokerage Services; $194m; Money laundering
Money laundering
Credit Suisse; $1.1b; Fraud
Misleading information
FBI; $140m; Penny stock fraud
International transaction
MF Globa; $141m; Rogue trades
Poor controls
Credit Suisse; $540m; Price manipulation
Complex transaction
Fire Finance; $200m; Fraud
Computer hacking Unnamed; $850m; Cyber gang
International transaction
Carder Profit; $205m; Hacking
Crime
Barclays Bank; $298m; US sactions
UBS; $100m; legal action
Internal fraud
Unnamed; $221m; ATM heist
International transaction
JPMorgan; $384m; Legal issues
External fraud
Misleading information
JPMorgan; $549m; Misleading information
Manual process
Regulatory issues
Fannie Mae; $440b; Misleading investor
Complex products Brookstreet Securities Corp; $300m; Misleading information
Bank cross selling
Morgan Stanley; $275m; Misleading investors
Derivatives
BoA; $16.7b; Legal action
Bank cross selling
Legal issue Multiple institutions; $457m; High credit rating
Credit Suisse; $296m; Misleading information
Insurance
Regulatory issues Deutsche Bank; $1.1b; Derivatives
Complex products
JPMorgan; $228m; Bid rigging
Legal issue
BoA; $150m; Fraud
Arrowhead Capital Management; $100m; fraud
External fraud
Poor controls Wilmington Trust Bank; $148m; fraud
Money laundering
Countrywide; $624m; Legal issues
Poor controls
Goldman Sachs; $118.44m; Fraud
Internal fraud
Capital One; $210m; Deceptive marketing
Manual process
Goldman Sachs; $2.15b; Poor controls
Misleading information
JPMorgan; $1.1b; Subprime CDO
Derivatives, Complex products
Bank of New York Mellon; $1b; Administrative error
Internal fraud Omni National Bank; $2.89m; Fraud
Bank of the Commonwealth; $393.49m; Fraud
Manual process
Regulatory issues
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ; $250m; Illegal transfer
International transaction
MoneyGram International; $100m; Wire fraud
Legal issue BoA; $137.3m; Regulatory failure
Complex transaction
Goldman Sachs; $100m; Lawsuit
Derivatives Yorkville Advisors LLC; $280m; Fraud
Wells Fargo; $1.4b; Mismarked investments
Legal issue
Legal issue
Morgan Stanley; $102m; Improper subprime lending
Multiple banks; $700m; Legal action
Bank cross selling
Derivatives
JPMorgan; $100m; Distort price





Wachovia; $160m; Money laundering
Money laundering
IndyMac; $168.1m; Negliently lending
MF Global; $700m; Regulatory breach
Complex transaction
Software issue Several companies; $300m; Data breach
AXA Rosenberg; $242m; IT error
Legal issue, Manual process
Complex transaction
BoA; $2.8b; Legal issues
Legal issue, Misleading information, Complex products
Wells Fargo; $100m; Improper bid
Legal issue
Pierce Commercial Bank; $495m; Mortgage fraud
External fraud, Complex products






Money laundering SunFirst Bank; $200m; Money laundering
Standard Chartered Bank; $300m; Money laundering
Regulatory issues
Legal issue
HSBC; $1.92b; Money laundering
Money laundering
BoA; $1.74b; Legal issues
Complex transaction
Bank of New York Mellon; $114.28m; Lawsuit
Internal fraud Absolute Capital Management Holdings Ltd.; $200m; Stock manipulation
Allied Home Mortgage Corp.; $150m; Fraud
Insurance
International transaction Ally Financial; $2.1b; Lawsuit
Derivatives
Several banks; $303m; Tax issue
External fraud Bank of Montreal; $853m; Commodities trading scandal
Allied Home Mortgage Corp.; $834m; Lending fraud
Insurance






MortgageIT; $1b; Fraud lawsuit
Derivatives UBS; $500m; Lawsuit
Goldman Sachs; $1b; Legal action
Overcharging




Taylor Bean & Whitaker; $1.9b; fraud
Unnamed; $160m; fraud
Complex transaction
Jade Capital; $100m; Loan fraud
Money laundering
Regulatory issues
KPMG; $25b; Inconsistent regulation
JPMorgan Chase & Co; $13b; Regulatory breach
Derivatives
Bank of New York Mellon; $931.6m; Fruad
Overcharging
Complex transaction ConvergEx Group; $150.8m; Fraud
Offshore fund
Multiple companies; $4b; Regulatory issues
International transaction Credit Suisse; $3b; Tax evasion
Offshore fund
Wegelin & Co. Privatbankiers; $1.2b; Tax evasion
Complex products BoA; $1.27b; Regulatory failure
Several banks; $4.5b; Lawsuit
Legal issue
Legal issue JPMorgan; $722m; Unlawful pament scheme
UBS; $780m; Regulatory failure
Crime
Figure I.1: US Extreme Operational risk events, 2008-2014.
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Exposure
Erste Bank; $0.05m; Regulatory issues
Account management, Big banks involved
Access Bank Plc; $5.4m; Fraud
ABN Amro; $0.04m; Regulatory breach
Improper practices
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $2m; Fraud
Exposure, Multiple people
Barclays Bank; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Systems security
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Credit Suisse; $6.39m; Data failure
Improper practices
Multiple banks; $2.3b; Rate rigging
Barclays Bank; $2m; Internal fraud
Single person
Advisory activies
TD Bank; $11.43m; Control failure
Theft and fraud (Internal)
RBS; $24m; Regulatory failure
Theft and fraud (External)
Santander; $0.07m; Internal fraud
Systems security
Santander; $0.02m; External fraud
Monitoring and reporting
Santander; $0.17m; Legal action
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Individual; $3.2b; Scam
BTG Pactual; $0.46m; Insider trading
Systems security
Sparkasse Salzburg Bank AG; $0.1m; Human error
Advisory activies
Multiple people
RBS; $0.14m; Bank fraud
Big banks involved
Bank of Moscow; $31.17m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
HBOS; $0.4m; Robbery
Unicredit Bulbank; $0.02m; Robbery
Big banks involved
Systems
HBOS; $0.2m; Internal fraud
Multiple people




JPMorgan Chase & Co; $4.6m; Regulatory failure
Improper practices




Several banks; $48.79m; External fraud
Systems security
BCR; $0.01m; ATM theft
ATM






Frankfurter Volksbank; $294.5m; Human error
Single person
De Nederlandsche Bank; $1.6m; Internal fraud
Alpha Bank; $0.02m; Robbery
Improper practices
Theft and fraud (Internal)
1 Stop Financial Services; $188m; Regulatory breach
Systems security




Piraeus Bank; $1m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
BAWAG P.S.K.; $571m; Swap fraud
Unnamed; $0.01m; ATM fraud
Derivatives
Single person
Whiteaway Laidlaw Bank; $ 0.05m; Internal fraud
HBOS; $20.66m; External fraud
Monitoring and reporting









Bank of Montrel; $0.88m; Regulatory failure
Multiple people
AIB; $0.3m; ATM theft
Credit card
Deutsche Bank; $1.28b; Lawsuit
Improper practices
Julius Baer; $179m; Legal action
Nomura Holdings Inc.; $2.3b; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
FBME Bank; $531m; Regulatory breach
Theft and fraud (External)
Gruppo Battistolli; $12.9m; Robbery
Employee relations
Multiple people
Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Vignole; $0.02m; Robbery
Account management
Sparkasse Barnim; $2.3m; Robbery
Monitoring and reporting
Allgemeine Sparkasse Ober?sterreich Bank AG; $0.27m; Crime
Several banks; $61.8m; ATM fraud
Exposure
Advisory activies
HBOS; $1.1m; Internal fraud





The Money Shop; $1.2m; System error
Derivatives
Danish Police; $0.5m; Robbery
Single person
First Trust Bank; $3.1m; Employment issues
Suitability, Disclosure & fiduciary
Unnamed; $47m; Card fraud
Multiple people
Multiple banks; $47m; Computer hacking
Single person




Greenlight Capital; $0.55m; Insider trading
Big banks involved
Larkhill & District Credit Union; $0.5m; Fraud
Big banks involved
Deutsch banks; $7.8m; Regulatory failure
Monitoring and reporting
HSBC; $0.3m; Internal fraud
Account management
UniCredit; $0.44m; Regulatory fialure
Derivatives
Coutts bank; $182m; Misleading information
Single person
Barclays Bank; $43.9m; Regulatory failure
Lloyds TSB; $3140; Robbery
Products flaws
Lloyds TSB; $0.01m; Robbery
Monitoring and reporting
Multiple people
Unicredit Tiriac Bank; $0.01m; ATM theft
Monitoring and reporting
Lloyds Banking Group; $384m; Market manipulation
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Bank of Settlements and Savings; $51m; Money laundering
Derivatives
Several banks; $0.33m; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Goldman Sachs; $50m; Regulatory failure
RBS; $317m; Misselling
Employee relations
Theft and fraud (External)
Bank of Ireland; $3.83m; ATM glitch
Lloyds TSB; $1.5m; Internal fraud
Derivatives
Theft and fraud (External)
Volksbank; $5623.8; Software issues
Hypo Real Estate Bank; $4.49m; Employment issues
Systems security
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Wonga;$4.4m; Regulatory failure
Banca della Provincia di Macerata; $0.04m; Robbery
Multiple people
Big banks involved
Barclays Bank; $4.8m; Banking error
Intesa SanPaolo; $0.16m; Robbery
Multiple people
Single person
The Co-operative Bank; $0.07m; Robbery
Undisclosed; $0.05m; External fraud
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Hypo Group Alpe-Adria; $3.39m; $Internal fraud
ATM
Big banks involved
Lloyds Banking Group; $3.89m; Internal fraud
Intesa SanPaolo; $7895; Robbery
Theft and fraud (Internal)
Multiple people
Unnamed; $0.06m; ATM theft
Improper practices
Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank; $2m; Crime
Barclays Bank; $470m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved




Disasters and other events
Ulster Bank; $53m; Wrong billing
Multiple people
Ulster Bank; $0.26m; ATM scam
DSK Bank; $0.01m; Robbery
Systems security
Big banks involved
AIB; $0.67m; Regulatory beach
Disasters and other events
Credit Suisse; $6m; Regulatory failure




Disasters and other events
Bank of Ireland; $91m; External fraud
Credit card
G4S; $1.8m; Internal fraud
Barclays Bank; $776m; Regulatory failure
Big banks involved
Systems security
Blue Index; $2.98m; Insider trading
Single person





Unnamed; $1.4m; Money laundering
Theft and fraud (External)
Big banks involved
RBS; $66.79m; Legal issues
Bradford & Bingley; $55.4m; Mortgage fraud
ATM
Employee relations




National-Bank AG; $0.16m; Robbery
Big banks involved
AIB; $2.6m; Legal issues





Croatian Postal Bank; $530m; Bank error
Products flaws
Rosbank; $196m; Legal issues
AIB; $114m; Software issue
Big banks involved
Multiple people
Independent Currency Exchange; $0.01m; Theft
Disasters and other events
Discrinimation
Banca Carige; $0.01m; Robbery
Cheshire Building Society; $80.8m; Mortgage fraud
Big banks involved
BFS Corporation; $29.8m; Fraud
Improper practices
Advisory activies
RBS; $8.9m; Computer hacking
Big banks involved
Unnamed; $12.48m; Computer hacking
Employee relations
Barclays Bank; $0.06m; External fraud
Big banks involved
Raiffeisen Bank International; $6043; Robbery
Unauthorised activity
Multiple banks; $36b; Lawsuit
Big banks involved
Sesame Bankhall Group; $9.3m; Regulatory issues
Systems
Romanian Exchange Office; $0.05m; Robbery
Multiple people, Derivatives
Seymour Pierce; $0.25m; Internal fraud
Improper practices
Photo-Me International plc; $0.74m; Regulatory failure
Figure I.2: EU Extreme Operational risk events, 2008-2014.
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Figure J.1: US Connections.
Figure J.2: EU Connections.
